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The identification of the factors that explain
firm survival in an economy is an issue that has
drawn economists’ attention for many decades.
The relevant studies, in their majority, begin-
ning with Altman (1968), focus on the estima-
tion of the probability of a firm’s financial dis-
tress or bankruptcy by applying “bankruptcy
prediction models” that use financial data
taken from the published financial statements
of a sample of firms.
In the more recent literature alternative mod-
els, called “survival models”, have been used,
which, despite their theoretical similarity to
“bankruptcy prediction models” (in that they,
too, require the estimation of a hazard func-
tion), tend to differ in terms of the sample and
the variables they use. In typical bankruptcy
prediction models, the fundamentals of two
samples of firms, one that includes firms which
have gone into bankruptcy and another that
includes firms which have not, are examined
and non-financial factors that may be con-
nected with the non-survival of a firm are left
out. In reality, a firm may not survive in a mar-
ket even if its fundamentals do not foreshadow
its bankruptcy.
In general, a firm may not survive on account
of one of the following:1 (i) negative reasons
(e.g. bankruptcy as a result of its inability to
meet its obligations permanently), (ii) the
intentional dissolution of the firm in its legal
form, not necessarily because the firm is not
profitable,2 and (iii) an acquisition or merger,
which may not be the result of the firm’s bad
performance but occurs for other reasons, e.g.
efforts to achieve economies of scale, the
expansion into new markets or the creation of
synergies.3
Moreover, bankruptcy prediction models are
based exclusively on financial statement data,
whose quality may generally be affected by
accounting practices (“creative accounting”4),
and mainly use financial indicators that are
correlated with one another. By contrast, sur-
vival models mainly use qualitative (non-finan-
cial) variables. Finally, bankruptcy prediction
models are based on the empirical observation
that financial indicators worsen as the bank-
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1 1 For a detailed analysis see, indicatively, Hensler et al. (1997) and
Macey et al. (2005).
2 2 For example, intentional dissolution may occur because the owner
sells the firm’s assets in order to engage in another activity or
because of age- or health-related retirement.
3 3 Without ruling out the possibility of mergers and acquisitions stem-
ming from a market for corporate control. In an economic system
where shares with voting rights are negotiated freely in stock mar-
kets, the concept of the market for corporate control refers to the
process in which the control and ownership of a firm are transferred
from a group of investors and managers to another. In this way, the
management of firms is monitored for its efficiency, in the sense
that instances of management that do not conform with the rules
of sound corporate governance become an acquisition target. In
this case, the acquisition is seen as a means of “value conservation”.
4 4 The way that creative accounting impacts on the financial aggre-
gates of firms is a phenomenon that in the last few years has
strongly occupied the regulatory authorities, investors and more
generally the users of firms’ financial statements globally. Indica-
tively  for  Greece,  Caramanis  and  Lenox  (2008),  Koumanakos
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els, whose assumptions are established on the
theory of industrial organisation that studies
firms’ strategic behaviour and dynamics, the
structure of the market and the possible inter-
play between these factors.
Up until today, empirical studies in Greece
mainly involved bankruptcy prediction mod-
els, i.e. they tried to assess the probability of
firm bankruptcy using financial data (see e.g.
Doumpos and Zopounidis, 2007). By contrast,
the findings of studies which involve survival
models, i.e. models that examine factors other
than financial ones (see Fotopoulos and Louri,
2000) are very limited in number.
This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first to apply survival models on data from
firms listed on the Athens Exchange (Athex)
and to approach the issue of survival from a
different angle than that of bankruptcy pre-
diction models. In particular, in line with rel-
evant studies on other capital markets (see e.g.
Hensler et al., 1997, and Macey et al., 2005),
the criterion for non-survival is exit from the
stock exchange, which has a twofold meaning.
In the narrow sense, the exit of an Athex-listed
company is considered to occur when its shares
are suspended from trading for a period of
over  six  months,  after  which  it  is  delisted
(which essentially is an administrative act). In
the broader sense, exit includes firms placed
under surveillance. As regards the determi-
nants of non-survival, with the exception of
leverage,5 these  are  based  on  non-financial
data, e.g. size, sector, corporate governance
and other characteristics connected with the
environment  in  which  these  firms  operate.
Moreover, in order to minimise the possibility
of bias in the estimates, a number of alterna-
tive (parametric and non-parametric) models
are also used.
The study is structured as follows: Section 2
sets  out  the  theoretical  background  and
reviews the literature that focuses on the deter-
minants of firm survival. Section 3 presents the
data and the methodology used and Section 4
reports the empirical results. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 THE DETERMINANTS OF FIRM SURVIVAL
The  determinants  used  in  the  econometric
models of empirical studies internationally are
typically selected based on the availability of
data and the relevant research questions. Gen-
erally, they can be categorised into firm-spe-
cific and environment-specific determinants,




The studies of Modigliani and Miller (1958,
1963) on how the financial structure affects the
worth of a company have triggered a number
of relevant studies regarding the optimal cap-
ital structure and its determinants.6 Based on
the general conclusions of these studies, the
value of a company shows a positive correla-
tion with its leverage, due to the tax advantage
that the latter creates. However, an increase in
the leverage translates into a higher risk of
bankruptcy, creating a “bankruptcy cost” (Alt-
man, 1984).
An additional cost for a company, which is con-
nected with its capital structure, is the “agency
cost”7 between shareholders and management
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is the cost
borne by a company’s shareholders, when they
try to control the choices of its management as
far as they can. According to agency theory, if
a  company’s  leverage  is  high,  its  free  cash




5 5 This is the only financial factor used in the study, as it is entirely
or almost entirely unaffected by creative accounting.
6 6 See Athanasoglou et al. (2006) for details on the capital structure
and the determinants of Athex-listed firms and for a review of the
related literature.
7 7 In other words, the cost that arises from conflicts of interest.
8 8 Free cash flows are the flows that are not paid to the sharehold-
ers in the form of dividends but finance investment, whose pres-
ent value is not necessarily positive.
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ital and avoids risky investments. Based on this
rationale, leverage is used by the company as
a tool for value creation, thus reducing the pos-
sibility of failure but increasing the cost to
shareholders.9
The empirical results that review the relation-
ship between leverage and exit from the market
are rather inconsistent.10 We may indicatively
mention Opler and Titman (1994) and Altman
(1984), who show that, in the US market, com-
panies with high leverage lose market share
(indirect  bankruptcy  cost).  Fotopoulos  and
Louri (2000) come to a similar conclusion for
the Greek market, finding that the higher the
leverage the higher the probability of firm fail-
ure. By contrast, Wruck (1990) and Whitaker
(1999) conclude that high leverage is not in
itself a negative factor for the company, and
Audretsch et al. (2000) support that leverage is
not a determinant of firm survival.
2.1.2 The “liability of smallness” hypothesis
A key hypothesis in the international literature
on firm survival is the “liability of smallness”
hypothesis,11 wherein size is defined variably,
using, for example, turnover, the value of assets
or the number of employees.12
According to the above hypothesis, larger firms
have a higher probability of survival compared
with smaller ones, since they enjoy the privi-
lege of economies of scale, are granted easier
and more favourable access to money and cap-
ital markets and, on average, employ better
quality staff.
There are, however, arguments to the contrary.
For example, because their hierarchy is com-
plex, large companies bear increased agency
costs, leading to the principal-agent problem,
which can be set out as follows: the maximisa-
tion of value for shareholders need not coin-
cide with the maximisation of value for the
management. When this problem arises, the
profits of the said firms may decline, a devel-
opment that might consequently hinder their
survival.  Besides,  the  complex  structure  of
large companies may create problems of hier-
archical control of subordinate staff in respect
to the targets they are assigned, resulting in a
reduced sense of responsibility for staff when
performing their duties.
In their majority, empirical studies that meas-
ure company size using its size in the first year
of its operation (initial size) corroborate the
view that the initial size and the duration of
survival are positively correlated, irrespective
of the country, the sector and the age of the
company  (see  e.g. Audretsch  et  al.,  2000,
Honjo, 2000, Agarwall and Audtresch, 2001,
Mata and Portugal, 2002).
2.1.3 Corporate governance
Corporate governance is the reaction to a sit-
uation where ownership is separated from the
control of a firm and refers to the framework
which shareholders-investors use to ensure the
efficiency of their investment. From this per-
spective, the role of corporate governance is
summed  up  in  achieving  reduced  agency
costs.13
The shareholders, who finance an investment,
need a capable management that can effec-
tively manage the funds entrusted to it, so that
they can yield future cash flows. The manage-
ment also needs shareholders to finance its
business plans. In this framework, sometimes
the management takes decisions motivated by
the maximisation of their own personal gains,
by contrast to investors who are interested in




9 9 Essentially,  the  optimum  financial  structure  for  a  company  is
defined as the point at which the tax advantage is maximised and
the bankruptcy cost on account of conflicts of interest is minimised.
1 10 0 Most of these studies are based on bankruptcy prediction models.
1 11 1 The acceptance of the liability of smallness hypothesis is also con-
nected with the passive learning theory (Jovanovic, 1982), accord-
ing to which companies are better starting off small in size, due to
the uncertainty that surrounds their future development.
1 12 2 The  size  of  a  company,  according  to  the  law  (Regulation  EC
70/2001 as amended and currently applicable), is defined initially
by the number of its permanent employees. In their majority,
empirical studies in the European area define the size of a com-
pany based on this principle.
1 13 3 For a detailed review of the relevant literature, see Shleifer and
Vishny (1997).
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holder  base,  the  effective  control  of  man-
agement by shareholders-investors is a diffi-
cult task. Each minor shareholder alone may
not afford the cost of controlling manage-
ment decisions, thereby accepting that some
other minor shareholder will deal with the
control of management decisions and meet
the relevant costs (free rider problem).
This particular agency problem can be solved
if shares are concentrated in major sharehold-
ers who thus gather enough voting rights to
impose their will on the company’s manage-
ment, reducing the agency costs and increasing
the company’s chances of survival.
However, concentration also has some serious
disadvantages. The most important of these is
that the interests of major shareholders are
not always in line with the interests of minor
shareholders, the management or the employ-
ees.  For  example,  major  shareholders  may
impose the payment of additional dividends,
depriving the company of necessary cash flows
that could be used for its further development
or they may take advantage of relationships
with other firms in their control. The higher
risk premium for the negotiation of shares
with privileged voting rights14 is an indication
of the cost created by the conflict of interest
between major and minor shareholders (Zin-
gales, 1994).
The results of empirical studies confirm the
existence of these problems. In some studies,
the number of those involved, directly or indi-
rectly, in the management of a firm is positively
correlated with the period of the latter’s sur-
vival (Hensler et al., 1997, Peristiani and Hong,
2004), whereas others show there is no statis-
tically significant relationship between them
(Jain and Kini, 1999).
A large share of empirical studies on agency
costs (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976) do not
take account of the different role of the Board
of Directors and the Managing Director or of
their distinct role in the future performance of
the firm and the different impact that their
corresponding decisions may have on its sur-
vival.  The  Board  of  Directors  is  the  body
vested  with  the  mission  of  controlling  the
actions  of  the  Managing  Director,  solving
agency problems that arise from the separa-
tion of management and control. The degree
to which the Board of Directors may affect the
development of the firm depends on its abil-
ity to influence important decisions or even
request  the  replacement  of  the  Managing
Director (Dowell et al., 2006). Thus, the closer
the relationship of the Board of Directors with
the company, i.e. the larger the number of
shares that its members hold, the more moti-
vated the Board is to perform its duties with
diligence, exerting control over the actions and
the decisions of the Managing Director (Shiv-
dasani, 1993).
However, the participation of the Managing
Director  in  the  shareholder  base  is  strong
motivation too for the implementation of a
strategy for mitigating the hazard of a firm’s
non-survival. According to Tosi et al. (1999),
the Managing Director’s direct participation in
the share capital of a firm is more effective
than  other  systems  of  indirect  reward  (e.g.
stock option plans) at aligning his interests
with those of shareholders. Even if the Man-
aging Director’s participation in the share cap-
ital of a firm can change over time, after the
company’s entry to a stock market, the initial
percentage he holds has been found to signif-
icantly  affect  the  course  of  the  company
(Fisher and Pollock, 2004).
In the context of controlling the decisions of a
firm’s management, the role of institutional
investors is of importance, as they are consid-
ered the most active shareholders in terms of
monitoring the firm’s operation. They partici-
pate actively in the Board of Directors and in
the  general  meeting  of  shareholders  and




1 14 4 Shares with privileged voting rights should not be confused with
Greek “preferred shares”. In Greece, holders of preferred shares
usually have increased rights on the profits, but seldom have vot-
ing rights.
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time advice on its strategic planning.
Empirical studies have indeed shown that the
participation of institutional investors posi-
tively influences the company’s probability of
survival (Jain and Kini, 2000). There are how-
ever cases of firms with a broad shareholder
base or of family businesses where the cost of
communication  and  coordination  between
institutional  investors  and  owners  is  high
(Tosi et al., 1999), resulting in this factor’s
negative impact on the firm’s probability to
survive.
Finally, the rules of sound corporate gover-
nance ensure shareholder control of manage-
ment not only through control mechanisms but
also through the market for corporate control.
For example, in Britain, Denis and Sarin (1999)
have concluded that there is a positive corre-
lation between bad corporate performance and
a change of ownership brought about by merg-
ers and acquisitions. This relationship does not
seem to be confirmed fully (see indicatively
Franks  and  Mayer,  2001,  Heiss  and  Koke,
2004) in the case of German corporations and
is rejected for Greek ones (Tsagkanos, 2008,
Tsagkanos et al., 2008).
2.1.4 The “liability of newness” and “liability of
adolescence” hypotheses
A second basic parameter connected with the
survival of a company is how long it has been
operating in a market. According to the pre-
vailing  view,  a  firm’s  exit  from  a  market  is
inversely related to the duration of its presence
in  it  (Freeman  et  al.,  1983,  Mitchell,  1994,
Mata and Portugal, 1994).This is also known as
the “liability of newness” hypothesis.15 The pas-
sive learning model (Jovanovic, 1982) and the
active  learning  model  (Ericson  and  Pakes,
1995) also move along this line.
A primary characteristic of the first model is
that the cost for new entrants is not only ran-
dom but differs from one firm to another. In
other words, a firm that enters a market for
the first time cannot be certain of its prospects
for success and its initial size is necessarily
small until it has ascertained that it can gain
a satisfactory share of the market. If the firm
proves efficient at a later date, it stands a bet-
ter chance of remaining in the market and
developing further; otherwise, it will shrink
and probably exit the market. Because of the
exit of weak companies from the market, the
average efficiency of the firms that remain
improves over time, without this improvement
stemming from a change in their fundamen-
tals, thus reducing the probability of their exit-
ing the market. Alternatively, the probability
of exit remains constant and independent of
time.
According to the second model, new entrants
generally “learn” from their presence in a mar-
ket,  thereby  improving  their  administration
and production methods, which results in a
reduced probability of exit. In other words, the
probability of exit is not constant and falls with
time.
There are, nonetheless, arguments in favour
of the view that firms with a relatively small
period of activity in a market may have better
growth and survival prospects compared to
those that have been in the market for longer
periods of time. For example, it is possible
that “older” firms use obsolete technology.
The productivity of a factory is defined, to a
certain degree, by the year in which it was
established. New firms establish factories that
use state-of-the-art technology and produce
correspondingly  state-of-the-art  products.
Older firms have either difficulty incorporat-
ing new technologies into their production
process or a disadvantage when it comes to
innovative methods. Both result in obsolete
products and services.
By contrast, new firms venturing to acquire a




1 15 5 Even  though  the  analysis  of  this  particular  hypothesis  applies
mostly to newly established firms and not to new entrants in a stock
market, our analysis includes elements that are relevant to the lat-
ter case too.
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away from older firms. Moreover, relatively
older and larger firms are faced with opera-
tional difficulties when trying to restructure
themselves (inertia): about 70% of these firms
wishing to adopt new technologies or change
staff relations fail to achieve the desirable
outcome (Georgopoulos, 2004).
With particular regard to listed firms that
have been operating for many years prior to
their entry in the stock market, the “liability
of newness” hypothesis, keeping its key fea-
tures, is referred  to in the literature (e.g.
Hensler et al., 1997) as the “liability of ado-
lescence”  hypothesis.  According  to  this,  a
new entrant in a stock market may survive in
the first years of its presence by using up the
funds from its public offering. Thus, the risk
of  exiting  the  market  is  small  in  the  first
years, but then it peaks and finally starts to
fall.16
Even though a significant number of empirical
studies examine the relationship between sur-
vival and age, the findings are rather contro-
versial. For example, the studies of Amburgey
et al. (1993), Olzak and West (1991), Mata and
Portugal (1994) and Audretsch et al. (2000)
confirm the validity of the “liability of new-
ness” hypothesis, in contrast with the studies
of  Barron  et  al. (1994)  and  Ranger-Moore
(1997).  Among studies  that  examine  listed
firms,  Audretsch  et  al. (1999),  Perez  et  al.
(2004) and Kaniovski and Peneder (2007) con-
clude  that  the  “liability  of  adolescence”
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
2.1.5 The “window of opportunity” hypothesis
Assuming that,  as  outlined  in  section  2.1.3
above, a firm’s management does not always
have the interests of minor shareholders in
mind, the question is how firms manage to
raise considerable funds through their public
offerings, in which minor investors also par-
ticipate, without a commitment that the funds
invested will receive a minimum guaranteed
return.
A possible explanation refers to the overopti-
mism of investors, which is mainly affected by
the current environment and announcements
of the firm’s positive business developments
and prospects. Based on this hypothesis, which
is also known as the “window of opportunity”
hypothesis, investors participate in a public
offering  not  based  on  the  future  long-term
yields of the firm’s investments, but on the
expectation of a short-term increase in its share
price (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This hypoth-
esis has been explored in the literature which
concludes that public or secondary offerings
are systematically overpriced (see indicatively
Ritter, 1991, Pagano et al., 1998, Teoh et al.,
1998).
These studies also reach the conclusions that:
(i)  public  offerings  take  place  during  the
upward  phase  of  the  stock  exchange  cycle;
(ii) the firms’ long-term returns are smaller
than expected; and (iii) the profitability in the
year prior to the public offering is likely to be
affected by creative accounting. Furthermore,
high sector valuations (as measured by the
ratio of market to book capitalisation) repre-
sent an incentive for marginal firms to enter
a stock market, expecting that due to investor
overoptimism they will be able to attract funds
relatively more easily. In these cases, high sec-
tor valuations have a negative effect on the
firms’ survival duration.
Nonetheless, high sector valuations may come
as the result of positive expectations about the
growth prospects of firms (see, indicatively,
Pagano et al., 1998; Jain and Kini, 1999). Con-
sequently, high sector valuations in this case
have a positive effect on the firms’ survival
duration. Which of the two hypotheses is valid
is clearly an empirical issue.
2.2 THE SECTORAL IMPACT
According to Hensler et al. (1997), firms in the




1 16 6 This reduction may be attributed to the fact that less effective firms
exit the market.
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since they apply like production methods, use
the same factors of production and the sector’s
growth prospects shape their individual ones.
Their  individual  probabilities  of  survival,
therefore, are interrelated.
Based  on  industrial  organisation  theory,
cross-sectoral differences are moulded by the
degree of competition across sectors. In sec-
tors  with  low  competition,  a  firm  may  set
prices that yield abnormal profits, if there are
barriers to market entry and a high degree of
co-operation among incumbent firms (Bunch
and Smiley, 1992). Additionally, the proba-
bility of a firm’s survival is also connected
with the business cycle, which fosters high
growth rates in its upward phase, facilitating
new entry without causing existing firms to
resort to retaliation (Mata et al., 1995).
A typical measure of the degree of competi-
tion in a sector is the degree of concentra-
tion: usually, a high degree of concentration
is positively related to significant barriers to
entry. It is possible, however, that the degree
of concentration remains stable at a relatively
high level without creating barriers to entry,
as is the case when new entrants replace exit-
ing firms (Baldwin, 1995). Also, the extent to
which firms enter a sector may not depend on
the size of entry barriers but on the sector’s
growth prospects (Jain and Kini, 1999). The
conclusions  of  empirical  studies  on  the
impact of the degree of concentration are
mixed, since in some cases the degree of con-
centration  is  positively  correlated  to  the
probability of a firm’s survival (Li, 1995) and
in others this relationship appears to have no
statistical significance (Mata and Portugal,
1994, Heiss and Koke, 2004, Jain and Kini,
1999).
Another dimension of the degree of competi-
tion in a sector is captured by an index of new
entrants. According to the population ecology
theory (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), the sur-
vival of a new entrant is negatively related to
the rate of new entrant into the sector, as any
new firm has to face competition not only from
existing firms but also from other new entrants.
Therefore, a firm exhibits an increased prob-
ability of survival if the index of new entrants
is not very high (Audtresch et al., 2000). An
alternative version based on industrial organ-
isation theory comes to the same conclusion,
albeit for different reasons. Barriers to entry
may also become barriers to the exit, to the
degree that an investment which discourages
new entrants also discourages the exit of exist-
ing firms, leading to the recording of higher
exit rates from sectors that favour new entrants
(Mata  and  Portugal,  2002,  Fotopoulos  and
Louri, 2002).
However, the index of new entrants may be
high if the sector is in a development phase.
In such a case, the survival of firms is easier,
as their growth rate is not a result of captur-
ing market share from rival firms, but of the
sector’s high growth rates. Business expecta-
tions on the possible success of the investment
are  higher,  thus  the  initial  size  of  firms  is
larger.
2.3 THE EFFECT OF THE MACROECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT
Empirical studies in their majority, with only
a  few  exceptions,  examine  the  factors  that
affect a firm’s survival, which are connected
with both individual, firm-specific character-
istics and sectoral characteristics. However,
the survival probability of a firm depends also
on  the  phase  of  the  business  cycle,  which
means that the cyclical effect should also be
taken into account. For example, a negative
economic conjuncture may hurt new entrants
more than firms already operating for some
time. Studies that take the cyclical effect into
account  approach  it  in  a  number  of  ways.
Audtresch and Mahmood (1995), for exam-
ple, have used unemployment and real inter-
est rates, to no effect, whereas Buehler et al.
(2006) use GDP growth and conclude that the
probability of survival increases in upward
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3.1 DATA
17
The inability to find the appropriate (non-
financial) data for inclusion as determinants
in the estimation of hazard functions has been
a  factor  that  has  limited  empirical  studies
especially for Greece. For this reason, in this
study, we use data (including available non-
financial data) on Athex-listed firms. More
specifically, the database used in the estima-
tion of the empirical model was put together
as follows:
Initially,  through  the  press  releases  of  the
Athex, we located the public offerings of Greek
commercial and industrial firms for the period
1993-2002  along  with  cases  of  firms  whose
shares on the Athex were suspended until end-
2006, which is the cut-off date of this study. We
then collected the necessary data on the share-
holder composition of these firms through the
Athex and public offering press releases for the
periods before and after the initial public offer-
ing (IPO). The total number of public offerings
examined, for which there is a full set of data
meeting the requirements of this study, is 196
(see Table 1). At the same time, we enriched
the database with data from the published bal-
ance sheets of these firms and with macro-
economic data from the National Statistical
Service of Greece (NSSG).
3.2 VARIABLES
Based on the theoretical background detailed in
section 2, we use the variables set out in Table 2.
Survival  duration  (SD),  which  is  the  main
(dependent)  variable  under  examination,  is
measured as the number of years between the
year a firm was initially listed on the Athex and
either 2006, for firms whose shares are traded
continuously (censored observations), or the
year when the share was suspended. Suspen-
sion in the narrow sense refers to firms whose
shares were suspended for periods of over six
months (21 firms) and, in the broad sense, to
firms whose shares were placed under surveil-
lance (32 firms in total).
As regards the explanatory variables, leverage
(LEV) is calculated as the ratio of the firms’
total short- and long-term obligations to their
total capital in the first year of their listing on
the Athex. As a measure of firm size (SIZE) we
use the logarithm of its employees in the first
year after its listing on the Athex.18 To estimate
the influence of corporate governance, the vari-
ables MD and BOD were used, which reflect
the participation of the Managing Director and




Table 1 Sectoral classification and number
of firms
1 0500 Oil & gas 3
2 1300 Chemicals 7
3 1700 Basic resources 11
4 2300 Construction & materials 6
5 2700 Industrial goods & services 19
6 3500 Food & beverages 24
7 3700 Personal and household goods 29
8 4500 Healthcare 7
9 5300 Retail 10
10 5500 Media 16
11 5700 Travel & leisure 17
12 6500 Telecommunications 5
13 7500 Utilities 3
14 9500 Technology 31
15 8700 Other sectors 8









1 17 7 The following analysis refers to data referring to the year when the
firm  is listed  on  the  Athex;  this  data  is  not  time-dependent.
Notwithstanding the fact that the collection of annual data for
some variables presents difficulties, the basic reason why this par-
ticular time-frame is used can be traced to the industrial organi-
sation theory, which puts particular emphasis on the condition of
firms at the beginning of the period over which they are examined
(which in this study coincides with the listing of their shares on the
Athex).
1 18 8 In the empirical literature, a number of variables for calculating
the size is used, although the most commonly used is the num-
ber of employees. As mentioned in fn. 12, according to Regula-
tion EC 71/2001 and previous Regulations, the size of a firm is
defined by the number of permanent employees. Finally, Cabral
and Mata (2003) observe that the size of existing firms, measured
by the logarithm of their employees, approximates the normal
distribution.
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after the completion of the public offering. In
order to avoid problems arising from possible
multicollinearity between these two variables,
the percentage of shares held by the Managing
Director is subtracted from BOD. Moreover, in
respect to the shareholding composition, the
variable INST is included, which equals 1 if
there are institutional investors with holdings
of at least 5% in the share capital after the pub-
lic offering.
Furthermore, the “one share one vote” prin-
ciple  is  not  always  applied  in  Greece.  For
example,  holders  of  preferred  shares  enjoy
more privileges compared with holders of com-
mon shares (priority rights when the dividends
are distributed or when the share capital is
increased,  etc.),  but  usually  have  no  voting
rights in the general meeting of shareholders;
thus they do not take part in the decision-mak-
ing process. When there is such a distinction in
a firm’s share capital, the percentage of shares
without voting rights is not taken into consid-
eration.
Additionally,  in  order  to  assess  whether
overoptimistic expectations of investors about
the sector are a motive for the entry of mar-
ginal firms, we use the ratio of the annual sec-
toral capitalisation to total net worth (SCNW)
in the first year of listing on the Athex.
Turning to the sectors under examination, we
use the 15 sector categories of the ICB classi-
fication of the Athex (a classification adopted
by many major stock markets globally).19 Table
1 summarises the number of firms under exam-
ination in each sector.
The degree of competition in each sector can
be assessed by a concentration index (e.g. the
Herfindahl index). However, because in some
sectors the number of participating firms is rel-
atively small, an alternative measure of com-
petition is used: the index of new entrants in





Table 2 Model variables
* Time-dependent variable.
1 The NSSG Industrial Production Index covers all activities listed in Sections C to E (Mining-Quarrying, Manufacturing and Electricity-Gas-




SD* Survival duration (years) 6.897 2.767
LEV Total leverage to total liabilities in the first year of the initial public offering (IPO) 0.418 0.195
SIZE Logarithm of permanent employees in the first year of trading 4.956 1.275
BOD Percentage of shares held by members of the Board of Directors after the completion of the IPO
excluding shares held by the Managing Director 0.225 0.220
MD Percentage of shares held by the Managing Director after the completion of the IPO 0.308 0.250
INST This variable equals 1 if institutional investors participate in the share capital after the IPO 0.168 0.375
SCNW Median of annual sectoral capitalisation to total net worth in the first year of the IPO 3.503 1.395
NEWE Logarithm of new entrants in the sector 2.793 0.619
AV-NEWE Logarithm of the average size of new entrants in the sector 5.478 0.894
IND* Industrial production index 1 (2000=100) 93.895 5.358
1 19 9 According to this method, which is detailed on the website of the
Athex (www.ase.gr), firms are categorised either as per their final
product or as per the production process they apply, which is
believed to reflect more accurately the conditions that prevail in
the sector. For example, the activities of the company PLAISIO SA
include the trading and partial assembly of PCs, whereas INFO-
QUEST is the representative of a well-known maker of PCs and
also has an assembly line for PCs. The first company would be clas-
sified under SIC 52 (retail trade) and the second under SIC 72
(computer and related activities). According to the ICB classifi-
cation, however, both companies belong to the same sector (com-
puters), on the grounds that, if the outlook for sales of PCs is pos-
itive, then the outlook for the growth of these two companies can-
not be but positively correlated.
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macroeconomic environment on the survival of
firms, the index of industrial production (IND)
is  used.  Table  3  summarises  the  variables
under examination and indicates the expected
signs of the estimated coefficients.
3.3 METHODOLOGY
3.3.1 Key concepts
All studies that focus on the probability of firm
survival  estimate  the  hazard  function  (see
equation 1), which allows the estimation of the
conditional probability20 of a firm not surviv-
ing beyond a specific time (t):
ʻ(t) = f(t)/1-F(t) (1)
where ʻ(t) is the hazard function, f(t) is the
probability of non-survival of the firm at time
t, i.e. the probability function, and F(t) is the
probability of non-survival of the firm up to
and including time t, i.e. the cumulative prob-
ability function.
A key feature of a hazard function, apart from
estimating the probability of survival, is the
time  horizon  of  the  observation.  In  more
detail, the survival duration (T) is defined as
the period between the first observation for the
firm (the date of the public offering in this
study) and either the occurrence of the event
(exit of the firm from the market) or the end
of the observation period (T
–
). If in the course
of the period under review the firm does not
exit the market, then the observation is con-
sidered right-censored. Chart 1 depicts these
concepts of period and censorship for three
hypothetical cases of firms. The first and third
firms are right-censored, since they continue to
survive beyond T
–
>0, which is the censoring
time, whilst the second firm exits the market
prior to T
–
, and is thus uncensored.
These features of a hazard function do not
allow the application of classical econometric
methods, such as the method of least squares,
since not all observations for the survival dura-
tion  (the  dependent  variable)  are  available
(given that some of them are censored). If e.g.
the least squares method is applied with sur-
vival duration (or its logarithm) as dependent
variable  and  the  initial  size  of  the  firm  as
explanatory variable, the exclusion of the cen-
sored  observations  from  the  sample  would




Table 3 Expected effect of individual factors on the duration of survival
Indebtedness -
Initial size +
Rate of new entrants -
Initial size of new entrants +
Managing Director +
Board of Directors members +
Institutional investors +/-











Note: A positive sign means that the variable reduces the probability of a firm's exit and increases its survival duration. Alternatively, a posi-
tive sign implies a hazard ratio (HR) less than 1 and a time ratio (TR) greater than 1.
2 20 0 Meaning that the hazard function can take only positive values (0.1
and beyond). See also section 3.3.2.
1.Meleti Asimakopoulou:￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1  09-11-09  12:06  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 16on size. Similarly, bias would ensue if the cen-
sored observations were included in the sam-
ple, since it is assumed that the firms corre-
sponding to those observations have not sur-
vived beyond the censoring time.
3.3.2 Estimating hazard functions
In the relevant literature, hazard functions
are estimated using mainly three approaches:
(i) life tables, (ii) semi-parametric methods
and (iii) parametric methods. The first ap-
proach, which is the simplest to apply, since it
does not presuppose some kind of estimation,
has the basic disadvantage that the influence
of several explanatory variables is difficult to
include in the hazard function.
One of the models that has been widely used
in survival studies and minimises the problems
noted in the previous section is the continuous
time hazard model of Cox (1972),21 which takes
the following basic form:
ʻ(t,X) = ʻ0(t) exp(X’ʲ), 0≤ʻ (2)
where  ʻ(t,X) is  the  hazard  function  of  a
firm, which can be interpreted as the instant
hazard rate of a firm between (t,t+∆t), with
∆t ₒ 0, ʻ0(t) baseline hazard function, i.e.
the instant hazard when all explanatory vari-
ables are zero, and (X’ʲ) the vector of the
model’s explanatory variables, which explains
the observed heterogeneity between firms.22
The use of the exponential logarithm in func-
tion (2) is necessary to ensure that the esti-
mated hazard ʻ(t) does not take on negative
values even if there are negative values in the
vector of explanatory variables.
A key feature of model (2) is the assumption
of proportionality, i.e. that the relative hazard
between two firms, also known as hazard ratio
or HR, is constant and time-invariant. The pro-
portionality of the hazard ratio is calculated as
follows:
ʻ(t,ʧi)/ʻ(t,Xj) = exp[(Xi’−Xj’)ʲ] (3)
Consequently, the explanatory variables in the
model shift the baseline hazard function; thus,
the estimation of the hazard function essen-
tially amounts to measuring the relative hazard
compared to the baseline hazard, which does
not allow for its estimation.
The above analysis can be better understood
through an example: suppose that the vector of
explanatory variables in the hazard function
includes the size of the firm and the sector,
whose value is 1 for firms in the technological
sector  and  0  for  firms  in  any  other  sector.
Based on the HR, we can examine the relative
hazard of firms in the technological sector. If
e.g. the coefficient ʲ for the technological sec-
tor is estimated as 0.18, then exp(0.18)=1.20.
Thus, the hazard rate for firms in the techno-
logical sector (with Xi=1), ceteris paribus, is
20% higher than that for firms in other sectors.
By contrast, if the coefficient on the techno-
logical sector is -0.18, then exp(-0.18)=0.83,
i.e. the hazard for the firms in the technolog-
ical  sector  (Xi=1)  is  17%  smaller  than  for




Chart 1 Schematic representation of 
censored observations
2 21 1 In the said model, duration is considered a continuous random
covariate. Because the expected survival duration is relatively large,
it is considered that estimations of the continuous time variant of
the hazard function are not significantly different compared to a
discrete time model (see also Siriopoulos and Lalountas, 2008).
2 22 2 For more information on the explanatory variables used in this
study, see section 3.2.
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the narrow and in the broad sense of survival,
will be undertaken using the method of maxi-
mum likelihood, where the baseline hazard
function is estimated non-parametrically thus
generating  a  very  flexible  baseline  hazard
(hence it is a semi-parametric model).
Apart  from  semi-parametric  models,  para-
metric models have also been used in the lit-
erature.  The  latter  models  assume  that  the
baseline hazard function follows a specific dis-
tribution.23 In this way, it is possible to exam-
ine whether the estimations of a hazard func-
tion are sensitive to the applied methodology.
For this reason, in this study we have used
alternative parametric models, which we detail
in the Appendix. These models assume that the
baseline  hazard  function  follows  either  the
Weibull, loglogistic or lognormal distribution.
3.3.3 Model assessment and selection process
We apply a specific method to assess and select
between the above models. In more detail, the
initial assumption is that the survival duration
is a constant random variable that does not fol-
low  a  specific  distribution.  Restrictions  are
then applied gradually and the constancy of the
parameters  is  checked  through  the  various
specifications.
For general optimisation criteria, we use the
Akaike criterion24 and the Likelihood Ratio
(LR),25 through which the overall significance
of the parameters in the model is tested. More-
over, this particular test has also been used to
control for unobserved heterogeneity.26
Finally,  we  use  the  Cox-Snell  residuals  test
(1968) for a more general comparison between
models (both parametric and non-parametric).
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 BASIC STATISTICAL DATA
The basic descriptive statistics of the variables
offer a measure that enables the comparison of
Greek market data with that of foreign mar-
kets. If we compare our sample with samples
from empirical studies on other countries, it is
interesting to focus on the initial size and the
age of firms before the public offering.
Over the whole sample, the average age of
firms before the initial public offering was 13
years,27 i.e. significantly higher than in US ini-
tial public offerings, where the average age is
8.6 years (Hensler et al., 1997), but closer to
the European average (of 11.6 years in Ger-
many (Audretsch and Lehman, 2004) and 19
years in the Netherlands (Roosenboom et al.,
2003)).
Turning to size, the average value of the sam-
ple (the median) is 556 (137) employees, which
is smaller than similar European firms,28 for
which  e.g.  Pagano  et  al. (1998)  estimate  a
median of 1,447 (759) employees. However,
despite the fact that Greek firms with Athex-
listed shares are smaller than their European
counterparts, their average size is larger by far





2 23 3 The application of parametric models yields more accurate esti-
mations of the parameters. However, the assumption of an incor-
rect parametric form for the baseline hazard leads to biased esti-
mations; by contrast, the semi-parametric method does not have
this disadvantage.
2 24 4 This criterion is: -2logL+2(k+c), where k is the number of explana-
tory variables in the model and c the number of parameters in the
baseline hazard function.
2 25 5 LR is calculated as follows: -2(LogL-LogL0), where LogL is the log-
arithm of the likelihood and LogL0 is the corresponding logarithm
under the specific restrictions.
2 26 6 By analogy to the simple classical linear model, heterogeneity may
be the result of e.g. the researcher’s inability to quantify the vari-
ables that should be included in the model according to theory, or
the omission of explanatory variables or a weakness in theory that
makes it impossible to define fully the explanatory variables in the
sample. The consequences of unobserved heterogeneity for the esti-
mation of the hazard model are significant. It is well-known that
in the standard linear model, the omission of significant variables
affects the estimated coefficients only if the omitted variables are
correlated with other explanatory variables in the regression. This
does not apply to the hazard model. Even if the omitted variables
are not correlated with the other explanatory variables, the esti-
mated coefficients are biased. For these reasons, the control of
unobserved heterogeneity is an essential part of the empirical
analysis of survival models.
2 27 7 From a corresponding sample of 110 public offerings in the Athens
Exchange (Koumanakos, 2004), the average age of firms before the
initial public offering was 15 years.
2 28 8 Koumanakos  (2007)  comes  to  the  same  conclusion,  using  the
accounting value of the firm’s assets for size.
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The results of estimating the hazard models of
section 3.3 and the Appendix are presented in
Table  4.  Estimates  for  the  semi-parametric
model, which refer to hazard ratios, are pre-
sented in the first two columns and estimates
of the parametric models, which refer to time
ratios, are presented in the last three columns.
The main result derived from observing the
statistical significance and the size of the coef-
ficients is that these estimations are minimally
affected by the sample selected. This result
strengthens the empirical findings. Moreover,
leverage, size, sector and duration (as repre-
sented by the estimate of the baseline hazard)
are found to be statistically significant.
More specifically, if we examine the first two
columns of Table 4, which show the hazard
ratios – HR – as estimated using equation (3),
bearing in mind that the interpretation of the
estimated coefficients relates to whether they
are greater than or less than 1,29 we can draw
the following conclusions:
Firstly, leverage (LEV) seems to significantly
increase a firms’ hazard ratio, a finding which
is in concordance with those of Fotopoulos and
Louri (2000). Thus firms with relatively high
leverage face a greater hazard of not surviving.
This is made more comprehensible through the
following example: If we use the coefficient
LEV  (15.705)  derived  from  the  semi-para-
metric model (first column of Table 4) and we




Table 4 Estimation of hazard models
LEV 15.705*** 6.380** 0.257** 0.268** 0.254**
SIZE 0.603*** 0.797 1.301** 1.278** 1.224*
BOD 0.401 0.486 1.621 1.437 1.714
MD 2.049 2.416 0.723 0.716 0.723
INST 2.060 1.799 0.707 0.694 0.710
SCNW 1.018 1.115 0.974 0.964 0.944
NEWE 3.233** 2.475** 0.559** 0.567** 0.572**
AV-NEWE 0.780 1.437 1.113 1.174 1.227
IND 0.893 0.945 1.070* 1.069* 1.069*
˃ 0.470*** 0.433*** 0.856***
LogL -85 -144 -57.72 -57.86 -57.43
LR test 22.69 19.90 24.36 23.84 24.36
AIC 139.45 139.72 138.87
Number of observations 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,352
Variable












Note: *, **, *** imply statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
1 The estimations of the semi-parametric model refer to hazard ratios calculated from equation (3), and the estimations of the parametric mod-
els 1-3 refer to time ratios calculated from equation (8) in the Appendix, respectively.
2 The survival duration in the narrow sense includes firms whose shares' trading has been suspended for a period of over six months. In the
broad sense, it also includes firms whose shares have been placed under surveillance.
2 29 9 Recall that, based on the analysis set out in section 3.3, the semi-
parametric model essentially estimates the relative hazard between
two firms given the baseline hazard function.
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Thus, if the leverage ratio is increased by 10
percentage points, to 0.60, then the firm’s haz-
ard ratio will be exp(log(15.705)*0.60)=5.21,
i.e. an increase of about 30%.
Secondly, as regards the relationship between
size and a firm’s hazard of exiting the capital
market, it appears that large firms face a sig-
nificantly  lower  hazard  than  smaller  firms,
since  the  coefficient  is  less  than  1  (e.g.
SIZE=0.603 in the first column of Table 4).
In a similar example, supposing that a small-
medium firm has 50 permanent employees and
a  large  (by  Greek  standards)  firm  has  150
employees, then the hazard ratio of the first
firm (0.14)30 is almost double that of the sec-
ond (0.08).31 Therefore, small-medium firms
face a hazard (0.14/0.08=1.75), ceteris paribus,
of not surviving almost double that of larger
firms.
Alternatively,  the  analysis  of  the  results  of
parametric  models  shows  that  the  survival
duration of big firms is greater than that of
small firms. E.g. the coefficient on size in the
Weibull model (SIZE=1.301), as calculated on
the  basis  of  equation  (8)  in  the  Appendix,
implies that the survival duration of large firms
is 30% higher than that of small firms.
The coefficient on size, nonetheless, is statis-
tically significant only in the narrow sense of
exit, i.e. when there is a suspension of the trad-
ing of shares. In the broad sense, i.e. including
firms with shares placed under surveillance, the
estimated coefficients are not statistically sig-
nificant.32 This  difference  can  possibly  be
attributed to the fact that surveillance aims at
the creation of forecasting mechanisms for the
protection  of  the  Athex  market  and  its
investors, without this necessarily translating
irrevocably into doubts about the smooth oper-
ation of the market.
Our estimation of the hazard on the basis of
the  semi-parametric  model  (0.603)  is  lower
than  that  (0.81)  of  Fotopoulos  and  Louri
(2000),33 but not significantly different from
estimations in other empirical studies. E.g. the
size coefficient of the hazard ratio is in the area
of 0.57 for the US market (Jain and Kini, 1999)
and 0.65 for the Portuguese market (Mata and
Portugal, 2002).
In order to examine the influence of corporate
governance,  by  contrast  to  other  empirical
studies (Peristiani and Hong, 2004, Hensler et
al., 1997, and Jain and Kini, 1999), the role of
the management (insiders) has been separated
into  the  individual  roles  of  the  Managing
Director, the Board of Directors and the insti-
tutional investors. Results show that agency
theory alone cannot explain the factors affect-
ing the survival of firms on the Athex, as the
relevant coefficients are not statistically sig-
nificant.34 Theoretically, a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the percentage of
shares owned by the Managing Director, the
members of the Board of Directors and the
institutional investors, on one hand, and the
survival duration of a firm, on the other, would
be expected. However, such a relationship is
not observed. Thus the corporate governance
system in Greece does not seem to allow for
high agency costs that could significantly affect
firm survival.
In any case, even if for the moment we ignore
the statistical significance of the coefficients
and examine only the signs of the estimated
coefficients, we observe that the interests of
the active shareholders (i.e. participants in the
Board of Directors) do not necessarily coincide
with the interests of the Managing Director. In
the first case the coefficients take values of less
than 1 (lower hazard) and in the second case




3 30 0 Exp(log(0.603)*log(50))=0.14.
3 31 1 Exp(log(0.603)*log(150))=0.08.
3 32 2 It can be noted that parametric models have also been taken into
consideration; in these, the survival duration is defined in its broad
sense. The results show no significant differences, which is why they
are not presented in Table 4.
3 33 3 In this study, the initial size is measured differently.
3 34 4 It is noted that statistical insignificance of similar variables has
been reported in other studies (e.g. Audretsch and Lehman, 2004).
However, there are findings for Greek firms that suggest a posi-
tive relation between concentration of ownership and efficiency
(Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007).
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has the incentive to take on excessive risk and
transfer it, at least in part, not only to other
shareholders but to creditors too (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). Moreover, the coefficient on the
INST variable provides only weak indication
that the participation of institutional investors
in the initial public offering increases the haz-
ard ratios for firms, since that coefficient is not
statistically significant either.
These findings give rise to a number of ques-
tions, because, although they could be attributed
to a certain extent to the hypotheses on which
the representation theory is based, corporate
governance in Greece abides by different rules
from those prevailing in the Anglo-Saxon system
of corporate governance. According to La Porta
et al. (1999), the majority of firms with Athex-
listed shares maintain the traditional family busi-
ness structure, thus it is not easy to separate
management from ownership, which results in
lower agency costs. Generally, there is evidence
that the concentration of shares leads to exces-
sive risk and to the transfer of this risk by the
Board of Directors to the other partners and
creditors. However, an alternative interpretation
of the results could be that the goal of small and
middle firms is not exclusively the maximisation
of the company’s worth.35
Regarding institutional investors, even though
through their participation in the Board of
Directors they play an active role in the man-
agement of the firm, the cost of communication
and co-ordination with the owners of a family
business is high. It is possible that institutional
investors as well as the businessman himself
cannot understand the business opportunities
that arise from the environment in which the
firm operates and thus hesitate to finance busi-
ness  plans  they  think  will  not  yield  good
expected profits or they consider that the risk
involved by  the  business  plan  is  dispropor-
tionate to the expected cash flows (Randoy and
Goel, 2003).
As regards competition in the sector, recall
that, according to the population ecology the-
ory, the survival duration is reduced when new
entrants increase due to retaliation by existing
firms; the opposite happens when the number
of new entrants is small. Industrial organisa-
tion theory reaches the same conclusion, albeit
for different reasons. The increased rate of
new entrants implies fewer barriers to entry.
Higher barriers to entry come as a result of
large-scale investment which is necessary for
the smooth operation of the firm. In turn, high
barriers to entry become high barriers to exit.
The rate of new entrants to the sector (variable
NEWE) is one of the determinants of the sur-
vival  duration.  Based  on  the  results  of  the
semi-parametric  model,  an  increase  in  the
number of new entrants leads to an increase in
the hazard ratio. More specifically, the coef-
ficient 3.233 implies that the entry of a firm
into a particular sector, ceteris paribus, dou-
bles, in logarithmic scale (3.233-1=2.333), the
hazard of non-survival relative to the existing
firms in the sector. This conclusion is in line
with the findings of the empirical studies of
Mata and Portugal (1994 and 2002), Mata et
al. (1995) and Fotopoulos and Louri (2000).
Moreover, the fact that the coefficient on the
variable AV-NEWE is less than 1 indicates
(note that the factor is not statistically signif-
icant) a reduction in the hazard ratios of new
entrants with high average initial size, making
the probability of exit for negative reasons less
likely. The variable that tests the “window of
opportunity” hypothesis (SCNW) is insignifi-
cant even though the value of the coefficient
serves  as  indication  of  a  positive  relation
between this factor and the degree of hazard.
Macroeconomic factors do not seem to have a
statistically significant influence on survival
duration, a finding common to other relevant
studies. The insignificance of the variable IND
in the semi-parametric estimations may possi-
bly be the result of the fact that the time span
of the study does not suffice to establish a rela-
tionship  of  interdependence  between  the




3 35 5 Thanks are in order to Ms. Heather Gibson for this remark.
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account that, even in the longest time span cov-
ered by the study, the business cycle was only
in its upward phase. A second possible expla-
nation is that changes in the index of industrial
production do not have the same influence on
all sectors. Last but not least, IND, by contrast
to other variables, is time-dependent and thus
affected by the form that the baseline hazard
function takes (Meyer, 1990). That is, if an
erroneous parametric model is applied, the
coefficients on the time-dependent variables
will be biased. Indeed, if we examine the last
three columns of Table 4,36 we observe that this
variable, contrary to what has been observed in




Chart 2 Comparison between models using the residuals test
Note: The straight line depicts the optimum adjustment of residuals and the crooked line the degree of adjustment of the residuals in the
samples.
3 36 6 These columns contain the results of the estimations of the para-
metric models detailed in equations 4-6 and interpreted on the basis
of equation 8 (see Appendix).
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between  a  favourable  macroeconomic  envi-
ronment and the probability of survival.
Turning to the estimates of the parametric mod-
els (see Appendix), besides confirming the find-
ings of the semi-parametric model, they also
give additional significant information on the
shape of the baseline hazard through the coef-
ficient ˃. These estimates shed light on the “lia-
bility of adolescence” hypothesis. Of particular
relevance  to  testing  the  hypothesis  are  the
results of those models that assume either a
loglogistic  or  lognormal  distribution  for  the
baseline hazard since they allow the baseline
hazard to be non-monotonic in contrast with the
Weibull distribution which restricts the baseline
hazard to be monotonic. Hence, even though in
the Weibull model the value of ˃ shows that the
hazard  function  is  increasing  monotonically,
thus  rejecting  the  “liability  of  adolescence”
hypothesis, the results from the other two para-
metric models generate a ˃ of less than 1 (0.433
and 0.856 respectively),37 providing support for
the “liability of adolescence” hypothesis.
If we compare the alternative models using the
Cox-Snell residuals test (1968)38 as done in
Chart 2, it appears that, apart from the fact
that deviations are stronger when the survival
duration increases, which is expected given that
a lengthier duration makes the forecast more
difficult, the semi-parametric model seems to
fit the data better.
Taking the above into consideration, the haz-
ard function is estimated using the semi-para-
metric model. A graphic representation of this
baseline hazard is provided in Chart 3.39 This
indeed confirms that the form of the baseline
hazard is non-monotonic. The “liability of ado-
lescence” hypothesis is confirmed, as the val-
ues of the baseline hazard function are rela-
tively  low  in  the  first  years  and  are  then
increased  to  reach  the  maximum  value  in
around the 7th year. This implies that in the
beginning, the firm’s hazard of exit is small,
because the new entrant may survive in the first
years by using up the funds from the initial
public offering. In the period that follows, the
hazard increases significantly before turning
downwards. This is true both in the narrow and
the broad sense of exit. Thus, the longer the
period that a firm operates on the Athex, the
smaller the probability of its exit from it, which
means that the hazard is reversely proportional
to the survival duration, which is an indication
of the significance of a long-term investment
horizon.
Even though there is considerable disagree-
ment  in  the  literature  regarding  the  rela-
tionship between survival duration and the
hazard function, the findings of this study are
in line with the literature on public offerings.
For example, Hensler et al. (1997) concur
with our conclusion, using data from the US
stock market, even though the hazard func-





Chart 3 Estimation of the hazard function
3 37 7 A confirmation of this estimation is provided in Chart 3.
3 38 8 It can be noted that the direct comparison of the estimations of the
parametric models with the corresponding non-parametric Cox
model is not possible due to the fact that the estimations of the first
are in accelerated form, by contrast to the analogue form of the
estimations of the Cox semi-parametric model.
3 39 9 The hazard function has been estimated using the method of the
Epanechnikov kernel (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1997).
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This study, building on the theoretical back-
ground of the standard bankruptcy prediction
models, has reviewed a series of factors that may
affect the survival or the exit from the stock
market of firms with shares listed on the Athex
after 1993. In particular, in the light of the exist-
ing literature, we examined the following fac-
tors: leverage, initial size, corporate governance,
sector and macroeconomic conditions.
According  to  our  findings,  the  form  of  the
baseline  hazard  function  is  non-monotonic.
This implies that the hazard of exiting the cap-
ital market is initially small, increases, peaks
after approximately 7 years and drops back
thereafter.  This  corroborates  the  view  that
investment in the stock market must have a
long-term character, as the hazard of exit is
reduced with time. Firms with high leverage
face proportionally greater hazard to be put
under surveillance or to exit altogether from
the Athex, in relation to firms with low lever-
age. Firms in sectors with a high rate of new
entry face a proportionally greater hazard to be
placed under surveillance. Another determi-
nant is the firm’s initial size. Between two firms
with high leverage, which are active in a par-
ticularly competitive sector, the one that is
smaller will have almost double the probabil-
ity of exiting the market.
In contrast to the above, factors such as cor-
porate  governance  and  the  macroeconomic
environment do not seem to have a statistically
significant effect, except in the cases where the
baseline  hazard  is  specified  parametrically
when  the  macroeconomic  environment  is
found to play some role.
This study may become the basis for further
research in at least two directions: (i) the ques-
tion whether the effect of the initial charac-
teristics remains constant or change over time;
(ii) in the context of corporate governance,
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using semi-parametric methods, we also test
parametric specifications of the hazard func-
tion to establish whether the results are sensi-
tive to the applied methodology, i.e. we assume
different distributions for the baseline hazard.
In more detail, we initially assume the Weibull





1/˃-1 is the baseline hazard function,
˃ the  parameter  of  duration-dependence,
(X’ʲ) the vector of the explanatory variables
that account for the observed heterogeneity
between  firms  and  ʲ a  vector  of  unknown
parameters.
According to equation (4), apart from the coef-
ficients on the explanatory variables (ʲ), the
parameter ˃, which indicates the form of the
baseline hazard is also estimated. If ˃=1, the
probability of survival is constant and inde-
pendent of duration. But if ˃>1 (˃<1), the
probability of survival decreases (increases)
with duration. The main feature of the Weibull
specification is that it constrains the hazard to
be monotonic thereby excluding the case of an
increase at the beginning and a fall thereafter
or vice versa. This limitation leads to alterna-
tive specifications for the baseline hazard that
are subject to less limitation. E.g. the loglo-
gistic specification allows the baseline hazard
to take on both monotonic and non-monoto-
nic forms.
The loglogistic specification of function (2)





where ˃ is the parameter of duration-depen-
dence and (X’ʲ) the vector of explanatory vari-
ables that account for the observed hetero-
geneity between firms. When ˃≥1, the baseline
hazard is monotonic, as in the Weibull case;
when ˃≤1, the baseline hazard is non-mono-
tonic (an inverted U-shape).
Finally, we examine the lognormal specifica-
tion of equation (2), which can be expressed as:
ʻ(t) =







where z(t)=[log(t)-X’ʲ]/˃ and ʦ[z(t)] is the
distribution function of the standardised nor-
mal distribution.
It can be noted that in the cases where the
baseline hazard is parametric, model (2) loses
its analogue capacity (although in the Weibull
specification  the  analogue  interpretation  is
also possible) and its factors are interpreted
slightly differently (accelerated model).
Accelerated models take on the following gen-
eral form:
logT=-X’ʲ*+u?log[T exp(-X’ʲ*)]=˃w (7)
where the expression exp(-X’ʲ*) operates as a
time scale, having the following practical sig-
nificance: If exp(-X’ʲ*)>1, the time scale for
the observation with X features changes more
rapidly and accelerates the non-survival of that
particular observation by T*exp(-X’ʲ*)-T. By
contrast, if exp(-X’ʲ*)<1, the time scale for
the observation with X features slows down
non-survival by T*exp(-X’ʲ*)-T.40
ʲ* parameters in model (7) are interpreted
with the help of the time ratio–TR. This ratio
is calculated as follows:




4 40 0 For more information on these samples see Lancaster (1990).
PARAMETRIC METHODS FOR ESTIMATING THE
HAZARD FUNCTION
APPENDIX
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duration and values less than 1 mean a reduc-
tion in duration. E.g. if the ratio took on the
value 1.224, it would mean an increase in the
survival duration by 22.4%; if it took on the
value 0.25, it would mean a decline in the sur-
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In recent years international capital flows in
the form of foreign direct investment (FDI)
have increased considerably. Indicatively, from
2002 to 2006 intra-euro area FDI inflows
(among the 12 oldest countries) recorded an
increase of the order of 20%. Also indicatively,
intra-euro area FDI stocks amounted to 29%
of euro area GDP in 2006, compared to 22%
in 2002.1
For Greece, the degree of inward foreign
direct investment, mainly in comparison with
other member countries of the European
Union (and the euro area), appears particu-
larly low. The inward FDI stock originating
from countries of the euro area in 2006 was
only 4.3% of the Greek GDP (in 2002, this per-
centage was 3.8%).2
The effects of FDI on the host country is one
of the most important issues in international
economics. The large increase in international
capital flows in FDI has renewed interest in
these issues. The main questions economic
research is concerned with are: (a) the direct
and indirect (through technology diffusion)
effects of FDI on domestic productivity and
( b) the cost to domestic firms from new mar-
ket entrants.
The aim of this study is to investigate the
impact of FDI on the productivity of the Greek
economy. More specifically, what are the direct
and indirect effects of foreign presence on
domestic productivity?
It must be stressed that FDI exerts an effect on
the productivity of the domestic economy via
two different channels. The first (direct) chan-
nel is related to the average productivity of the
economy. If the whole economy consists of M
foreign firms and N domestic ones, where for-
eign firms have a higher productivity, a mar-
ginal increase (to M+1) in the presence of for-
eign firms leads to an increase in the average
productivity of the economy. The second (indi-
rect) channel is related to the marginal
increase in economic activity that results from
an increased foreign presence, i.e. a marginal
increase (to M+1) in the presence of foreign
firms may lead to an increase in the produc-
tivity of other X firms through the concept of
“technology diffusion” (the concept will be
analysed below).
There are a number of stylised facts that relate
to the productivity of firms:
– Export firms are more productive than firms
whichproduceonlyfordomesticconsumption.
– Multinational firms are more productive
than domestic and exporting firms and
invest more in research and development
(R&D).
The explanation of the above facts is fairly
straightforward. Export firms face greater com-
petition than domestic firms. If they are not
productive enough, they will not survive as
export firms. Multinationals, besides compe-
tition, also face large sunk costs associated with
the establishment of subsidiaries. In order to
meet these costs, they have to be more pro-
ductive. Furthermore, multinationals are
usually characterised by higher technological
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more effective organisation and a more effi-
cient distribution system.
The present study is structured as follows: The
second section analyses further the concepts of
the  direct  and  indirect  productivity  effects
stemming from FDI and  presents briefly a sur-
vey of the international empirical literature.
The third section presents the relevant litera-
ture and empirical findings for Greece and
describes the data used in this study. In the
fourth section the theoretical and empirical
model employed is explained. The fifth section
reports the main results of the study. The last
section concludes.
2 EMPIRICAL INDICATIONS
2.1 DIRECT EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY
There are several empirical indications that
FDI firms are more productive than domestic
firms. Consequently, they have positive direct
effects  on  the  average  productivity  of  the
domestic economy.
Using firm-level data for the US, the United
Kingdom and Italy, Conyon et al. (2002) and
Criscuolo and Martin (2004) show that multi-
national firms (and consequently FDI firms)
are more productive than domestic firms.3 In
the United Kingdom, for instance, data show
that multinational firms are twice as productive
as domestic firms (Criscuolo and Martin, 2004).
A survey article by Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare
(2004) shows that the same is also true for
developing economies.
Generally, the assumption that multinational
firms are more productive than domestic firms
enjoys strong empirical support. Behind this
result is the now well-established theory of
multinational firms (Caves, 1996, Markusen,
2002,  Helpman  et  al.,  2004),  according  to
which, if there is a specific cost for a firm to
become multinational (e.g. the sunk cost of set-
ting up a subsidiary), then, in equilibrium, only
the most productive firms will operate as multi-
nationals.
2.2 INDIRECT EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY
The  literature  investigating  the  indirect
effects of FDI on the domestic economy is
more  voluminous,  mainly  for  two  reasons:
First, because these effects are of a more com-
plex nature and, second, because the results
concerning indirect effects on productivity are
controversial and contradictory.
Multinational firms, in relation to domestic
ones, usually possess certain intangible assets
such as: better knowledge of technology, bet-
ter marketing and managerial skills, closer ties
to exporters, more coordinated contacts with
suppliers and customers, as well as a better
reputation  in  the  market.  These  intangible
assets can be transferred to a subsidiary and
some of them can be transferred to domestic
firms.
For instance, multinational firm employees
can  acquire  specialised  knowledge  in  their
firms. When changing workplace, they trans-
fer  this  knowledge  to  their  new  jobs.  Fur-
thermore, when domestic firms are exposed to
new products as well as new production and
marketing methods, they can imitate some of
them. Finally, by establishing business rela-
tions  with  the  foreign  multinational  firm,
either as suppliers or purchasers of interme-
diate products, domestic firms may acquire
technical support, as well as knowledge of pro-
duction methods, staff management and mar-
keting. Hence, foreign firms can exert a pos-
itive impact on the productivity of domestic
firms by diffusing the technology and know-
ledge they possess.
Consequently,  there  are  many  reasons  to
believe  that  FDI  firms  can  have  a  positive
impact  on  the  productivity  of  host  country




3 3 A firm is defined as multinational when it has some sort of pro-
duction in another country through FDI. Consequently, a firm char-
acterised as FDI firm is part of a multinational one.
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have negative effects on domestic firms. Once
the former have penetrated the market as com-
petitors, they can, through a lower marginal
cost of production, increase their production
and  capture  market  shares  from  domestic
firms. This causes domestic firms to reduce
their production. Given that domestic firms
have a certain sunk cost, they are obliged to
cover this cost by reducing the quantity of their
production. This implies lower productivity.
The aforementioned indirect effects can be
more easily understood by means of a chart.
Chart 1 shows the effects that the presence of
FDI firms may have on domestic firms.
At first, technology/know-how diffusion has a
positive impact on domestic firms and the aver-
age cost curve (AC) shifts from AC0 to AC1.
However,  further  competition  forces  the
domestic firm to reduce its production and
moves  it  back  along  the  new  average  cost
curve. In the case presented in Chart 1, the net
result for a given level of labour inputs is a
reduction in productivity.
As it appears, the indirect effects of FDI on
domestic  firms’  productivity  are  complex.
Thus, it is not surprising that the results of
empirical studies investigating technological
diffusion are mixed and do not provide strong
empirical support for positive indirect effects
of FDI.4
In general, studies based on industry-level data
point to a positive correlation between foreign
presence  and  average  value  added  per
employee in the sector.5 By contrast, studies
employing firm-level data exhibit mixed results.
Certain studies, such as those of Haddad and
Harrison (1993) on Morocco and Aitken and
Harrison (1999) on Venezuela, find negative
indirect effects on domestic productivity, owing
to the presence of foreign firms.  Other studies,
such as those of Djankov and Hoekman (2000)
on the Czech Republic, Konings (2001) on Bul-
garia, Poland and Romania, Braconier et al.
(2001)  on  Sweden  and  Girma  and  Wakelin
(2001) on the United Kingdom, find doubtful or
zero indirect effects on domestic productivity,
while the studies of Haskel, Pereira and Slaugh-
ter (2007) on the United Kingdom, Griffith,
Redding and Simpson (2003) also on the United
Kingdom, Javorcik (2004) on Lithuania, Keller
and  Yeaple  (forthcoming)  on  the  US,  Liu
(2008) on China and Javorcik and Spatareanu
(2008) on Romania find that foreign firm pen-
etration of the domestic market has positive
indirect effects on domestic productivity.
Finally, there are two studies on Greece by
Dimelis  and  Louri  (2002,  2004),  which  find
posi-tive direct and indirect effects on the pro-
ductivity of domestic firms as a result of the
existence of FDI. It is to these studies that we
now turn.
3 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN GREECE
3.1 FINDINGS ON GREECE
The study by Dimelis and Louri (2002) utilises




4 4 See Keller (2004) for an overview of literature concerning tech-
nology diffusion.
5 5 See Blomstr￶m and Kokko (1998) for an overview.
Chart 1 Changes in domestic firms’ 
production due to the presence of FDI firms
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firms  in  the  manufacturing  industry.  The
results show that the positive direct and indi-
rect effects on productivity differ depending on
the level of productivity. Specifically, the direct
effects are more obvious in the intermediate
quantiles of productivity, i.e. foreign presence
does not affect the productivity of firms which
have either a very high or a very low produc-
tivity. Also, direct effects on productivity are
only significant for firms where foreign share-
holders  possess  the  majority  of  the  shares.
Indirect effects due to technological spillovers
are more positive for firms with high produc-
tivity, irrespective of whether foreign share-
holders possess the majority or the minority of
the shares. In contrast, firms with average or
small productivity are positively affected solely
by the presence of joint ventures i.e. with a co-
ownership percentage of up to 50%.
The second study by Dimelis and Louri (2004)
also employs firm-level ICAP data for 1997, for
3,742  firms  operating  in  the  manufacturing
industry. The authors separate their sample
into large and small firms (firms employing
more than 50 persons and firms employing up
to 50 persons). This separation is performed so
that they can investigate the productivity dif-
ferences between small and large firms.
The main findings of the study show that there
are positive direct and indirect effects on the pro-
ductivity of domestic firms as a consequence of
FDI. Specifically, it is ascertained that the firms
characterised as FDI ones and in which foreign
investors possess a majority of shares are more
productive than the domestic ones. Furthermore,
the difference in productivity increases with the
size of the firm, i.e. large firms (with more than
50 employees) are relatively more productive. By
contrast, the positive indirect effects from tech-
nology diffusion are exerted by smaller joint ven-
tures mainly in smaller domestic firms.
3.2 THE DATA
The data employed in the present study are
firm-level data from the ICAP data base. The
data is an unbalanced panel that covers the
period 2002-2006 and a total of 16,780 firms,
of which 1,113 firms have an FDI indication for
at least one year. Also, the data concern all the
industries of the economy, not only manufac-
turing.
The firms were selected on the basis of the fol-
lowing  criteria:  (a)  firms  with  10  or  more
employees, as defined in the ICAP data base;
(b) firms with positive sales; (c) firms with pos-
itive own funds (the firms which had negative
own funds were state firms with large accu-
mulated losses). Finally, the financial sector
was excluded because of the particularity of
balance sheets in this sector.
Supplementary data on FDI, besides those of
ICAP,  were  also  taken  from  the  Bank  of
Greece data base. These data concern foreign
firms investing or disinvesting in the period
2002-2006. The ICAP data on foreign owner-
ship  were  not  intertemporal but  concerned
only the recent period. However, in order to
have a more comprehensive picture of certain
changes over time in the structure of foreign
participation in our sample, the ICAP data
were  matched  with  data  from  the  Bank  of
Greece.
3.3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE DATA
Probably the simplest way for someone to have
a more general picture concerning firms char-
acterised  as  FDI  ones  relative  to  domestic
firms is through a visual analysis of the data.6
It should be pointed out that, on the basis of
the numbers provided in each column, the
majority of the firms in our sample operate in
the manufacturing and the retail and whole-
sale trade industries (62% of all firms in 2005.
The percentages concerning domestic firms
as well as FDI firms are similar.) From Charts




6 6 The data refer to 2005, as the majority of remarks regard that year.
More charts as well as tables with descriptive statistics are included
in the Annex.
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to the number of firms are quite large. Even
though there are certain differences among
industries concerning the presence of FDI
firms, on average 10% of all firms have an




Chart 2 Number of firms per industry
Chart 3 Sales per industry (at firm level)
(million euro)
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clearly that on average FDI firms are larger
than domestic firms.
The  differences  between  FDI  and  domestic
firms become more evident if certain average




Chart 4 Average fixed capital per industry (at firm level)
(million euro)
Chart 5 Average personnel per industry (at firm level)
(number of employees)
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industries, manufacturing and retail and whole-
sale trade, foreign firms have on average more
personnel, more fixed capital and higher sales.
As shown in the charts, there are significant dif-
ferences  between  industries  in  all  economic
aggregates. The fixed capital per firm seems to
be concentrated in the industries “electricity-
gas supply”, “transport” and “manufacturing”
( “manufacturing” covers only the FDI firms),
which is reasonable, since they are also indus-
tries with high capital requirements. Regarding
personnel, the highest bars always concern FDI
firms. Specifically, the firms which, on average,
have more personnel can be found in “public
administration, education and health”, “manu-
facturing” and “wholesale trade”. Finally, in
sales per firm, firms charachterised as FDI ones
also come first. “Manufacturing” and “whole-
sale trade” display large differences in com-
parison with the other industries.
Probably the most interesting results appear if
all three charts are examined together for the
largest industries of the sample (“manufac-
turing” and “wholesale trade”).  Manufactur-
ing  FDI  firms,  relative  to  domestic  firms,
employ about 3.2 times more fixed capital and
2.4 times more personnel, while they have 5.5
times larger sales. “Wholesale trade” employs
respectively 2.5 times more fixed capital and
2.3 times more personnel, with 3.4 times larger
sales. The economic aggregates for total firms
give a similar picture.
The fact that FDI sales are disproportionately
large means that FDI firms use in general less
labour units and fewer capital units per each
unit sold. This constitutes a first “visual” indi-
cation that FDI firms are more productive than
domestic firms.
Although the charts provide a first visual indi-
cation of productivity differences, they cannot
inform us precisely of its size or of whether it
is systematic and statistically significant. Fur-
thermore,  they  cannot  answer  the  question
whether FDI in Greece can help domestic pro-
ductivity  through  technological  diffusion  or
not. In order to answer these questions, certain




Chart 6 Average value of sales per industry (at firm level)
(million euro)
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4.1 THE THEORETICAL MODEL
As a first step to employ econometric estima-
tions  we  need  to  define  a  basic  theoretical
model. Here, we will use as a base the model
presented in Dimelis and Louri (2002, 2004).
The model is a general form of the production
function, where the firm’s output Yi is formu-
lated as:7
Yi = F(Ki,Li)eZi = F(Ki,Li)e
∑γ iXij+ei (1)
where Ki and Li are the production factors
“capital” and “labour” respectively for the
firm i. Zi = ∑γjXij imply other exogenous pro-
duction factors, the effect of which is given by
γj (Other exogenous factors imply certain eco-
nomic factors that affect the dependent vari-
able, but do not explicitly appear in the gen-
eral form of the function. The exogenous vari-
ables are presented in detail below.) Finally,
ei denotes the random error.
4.2 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
For the empirical specification we assume that
equation (1) has a Cobb-Douglas form. Con-
verting the equation into logarithms and rear-
ranging gives us the following form:
ln(Yi/Li) = γ0+Dj+Dt+αln(Ki/Li)
+∑γjXijt+ei, i=1,...,N (2)
The model is now in labour intensive form.
The dependent variable measures labour pro-
ductivity and is defined as “total sales/num-
ber of employees”. Productivity is a function
of capital per employee, defined as “fixed
capital/number of employees” and a series of
other explanatory variables. γ0  is an inter-
cept, while Dj  and Dt  are dummy variable
vectors based on the two-digit NACE classi-
fication and time respectively. Finally, the
group of explanatory variables Xij  consists
of:8
FDI  dum.:  it is  a  dummy  variable  with  the
value of 1 if the firm is an FDI firm for the year
t (t=2002-2006) and 0 otherwise.
FDI maj.dum.: it is a dummy variable with the
value of 1 if the firm is an FDI firm and the for-
eign shareholder possesses >50% of the shares
for year t (t=2002-2006) and 0 otherwise.
FDI min.dum.: it is a dummy variable with the
value of 1 if the firm is an FDI firm and the for-
eign shareholder possesses ≤50% for the year
t (t=2002-2006) and 0 otherwise.
FDI. FC Spillover: this variable measures tech-
nological diffusion and has been created as fol-
lows: For each two-digit NACE industry clas-
sification, total fixed capital corresponding to
foreign investors is divided by the total fixed
capital of the industry. A positive effect on pro-
ductivity will indicate technological spillovers
to domestic firms i.e.more foreign capital in
the industry has a positive impact on the pro-
ductivity of the industry’s firms.9
MNE domestic: it is a dummy variable with the
value of 1 if the firm is a domestic multinational
(without being an FDI firm) and 0 otherwise.
Exporter: it is a dummy variable with the value
of 1 if the firm is an export firm (without being
an FDI firm or a domestic multinational) and
0 other-wise.
l (Leverage): it is the logarithm of short-and




7 7 Without a loss of generality the (t) index for the time period is omit-
ted.
8 8 A difference in relation to the explanatory variables employed by
Dimelis and Louri (2002, 2004) is that here the size of the firm is
not included. However, the variables MNE domestic and exporter
are used. These variables display a high degree of correlation with
the size of the firm, as multinationals and export firms tend to be
bigger. Since the addition of variables MNE domestic and exporter
allows us to draw certain interesting conclusions, we focus on them
here.
9 9 For FDI firms, the foreign capital of the firm itself was deducted
from total foreign capital, so that the capital of the firm can be
added on to itself.
1 10 0 The logarithm of zero and negative numbers is not defined. How-
ever, given that a firm can have zero debt or zero (and negative)
working capital, in these cases data for the variables in question
were replaced with 0.000001. It should be noted that the general
results do not depend on these changes.
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ital over total assets.
The two financial variables l (Leverage) and
l (Liquidity)  can  depict  either  the  conse-
quences  of  the  financial  pressure  on firms
which makes them become more productive or
the  firm’s  capability  to  utilise  investment
opportunities (for which it holds liquidity) that
are  more  productive.  Both  variables  are
expected to increase productivity (Nickel et
al., 1992, Caballero, 1997, Hubbard, 1998).
However, caution is required concerning the
1(Leverage) variable, which, as noted above,
refers to debt over the firm’s net worth. A pos-
itive effect on productivity may be expected
when  the  data  concerning  firms  regard  a
period covering a whole economic cycle. The
years  covered  in  the  study,  2002-2006,  are
characterised by a positive growth rate, with-
out a decline period. In such a period there is
the possibility that a relatively increased debt
indicates firms with chronic problems and low
productivity, so that the coefficient sign is neg-
ative.
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 THE ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) 
METHOD
Equation (2) is estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS), where all estimations include
the intercept, the two-digit NACE dummy vari-
ables  and  the  time  dummy  variables.  The
results of the  dummy variables are not pre-
sented due to space considerations.
Estimations have been performed on the whole
sample, as well as on the sub-samples of small
firms (with ≤50 employees) and large firms
(with >50 employees). The reason for this divi-
sion is that small firms may differ from large
ones in their use of intermediate factors of pro-
duction (without a division of the sample, the
results could be biased), i.e. small and large
firms may differ in terms of production fac-
tors(capital and labour) and productivity.
Table  1  presents  some  interesting  results.
From regression (1) a number of conclusions
can be derived: First, capital per employee has
a positive sign and is statistically significant.
Since it is in logarithmic form, the coefficient
represents the elasticity, i.e. a 10% increase in
capital per employee increases productivity by
about 1.8%. In addition, the financial vari-
ables 1(Leverage) and 1(Liquidity) are posi-
tive and statistically significant, although with
a smaller coefficient.
The most interesting results are the following.
As concerns dummy variables, we can recall
that they denote whether the firm is an export-
ing firm, a Greek multinational or an FDI firm.
The purely domestic firms are the excluded
firms and thus constitute our control group.
The results show that a Greek exporting firm
is more productive by 9% [(e0.0856-1)x100≈8.9]
than a purely domestic one. A Greek multi-
national is 41% more productive, while an FDI
firm is on average about 59% more productive
than a purely domestic firm.
It should also be pointed out that the differ-
ence between the productivity of an FDI firm
in relation to another Greek multinational is
statistically significant (the difference in coef-
ficients, 0.462 and 0.35, respectively, is statis-
tically significant). What is interesting here is
that it is obvious that foreign multinationals
possess an advantage which makes them more
productive  than  Greek  firms.11 Finally,  it
should be noted that the variable that meas-
ures technology diffusion (FDI. FC Spillover)
is positive, but statistically significant only at
the 10% level.
Regression (2) also shows that FDI firms in
which  the  foreign  shareholder  possesses  the
majority of shares (usually 100%) are the firms
which  differ  most  in  terms  of  productivity.
According to the literature dealing with FDI,




1 11 1 At this point, it should be noted that firm size is important for pro-
ductivity and that export firms and multinationals are clearly big-
ger firms compared to the purely Greek firms, but the use of
dummy variables allows more interesting results to be drawn.
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nology and ‘better’ knowledge, it will be more
willing to apply it in its subsidiary if it can have
total control, without having to share this tech-
nological advantage with a domestic partner
that may become its competitor in the future.
Finally, regressions (3)-(6) yield the following
results: First, large firms, relative to small ones,
differ clearly in terms of the contribution of
capital  per  employee  to productivity.  From
regressions (4) and (6), for instance, the dif-
ference in the coefficient, 0.278, for large firms
from the coefficient, 0.160, for small firms is
statistically significant.
Second, increased borrowing for small firms
has positive effects on their productivity, while
for large firms it has negative effects. Perhaps
for the sample of large firms increased lever-
age indicates firms with chronic problems and
relatively low productivity.
Third, FDI firms are more productive than
Greek multinationals only when they are large
firms. In the case of smaller firms, no differ-
ences are found in productivity between FDI
firms and domestic multinationals (although
both  groups  are  more  productive  than  the
purely  domestic  firms  as  well  as  exporting
firms). In regression (3), which concerns small
firms, the coefficient for FDI firms is 0.44,
while that for domestic multinationals is 0.508
(without, however, the difference being sta-
tistically significant). These results are also
probably an indication that foreign firms are
able to better manage economies of scale.
Moreover, it is obvious that technology diffu-




l l( (K K/ /L L) ) 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.275*** 0.278***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006]
l l( (L Le ev ve er ra ag ge e) ) 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.016*** -0.005*** -0.004**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
l l( (L Li iq qu ui id di it ty y) ) 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.040*** 0.042***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
F FD DI I   d du um m 0.462*** 0.440*** 0.491***
[0.014] [0.018] [0.023]
F FD DI I   m ma aj j. .d du um m. . 0.538*** 0.523*** 0.572***
[0.016] [0.021] [0.026]
F FD DI I   m mi in n. .d du um m 0.276*** 0.219*** 0.324***
[0.024] [0.034] [0.034]
F FD DI I. .   F FC C   S Sp pi il ll lo ov ve er r 0.262* 0.258* 0.483*** 0.488*** 0.02 0.013
[0.153] [0.153] [0.181] [0.181] [0.267] [0.267]
M MN NE E   d do om me es st ti ic c 0.350*** 0.348*** 0.508*** 0.507*** 0.270*** 0.266***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.048] [0.048] [0.030] [0.030]
E Ex xp po or rt te er r 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.125*** 0.125***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.022] [0.022]
O Ob bs s. . 62,949 62,949 50,866 50,866 12,083 12,083



















Table 1 Regressions by the least squares method
Note: *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are given in square brackets.
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a first indication that technology diffusion is
probably not the same for all levels of pro-
ductivity.12 This is because large firms are usu-
ally more productive due to economies of scale.
On the basis of these results, the effects of FDI
are investigated below by applying quantile
regressions.
5.2 QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
In this section, regressions (1) and (2) of Table
1 are estimated separately for each productiv-
ity quantile. This allows our explanatory vari-
ables to have a different impact on productiv-
ity for each quantile.
Specifically, the quantile estimation is based on
the assumption that the dependent variable, pro-
ductivity, is not identically distributed across the
sample (in our sample, where the cross-sectional
dimension, i.e. firms, dominates the time dimen-
sion, it means that productivity is not identically
distributed across all firms). If this is true, the
estimates  carried  out  with  the  least  squares
method (OLS) may not be representative.
The empirical model defined in equation (2)
can be rewritten to allow quantile regressions.
In a compact form it becomes:
yit = x’ itβ(q)+eit = Qq(yit)+eit ,     0<q<1 (3)
where β(q) is a vector of coefficients that will
be estimated for a given value of q ∈(0,1).
In order to make the results more compre-
hensible and due to space considerations, we
do not present tables with estimation results.
Instead, for the variables of interest, we plot
the coefficients of each quantile regression. We
include the point estimates of the coefficients
that are statistically significant, which appear
in numerical form in the charts. Estimates start
from productivity quantile 0.05 (the 5% firms
with the lowest productivity) and increase by
steps of 0.05 up to quantile 0.95.
Chart 7 gives us an idea (by productivity quan-
tile)  of  the  productivity  differences  of  FDI
firms  from Greek  multinationals.  Recalling




1 12 2 Dimelis and Louri (2002) show that this applies in their sample.
Chart 7 Quantile regression, FDI dummy variables and domestic variables
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that (excluding the lower productivity quan-
tiles) foreign firms have a greater advantage
relative  to  Greek  firms,  as  they (both)  are
multinational.
Chart 8 shows that technology diffusion is sta-
tistically significant only for the intermediate
quantiles. A reasonable explanation is that the
less productive firms do not have the potential




Chart 9 Quantile regression, majority FDI dummy variables, minority FDI and domestic
multinationals
Chart 8 Quantile regression, FDI dummy variable and technology diffusion
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more productive firms by contrast may already
have  this  technology  and  know-how;  hence
there is no effect on their productivity from for-
eign presence. By contrast, firms with moderate
productivity, which are able to apply the more
effective production methods that exist in for-
eign firms, experience a positive effect on their
productivity from the presence of FDI firms.
If we compare Chart 7 with Chart 8 we can see
that technological diffusion is statistically sig-
nificant in the quantiles where the productivi-
ty of domestic multinationals is lower relative
to that of foreign firms. This result may indi-
cate increased competitive pressure for the
quantiles  where  productivity  differs  more
between foreign and domestic firms, i.e. there
is higher pressure for an increase in produc-
tivity in these quantiles.
Finally, Chart 9 shows that if the firm is a for-
eign multinational or a Greek multinational,
there is a statistically significant difference in
productivity only if the foreign shareholder
possesses a majority of shares. This large pro-
ductivity difference applies in all quantiles and
thus raises the following concerns. It appears
that either (a) FDI firms in Greece in which
the foreign shareholder has the minority of
shares  do  not  possess  superior  technology
and/or know-how (however, it seems strange
that  foreign  multinationals  that  invest  in
Greece and do not differ in productivity from
Greek multinationals are minority FDI firms,
while  those  that  differ  in  productivity  are
majority FDI ones) or (b) the minority FDI
firms are, for some reason, unwilling to adopt
superior technology and/or know-how that the
foreign investor probably possesses (while it
seems that superior technology and know-how
is utilised in majority FDI firms).13
6 CONCLUSIONS
By utilising a large sample of Greek firms for
the years 2002-2006, we investigated the direct
and indirect productivity effects exerted by for-
eign direct investment in Greece. The results
show that foreign firms, both on average and
relative to domestic firms, are more produc-
tive.  Differences  in  productivity  are  of  the
order of 59%. Furthermore, foreign firms are
by about 18% more productive than Greek
multinationals. The difference in productivity
between  foreign  and  Greek  multinationals
depends on the degree to which the foreign
firm participates in the domestic firm. FDI
firms in which foreign participation is 50% or
less do not seem to be more productive than
Greek multinationals. However, such firms are
more productive than purely domestic firms.
Finally, the presence of foreign direct invest-
ment seems to have a positive impact on tech-
nology diffusion in the Greek economy. Tech-
nology diffusion is significant for smaller firms
which exhibit  intermediate productivity levels.
The overall picture is that foreign direct invest-
ment has a positive impact on the productivity





1 13 3 There is also the possibility that minority investment has another,
perhaps strategic, character, where productivity issues are of sec-
ondary importance.
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When Greece joined Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) on 1 January 2001, competence
for the pursuit of monetary and exchange-rate
policy was handed over by the Bank of Greece
to the Eurosystem. At the same time, the adop-
tion of the euro and its circulation on 1 Janu-
ary 2002 marked the end of the historical
course of the drachma as the country’s national
legal tender. For Greece, the benefits ―but
also the costs― deriving from this historic
event are expected to extend across a rather
long horizon, and thus their full evaluation will
not be feasible before a considerable number
of years have passed. It is estimated that
among the major benefits are the elimination
of exchange-rate risk in trade with the other
euro area countries and the stabilisation of
expectations as regards developments in nom-
inal exchange rates vis-￠-vis other currencies.
A means to this end is the ECB’s credibility
and commitment to the maintenance of price
stability in the euro area, through its interest-
rate and other policies. This fact, combined
with the ECB’s substantial weight in world
markets and its ability to sell large amounts of
foreign reserves to defend the euro, practically
eliminates for Greece the risk of exposure to
speculative attacks against the currency. In the
past, the country has paid a heavy price on
account of such attacks, in the form of insta-
bility in foreign exchange and capital markets
and the ensuing deceleration of real GDP
growth. This price may possibly have been
much greater had the Bank of Greece not
implemented ―successfully, as is commonly
admitted― measures and policies of preven-
tion and defence against such speculative
attacks.
The international literature puts forward a
pleiad of theoretical models that attempt to
interpret speculative attacks on fixed exchange-
rate regimes (or more flexible ones), the under-
lying mechanisms that cause them, and their
determinants. As section 3 explains, the mod-
els do not agree on the existence of a single
sequence of interdependent events that alter
the dynamics of an economy ―and in particu-
lar of the foreign exchange market― leading to
speculative attacks. At the same time, empiri-
cal research cannot be characterised as gener-
ally successful in predicting upcoming crises. A
small number of studies have dealt with the
speculative pressures exerted on the drachma
in various distinct circumstances.
This study aims at historically reviewing all
speculative attacks against the drachma
between 1960 and the introduction of the euro,
empirically evaluating the determinants of
these attacks and assessing the role of the Bank
of Greece in responding to them. Indirectly, it
also offers a measure of the respective advan-
tages for Greece from the changeover to the
euro. A dynamic analysis of attacks and pres-
sures on the drachma in the post-war era is
valuable for two reasons: it allows conclusions
to be drawn on the nature of the internal
macroeconomic and financial imbalances that
triggered each attack, and also helps evaluate
how the parameters attracting the interest of
world markets have varied over time through
the interaction between factors specific to
SPECULATIVE ATTACKS ON THE DRACHMA AND
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ground. In a changing international environ-
ment characterised by constantly increasing
interdependence  and  financial  surpluses  in
search of investment and speculative oppor-
tunities, it is particularly interesting to inves-
tigate  the  possibility  of  an  enhanced  role
played by expectations in the latest crises, and
of contagion from international crises to an
extent not justified by the level of fundamen-
tals. The evaluation of these factors may be of
particular  interest  to  the  new  EU  Member
States wishing to join the euro area.
For these purposes, we use Limited Depend-
ent  Variable  Models  with  many  macroeco-
nomic,  financial  and  political  indicators  as
independent variables. We investigate the exis-
tence of structural differences between these
speculative attacks, depending on the type of
macroeconomic  and  other  imbalances  that
caused them, the time at which the crises tran-
spired,  their  magnitude,  and  whether  these
attacks managed to force devaluation of the
currency or were successfully repulsed by the
Bank of Greece.
The study’s central conclusion is that specula-
tive attacks against the drachma up to the early
1990s are associated with the economy’s com-
petitiveness and monetary aggregates. There-
after, efforts to meet the Maastricht criteria
brought about a structural change in monetary
policy, so that any shocks observed transpired
rather due to contagion. In addition, devalua-
tions  are  correlated  with  deeper  structural
imbalances, unlike pressures repulsed by the
Bank of Greece, which rather emerged due to
transient market expectations.
The study is structured as follows: after this
first introductory part, Section 2 examines the
Greek  monetary  policy  framework  and  the
drachma exchange-rate regimes in the period
1960-2000  and,  in  relation  to  the  above,
describes the various episodes of speculative
pressures. Section 3 reviews the theoretical
models and empirical approaches that have
been employed to explain speculative attacks,
with special reference to studies examining the
case  of  Greece.  Section  4  describes  the
methodology of our approach, the theoretical
underpinnings of the variables used and the
data analysed. Section 5 presents the major
results  and  their  sensitivity  tests.  Section  6
recapitulates and puts forward the conclusions
drawn from our findings with respect to the
pursuit of policy.
2 MONETARY POLICY, DRACHMA 
EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES AND SPECULATIVE
PRESSURES
This section reviews the Greek exchange-rate
policy stance from 1960 to the country’s entry
into the euro area in 2001 within the more gen-
eral  framework  of  monetary  policy  pursuit,
with special reference to the cases of specula-
tive  attacks  on  the  drachma.  Table  1  sum-
marises the moments in time which ―based on
the following analysis of data collected from
various sources― were classified as incidents
of “speculative pressure” against the drachma,
whether successful or not. On the basis of these
instances we have also constructed an ad hoc
indicator of crisis identification, which consti-
tutes the starting point of the empirical analy-
sis and a comparison measure for the crisis
measuring indicators constructed by use of the
data.
In 1953, the drachma was devalued by 50%
and pegged to the US dollar at an exchange
rate of 30 drachmas per dollar on joining the
Bretton Woods system. According to Lazare-
tou (2009), this choice, combined with suc-
cessful  fiscal  consolidation  and  restrictive
monetary and economic policies, led to a sta-
ble environment of low and predictable infla-
tion (averaging 2.4% with minor fluctuations
over the period 1953-1973). This has stimu-
lated  investment  and  the  maintenance  of
strong economic growth, combined in parallel
with the deregulation of internal and external
trade, which contributed to the improvement
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of pressures on the drachma during its partici-
pation in the Bretton Woods system. In this
period, crises manifested themselves through
massive withdrawals of private deposits from
commercial banks and spilled over to the for-
eign  exchange  market  through  the  ensuing
jump in demand for gold sovereigns. The first
such incident came about in November 1963
and lasted until January 1964. As noted by Alo-
goskoufis and Lazaretou (2002), the political
instability that followed the electoral victory of
the Centre Union (“Enosis Kentrou”) party
resulted in a lower rate of increase in deposits
and in flights of capital abroad. The Bank of
Greece was forced to sell roughly 3.4 million
gold sovereigns in just one quarter. A second




Table 1 Chronology of major exchange-rate events of the drachma
* These incidents ended in devaluation or a fast depreciation. In other “SP” cases, pressures were absorbed by the Bank of Greece.
1 “SP”: Speculative Pressure, “C”: Calmness (absence of attack or voluntary depreciation).
Period Events in the foreign exchange market
Indicator’s
indication1
November 1963 Political instability, withdrawal of private deposits from commercial banks and bulge in demand for gold
pounds.
SP
July 1964 Escalating tension in the Greek-Turkish relations, with consequences such as those of November 1963. SP
August 1971 Collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Pegging of the drachma to the US dollar with an exchange rate
of 30 drachmas per dollar.
C
March 1975 Detachment of the drachma from the dollar and pegging to a basket of currencies. Policy of fast or con-
trolled (1980-1982) depreciation of the drachma.
C
January 1983 Devaluation by 16% vis-￠-vis the US dollar and 15.5% vis-￠-vis the ECU. SP *
October 1985 Devaluation by 15% vis-￠-vis the ECU under the two-year stabilisation programme. SP *
1985-1987 Fast depreciation of the drachma (sliding). C
March 1989 Depreciation expectations and pressures due to seasonal effects and the electoral results of June 1989 that
disallowed the formation of an autonomous government. Sales of foreign reserves.
SP
March 1990 Pressures due to a further deterioration of macroeconomic imbalances and uncertainty during the elec-
tions run-up period, intervention by the Bank of Greece in financial markets and rise in interest rates.
SP
September 1992 Crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS), expectations of depreciation of the drachma, capital out-
flow abroad. The Bank of Greece raises banks’ overdraft rates.
SP
October 1993 Pressures due to uncertainty in the elections run-up period and fiscal deficit excesses. The Bank of Greece
raises interbank market rates.
SP
May 1994 Pressures in view of the deregulation of movement of capital. The Bank of Greece raises the (interbank
market, intervention) rates.
SP
March 1995 Pressures in world markets. Short-lived acceleration of the drachma’s depreciation vis-￠-vis the ECU. SP
November 1997 Pressures due to contagion of the crisis in SE Asia, deterioration in the current account deficit and the
external debt, and market expectations of the drachma’s participation in EMS’s Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism with a depreciation. The Bank of Greece raises overdraft rates and intervenes extensively in the for-
eign exchange market.
SP
March 1998 Rumours and pressures force the Bank of Greece to expedite participation of the drachma in the EMS’s
ERM with a central parity of 357 drachmas per ECU (i.e. devalued vis-￠-vis the ECU by 12.3%) and a
fluctuation band of ﾱ15%.
SP *
August 1998 Capital outflows due to portfolio restructuring by foreign investors suffering losses from the financial tur-
moil in Russia. The Bank of Greece raises interbank rates.
SP
1 January 1999 Participation of the drachma in the ERM ʙʙ with a central parity vis-￠-vis the euro of 353.109 drachmas
per euro and a fluctuation band of ﾱ15%.
C
November 1999 Pressures due to doubts regarding the timely fulfilment of the inflation criterion as well as to uncertainty
as to whether the drachma/euro central parity would be the conversion rate of the drachma at end-2000.
C
January 2000 Revaluation of the drachma’s central parity rate by 3.5% (to 340.750 drachmas/euro) so as to limit the
required depreciation.
C
January 2002 Euro cash changeover. C
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Greek-Turkish relations and the bombing of
Cyprus by Turkey. The Bank of Greece, in
order to support the drachma, sold 3.6 million
gold sovereigns in the six months between May
and October 1964.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods rule in
August 1971 marked a shift in the world econ-
omy towards floating exchange rates, granting
to each country’s authorities independence in
monetary  policy  pursuit.  The  drachma  was
unpegged from the US dollar and followed a
regime of managed floating vis-￠-vis a basket
of currencies in March 1975. The steep rises in
oil and other commodity prices in 1973 and
1979 caused inflation in Greece, as well as
worldwide, to soar to two-digit figures. Yet,
after the second oil crisis, whereas most indus-
trialised countries set disinflation as a primary
objective of their economic policy and man-
aged to bring inflation down to one-digit fig-
ures by the early 1980s, Greece pursued an
expansionary monetary policy up to early 1982
(see Bank of Greece Annual Report for 1983).
As also mentioned by Garganas and Tavlas
(2002), a strategy of monetary targeting (for
Μ0 for the first time in 1975 and mainly for Μ3
since the early 1980s), while at the same time
monitoring domestic credit expansion and the
exchange rate, was not effective in lowering
inflation. Thus, a simultaneous policy of allow-
ing the drachma to depreciate fast became nec-
essary in order to offset the effects of wage
increases on the domestic economy’s interna-
tional competitiveness.
It should equally be pointed out that the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy was also under-
mined by the inflexibility with which the finan-
cial system operated, as well as by the multiple
restrictions  on  it.  The  financial  system  in
Greece up to the early 1990s was rigorously
controlled so as to serve specific objectives,
such as allowing for public sector financing at
low cost, providing incentives for the devel-
opment  of  specific  sectors  of  the  economy
―mainly agriculture― and, whenever deemed
necessary, discouraging credit expansion. The
main instrument of policy pursuit, alongside
restrictions and selective granting of credit, was
control over deposit and lending interest rates.
In the period June 1980 to end-1982, Greece
opted  for  controlled  depreciation  of  the
drachma, so as to maintain its products’ com-
petitiveness without feeding inflationary pres-
sures. However, inflation in the period 1980-
1985 remained on average at 20%. The redis-
tribution of income in favour of the popula-
tion’s weaker classes (set as a priority of eco-
nomic policy) combined with excessive gov-
ernment borrowing led to large fiscal deficits
and balance of payment disequilibria. In addi-
tion, the establishment of wage indexation in
1982 played a decisive role in keeping infla-
tionary expectations up.
High inflation and the fact that the depreciation
rate did not fully offset inflation differentials
led to appreciation of the real exchange rate
and loss in competitiveness. Under pressure,
the government attempted to recover this loss
through a 16% devaluation of the drachma vis-
￠-vis the US dollar and 15.5% vis-￠-vis the ECU
in early 1983. But the competitive disadvantage
persisted and, as a result, the current account
deficit reached 10% of GDP in 1985, while the
economy  showed  symptoms  of  stagflation.
Under these circumstances the drachma was
devalued anew by 15% vis-￠-vis the ECU on 11
October 1985, which improved competitiveness.
Anticipating inflationary pressures due to the
devaluation,  the  government  announced  an
anti-inflationary  policy  implementing  a  two-
year stabilisation programme, of which incomes
policy  formed  a  major  part.  Garganas  and
Tavlas (2002) consider that this programme
helped improve the current account balance
and reduce inflation.
It is obviously hard to conclude whether the
aforementioned devaluations were forced or
voluntary  policy  interventions.  Perhaps,  to
some extent, they could be seen as preventive
actions aimed at averting a more generalised
attack, given the macroeconomic imbalances
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gramme was discontinued after 1987. At the
same time, however, from early 1987 onwards,
financial markets started to be gradually dereg-
ulated, allowing for the adoption of indirect
instruments of monetary control. Expectations
of depreciation of the drachma and pressure on
the foreign exchange market resumed between
March and April 1989, triggered by certain sea-
sonal effects, namely, high balance of payments
deficits observed in the first months of the year.
Of course, the underlying cause was the coun-
try’s persistent positive inflation differentials
over its trade partners. Expectations of depre-
ciation were further fuelled by the electoral
results of June 1989, which disallowed the for-
mation of an autonomous government. The
Bank of Greece responded with massive sales
of foreign reserves and higher policy rates, and
managed to contain the depreciation of the
drachma’s average effective exchange rate for
1989 to around 7.1%, a level lower than infla-
tion.
However,  inflationary  pressures  resumed
worldwide due to rising oil prices in 1990 and
the economic recovery of industrialised coun-
tries.  Domestically,  macroeconomic  imbal-
ances worsened further and a climate of uncer-
tainty prevailed during the run-up to the elec-
tions. As a result of all the above parameters
combined,  strong  pressures  on  foreign  ex-
change and financial markets also continued in
the second half of March 1990. The Bank of
Greece, according to the Annual Report for
1990, in order not to deviate from the restric-
tive  monetary  and  credit  targets  it  had
announced  in  February  1990,  proceeded  to
interventions in the financial markets with a
view to controlling the banks’ liquidity and
credit expansion. The measures it adopted led
to an increase of 1-1.5 percentage points in the
interest rates on bank loans and helped alle-
viate the intense exchange-rate pressures.
Roughly at the same time, the Greek govern-
ment and the Bank of Greece engaged in coor-
dinated efforts to meet the criteria set by the
Maastricht Treaty (signed in February 1992
and put into force in November 1993), first for
joining  the  European  Monetary  System
(EMS), and then for adopting the single cur-
rency. The measures were mainly geared at
lowering inflation, fiscal deficits and public
debt.
The EMS crisis in September 1992 affected
Greece as well, but not to the point of dragging
it  into  a  collapse  of  its  exchange  rate.  The
expectations of depreciation of the drachma
that emerged resulted in considerable capital
outflows abroad and correspondingly limited
liquidity. The Bank of Greece, with a view to
containing pressures on the foreign exchange
market, raised the interest rate on banks’ over-
drafts from their current accounts held with
the Bank of Greece from 30% to 40%. Finally,
pressures in all European countries diffused
with the widening of the EMS fluctuation band
from ﾱ2.5% to ﾱ15% in August 1993.
Pressures  on  the  drachma’s  exchange  rate
appeared  anew  in  September  and  October
1993, on account of the uncertainty prevailing
during the run-up to the elections, as well as
the large excesses in the public sector’s bor-
rowing  requirements  compared  with  the
respective provisions in the State Budget. Once
more, the Bank of Greece resorted to increases
in interbank rates in order to contain these
pressures, as mentioned in the Annual Report
for 1993.
Nevertheless, the measures taken for meeting
the Maastricht criteria ultimately bore fruit.
The combined effect of restrictive incomes pol-
icy and moderate growth (GDP grew at an
average rate of 1%) contributed to a drastic
decline in inflation from 20% to 11% in the
period 1991-1994. Zonzilos (2000) empirically
showed that the inflation process underwent a
structural change in the first half of the 1990s.
This transition to a lower inflation regime may
have curbed the intensity of pressures on the
drachma, but does not seem to have averted
the accumulation of real appreciation. The rea-
son for this is that, within the context of anti-
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exchange-rate policy objective from January
1991 onwards that the drachma’s depreciation
rate should not fully offset the domestic infla-
tion’s differential over the inflation of the EU
countries (Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou, 2002).
Pressures on the drachma resumed on May
1994, as the final date of 1 July 1994, set by the
EU for full deregulation of the movement of
capital, was drawing nearer. The government’s
privileged borrowing from banks had already
been abolished in early 1994, according to the
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. But the
market expected that full deregulation would
be accompanied by a faster depreciation of the
drachma, or even a one-off devaluation, con-
sidering that real appreciation had accumu-
lated and now had to be eliminated for the
drachma  to  join  the  EMS  at  a  competitive
exchange rate. Questions also arose concern-
ing the government’s ability to service its ris-
ing external debt. As a result, capital outflows
were observed. To deal with this phenomenon,
the authorities proceeded without warning to
a full deregulation of capital movement on 16
May 1994. The Bank of Greece fended the
pressures off by drastically increasing its inter-
vention rate and imposing an additional daily
charge of 0.4% on the financial institutions’
cost of borrowing through overdrafts on their
current accounts held with the Bank of Greece.
The imposition of this additional daily charge
brought the respective annual overdraft rate to
180%, making borrowing in drachmas quite
unprofitable. These measures were successful
and  resulted  in  capital  inflows,  while  soon
afterwards interest rates returned to the levels
seen  before  the  crisis  and  the  depreciation
caused by the pressure exerted until mid-June
was more than offset.
In 1995, the Bank of Greece announced for the
first time a quantitative target on an annual
basis for the drachma’s exchange rate, namely
depreciation of around 3% between the begin-
ning  and  the  end  of  the  year.  Using  the
exchange rate as an “anchor” for monetary pol-
icy became official and known as the “hard
drachma” policy. Abrupt fluctuations in the
course of 1995 were avoided, but March saw an
acceleration  of  the  currency’s  depreciation.
According  to  the  Bank  of  Greece  Annual
Report for 1995, this fact was due to the par-
ticularly  strong  pressures  that  appeared  in
international foreign exchange markets, aris-
ing  from  the  political  uncertainty  that  pre-
vailed in Europe with respect to the starting
time of monetary union. Also, the fiscal con-
solidation  process  was  meeting  with  some
resistance because of its real effects on the
economies,  stemming  from  the  insufficient
economic  convergence  of  fiscal  aggregates
between certain Member States. Nonetheless,
pressures were short-lived and left no trace on
the data.
The outburst of the crisis in SE Asia in 1997
marked the start of persistent speculative pres-
sures  on  the  drachma  that  lasted  for  10
months, resulting in considerable capital out-
flows. Brissimis et al. (2002) argue that the
domestic market had already begun to foster
expectations regarding an overvalued drachma
from mid-1997. Such expectations had been
fuelled  by  the  appreciation  of  the  real
exchange rate, the high current account deficit
(4% of GDP in 1997) and the country’s high
external debt (public gross external debt, on its
own, amounted to 24% of GDP in 1997) in
combination  with  the  high  rate  of  wage
increases.  ʤhomopoulos  (2004)  notes  that
some investment banks were publishing esti-
mates that the drachma was overvalued by as
much as 28%. The same author estimates the
real appreciation accumulated during the pre-
vious three years due to the “hard drachma”
policy  and  the  simultaneous  persistence  of
long-lasting differentials between the domes-
tic and foreign levels of prices at around 10%,
taking into consideration the Balassa-Samuel-
son  effect  and  other  factors.  In  any  case,
against this background, it became necessary
for the Bank of Greece to take measures sim-
ilar in form and extent to those it had taken
during the crisis of 1994, in order to cope with
the pressures. But contagion from the Asian
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Several foreign financial institutions proceeded
to a liquidation of their positions in Greek gov-
ernment bonds and other investments to cover
losses in the Asian market.
However, rumours and pressures persisted
even after normalisation in Asia. The reason,
according to Voridis et al. (2003), was that
the country’s objective to join the euro area
by 2001 set May 1998 as a deadline for the
drachma’s entry into the ERM. Part of the
markets  expected  that  ERM  participation
would be accompanied by a devaluation of
the drachma so as to correct the competi-
tiveness deficit stemming from the accumu-
lated overvaluation. To diffuse tensions in
the foreign exchange market, the government
finally had to expedite (Voridis et al., 2003)
the  drachma’s  entry  into  the  ERM,  which
took place on 16 March 1998, with the cen-
tral parity set at 357 drachmas per ECU and
the fluctuation band at ﾱ15%. The central
parity represented a 12.3% devaluation of the
drachma vis-￠-vis the exchange rate deter-
mined  at  the  end  of  transactions  on  the
penultimate day before ERM participation.
This adjustment put an end to the period of
speculative  pressures  and  capital  outflows
and was considered as a necessary and suf-
ficient  condition  for  ensuring  that  the
drachma’s inclusion in the ERM would nei-
ther cause a slowdown of economic growth in
Greece nor place the balance of payments at
risk. Garganas and Tavlas (2002) estimate
that a parallel banking crisis was only avoided
thanks to the overall good condition of the
Greek  banking  sector,  and  attribute  this
banking soundness to the prudent regulatory
and  supervisory  activity  of  the  Bank  of
Greece.
In May 1998, the discount rate ceased to exist,
when this means of refinancing was abolished,
as there was no corresponding practice within
the Eurosystem. Garganas and Tavlas (2002)
note that the drachma’s participation in the
ERM restored calmness in the markets and led
to considerable capital inflows that increased
the country’s foreign exchange reserves in US
dollars. The central bank, in its effort to limit
these inflows, implemented an excess liquidity
absorption policy through interventions in the
interbank market. At the same time, it allowed
the drachma to remain overvalued compared
with its central exchange rate in the ERM,
within a band in the order of 6.5-9%. Garganas
(2008) emphasises that inflationary pressures
or potential recession after the devaluation
that  accompanied  ERM  participation  were
avoided thanks not only to the credibility the
ERM had already acquired, but also to the
country’s fiscal and labour market policies that
were consistent with ERM participation.
However, the crisis in Russia in end-August
1998 came to disrupt calmness and to bring
about a temporary rise in interbank rates and
a decline in the drachma’s appreciation rela-
tive to its central rate to 4% (Brissimis et al.
2002). The Bank of Greece, in its Monetary
Policy Interim Report (November 1998) esti-
mates that this crisis had an effect on liquidity
in the Greek capital markets, although to an
extent smaller than that after the crisis in Asia,
but nonetheless giving rise to a large increase
in the volatility of returns. Capital outflows
were recorded again by foreign investors who
restructured their portfolios so as to compen-
sate for losses suffered in the Russian market.
On 1 January 1999, the drachma joined the
ERM ʙʙ with a central parity of 353.109 drach-
mas per euro, and a fluctuation band of ﾱ15%.
At year-end, however, pressures on the foreign
exchange market resumed ―as noted also by
Garganas and Tavlas (2002)― although not as
intensely as before the drachma’s participation
in the ERM. They were triggered by doubts
with respect to the timely fulfilment of the
inflation criterion, as well as by uncertainty as
to whether the drachma/euro central parity
would be the drachma’s conversion rate at the
end of 2000. On 14 January 2000, the drachma
was 6% higher than its central exchange rate.
To avoid the inflationary consequences of the
required depreciation back to the central par-
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the ERM, the central parity was revalued by
3.5%, to 340.75 drachmas per euro, which lim-
ited the required depreciation to 2.6% (from
6% that would have been necessary otherwise).
On  19  June  2000,  the  ECOFIN  Council
approved the inclusion of Greece into the euro
area  as  of  1  January  2001,  followed  by  the
introduction  of  euro  banknotes  and  coins,
replacing the drachma, on 1 January 2002.
3 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
An exchange-rate crisis can be defined as a
case of extreme speculative pressure on the
foreign exchange market as a result of a sud-
den and sizeable change in the composition of
the portfolios of private citizens who try to
gain benefits or avert losses from: (a) an antic-
ipated change in the currency’s exchange rate,
or (b) changes in the exchange rates of other
currencies in which they have holdings. Such
pressure is often followed by an abrupt deval-
uation/depreciation of the exchange rate, but
may  sometimes  be  repulsed  by  the  central
bank, which, in its effort to defend the cur-
rency,  proceeds  to  dramatic  interest  rate
increases and/or sales of foreign reserves.
The international literature offers various dif-
ferent interpretations of the nature of specu-
lative attacks and the mechanisms that link
them to key economic and political aggregates.
These mechanisms also determine an attack’s
success probability, as well as the severity of its
impact. Crises vary in time as to their symp-
toms and the imbalances ascribed to them. The
review by Flood and Μarion (1998) shows that
most traditional models interpret the particu-
larities of specific episodes that gave birth to
the development of each model.
The point of departure are the “First Gener-
ation  Models”  (hereinafter  FGMs).1 These
support that the basic cause of all crises is the
inconsistency  between  an  expansionary
domestic policy and rigid exchange-rate tar-
gets. In more detail, crises are provoked by the
priority a government gives to strictly abiding
by an exogenously set policy target. In the ini-
tial model by Krugman (1979), the primary
objective is the servicing of a steadily widen-
ing fiscal deficit. Financing the deficit through
money issuing by the central bank, combined
with the need to maintain total money supply
unchanged, leads to a gradual depletion of
foreign  reserves.  Speculators  predict  the
inevitability of a devaluation and attack before
the exhaustion of foreign reserves, to prevent
capital  losses.  Although  the  framework  is
deterministic, it may allow for a rotation of
attacks and confidence restorations, if there
is  uncertainty  as  to  the  volume  of  foreign
reserves governments would be willing to sell
to defend the currency.
“Second  Generation  Models”  (hereinafter
SGMs)2 indirectly correlate the emergence of
a crisis with the soundness of an economy’s
macroeconomic aggregates. In more detail, as
also in FGMs, unusually high values of certain
variables may urge governments to implement
an  expansionary  monetary  policy  and  thus
place the fixed exchange rate at risk. The dif-
ficulty  of  maintaining  a  regime  of  fixed
exchange rates lies in the market’s low confi-
dence as to the achievability of this objective
because of the inherent inconsistency of the
policies followed. Inflationary expectations are
incorporated into wages and negatively affect
the macroeconomic aggregates. This enhances
the impact of any adverse shock to demand,
thus strengthening the government’s incentives
to  devalue.  This  bidirectional  interaction
entails that the cost of defending the exchange
rate depends on endogenous variables as well.
By consequence, any equilibrium is “fragile”,
because expectations may be self-fulfilling, and




1 1 Salant and Henderson (1978) used Hotelling’s (1931) model on the
pricing of exhaustible resources to study attacks on the price of gold
set by the government. Krugman (1979) applied this principle to
fixed exchange-rate values. Flood and Garber (1984) improved his
model further. See Agenor et al. (1992) for a review.
2 2 SGMs are based on expansions of the monetary policy time incon-
sistency models elaborated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983). Perhaps most representative is the one
by Obstfeld (1994).
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characterised by a single sequence of events.
Any variable (e.g. higher short-term real inter-
est rates, unemployment, changes in govern-
ment, etc.) may operate as an alarm signal to
synchronise expectations, spark off expecta-
tions of devaluation and consequently create
a crisis, as long as the market considers that
this  variable  is  relevant.  Even  a  seemingly
insignificant event may change market per-
ceptions and constitute the trigger of a spec-
ulative attack, if seen as the culmination of
some long-lasting economic and/or political
problem.
The  so-called  “Third  Generation  Models”
(hereinafter  TGMs)  place  emphasis  on  the
interaction between exchange-rate crises and
financial markets. Recent episodes, and par-
ticularly the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, have
made evident the connection between these
two and have brought to the fore notions such
as “moral hazard” and “adverse selection”.3
The imperfections of financial markets com-
bined with the provision of explicit or indirect
government guarantees to banks may lead to
excessive and unsecured borrowing. By con-
sequence,  exogenous  shocks  (e.g.  a  major
bankruptcy,  recession,  stock  market  crash,
political  instability,  or  banking  panic)  may
evolve into a generalised financial disruption
and then spill over to foreign exchange mar-
kets.
All the aforementioned theoretical approaches
perceive exchange-rate crises as cases of dis-
continuity in the foreign exchange market, but
interpret any abrupt movements observed dur-
ing the crises as consistent with the behaviour
of  forward-looking  speculators.  A  potential
rejection of the theoretical framework con-
cerning the emergence, extent, time and con-
tagion of the crises by empirical analysis would
cast doubt on the validity of the rational expec-
tations hypothesis and the treatment of the
exchange rate as an asset price. Unfortunately,
empirical research has yet to document a con-
vincing relationship between crises and eco-
nomic fundamentals. This has supported views
that markets are dominated by instincts and
self-fulfilling expectations. If this is true, it may
be practically impossible to predict the exact
time crises appear, but perhaps a vulnerability
zone may be traceable.4 Empirical findings can
thus be seen as a test of the validity of theo-
retical predictions, while at the same time pro-
viding an instrument for predicting, managing
and repulsing crises.
Identification of exchange-rate crises is hard,
since the whole process varies in each differ-
ent episode and involves several macroeco-
nomic indicators. This diversity of external fea-
tures, which has spawned different theoretical
approaches, casts doubt on the existence of a
satisfactory  degree  of  similarity  among  the
structural parameters underlying a crisis. Nev-
ertheless, successfully predicting future crises
depends heavily on answering the question of
whether all crises are characterised by common
drivers, so that generalisations based on pre-
vious experience may be feasible.
Answering  the  above  question  calls  for  an
empirical approach that systematically exam-
ines the nature of the relationships linking the
crises  with  macroeconomic  aggregates  in  a
common pattern, and quantifies the degree to
which crises are similar and, by consequence,
predictable. The first empirical studies, such
as  those  by  Blanco  and  Garber  (1986)  or
Cumby and van Wijnbergen (1989), do not ful-
fil this criterion, since they analyse the col-
lapse of specific fixed exchange-rate regimes.
These episodes are not necessarily represen-
tative of the underlying populations of signif-
icant devaluation episodes, which in turn are
not representative of the total population of
successful or unsuccessful speculative attacks
on various exchange-rate regimes (e.g. some
fixed exchange-rate regimes are abandoned




3 3 These notions had formerly been used by authors such as Μishkin
(1992, 1996), Calvo and Μentoza (1997) and Caplin and Leahy
(1994), in the broader context of asymmetric information models.
4 4 In such a case we could also predict the intensity of the blow a cri-
sis would bring about in different countries, as a function of their
sensitivity to disruptions such as a global decline in confidence.
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proach”,5 which records unusual deviations of
a  series  of  macroeconomic  aggregates  and
respectively signals an upcoming crisis. How-
ever, more rigorous scholarly efforts employ
binary  Limited  Dependent  Variable  (LDV)
models, applied to a panel of data from many
countries.6 LDV methods have the advantage
of  summarising  all  underlying  relationships
under  a  single  measure  of  likelihood.  But
although this methodology limits the episode
selection  bias,  the  above  studies  indirectly
assume the existence of homogeneity among
the various crises without proceeding to formal
tests. The typically average performance of the
empirical models has usually been attributed
to  the  loose  links  between  macroeconomic
aggregates and crises, overlooking the possi-
bility of it stemming ―at least partly― from
inherent differences among the episodes under
study.7 While  it  has  been  understood  that
episodes of different scale and impact are char-
acterised by heterogeneity, the latter has not
been documented through formal tests of the
existence of structural differences. The studies
focusing on the drachma are no exception with
respect to the above observations.
3.1 STUDIES OF SPECULATIVE PRESSURES ON THE
DRACHMA
The relatively limited literature on the drach-
ma8 acknowledges the impossibility of explain-
ing all events relying on a single rationale of
causalities and event sequences. On account of
this, these studies tend to focus on limited time
periods. The incidents examined exhibit by and
large the features described by FGMs. Conse-
quently, all these studies ―except the one by
Apergis and Eleftheriou (2002)― empirically
test the predictions of specific FGMs.
All such studies converge to the estimate that
crises were associated with external and fiscal
imbalances and nominal rigidities that created
inflation  differentials  over  other  advanced
countries. These factors, combined with the
reduction in the depreciation rate after 1985 in
order to contain inflationary pressures, were
leading to concerns about the eventuality of
the drachma being overvalued and were fos-
tering  expectations  of  further  depreciation.
However, the emergence of episodes of tur-
moil in the foreign exchange market became
possible ―if not even more frequent― due
also  to  the  deepening  and  deregulation  of
financial markets. The worse scenario of a twin
parallel banking crisis is thought to have been
avoided thanks to the Greek banking sector’s
sound economic aggregates.
Flood and Kramer (1996) attempt a qualitative
analysis of the drachma crisis in May 1994.
Although not providing a formal econometric
test, the authors argue that a FGM following
Flood  and  Garber  (1984)  can  adequately
explain the episode, as it delineates the basic
inconsistency between the policy of financing
the public debt by monetary means and the
“hard  drachma”  policy.  The  latter  ―albeit
more flexible than full pegging― led to an
accumulated real appreciation of the drachma.
The eventual failure of the attack is attributed
to the rise in interest rates brought about by
the Bank of Greece. This increased the cost for
speculators to such an extent that a deprecia-
tion of 40-50% would have been required for
speculative activity to be profitable − a per-
centage far too high relative to market expec-
tations.
Kalyvitis  (1993)  calculated  the  drachma’s
depreciation probabilities in the period 1987-
1992, applying the FGM of Blanco and Gar-
ber (1986) under reasonable initial assump-




5 5 Kaminsky et al. (1997).
6 6 Among others, Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996), Klein and Μarion
(1997),  Frankel  and  Rose  (1996),  Μoreno  (1995)  and  Gibson
(2003).
7 7 An opposite example is offered by Eichengreen et al. (1995), who
find that, while appreciations reflect analogous previous depreci-
ations, changes in exchange-rate regimes (from fixed exchange rates
to freely floating) are, to a large extent, unpredictable. Neverthe-
less, these authors used ad hoc definitions of the crises instead of
gleaning them from the data. Such practice is questionable as to
the objectivity of the selection. Moreover, it renders the method
inappropriate for predicting purposes, since such definition can
only be given a posteriori.
8 8 This category should include studies such as the one by Gibson and
ʤsakalotos (2005), which focuses on Greece and some countries of
similar economic characteristics (Spain, Portugal).
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tions regarding the eventuality of depreciation
were very high in the period 1987-1990, when
Greece was characterised by economic and
political instability. However, the implemen-
tation of the stabilisation programme over the
next two years limited these expectations. Sim-
ilarly, Apergis and Eleftheriou (2002) calcu-
late indicators of exchange-rate pressure on
the drachma and of the respective intervention
by the Bank of Greece to diffuse it. Yet, they
employ a methodology similar to Weymark’s
(1995) in the context of a small open economy.
This approach is empirically founded and does
not  rely  on  any  specific  theoretical  model.
Their calculations show that the drachma suf-
fered  the  greatest  depreciation  pressures
between 1974 and 1989. But at the same time
they calculate that interventions by the Bank
of  Greece  were  intensive  and  managed  to
absorb 97% of these pressures.9 The authors
conclude  that  the  proactive  exchange-rate
management policy pursued by the Bank of
Greece in 1992-1998 succeeded in imposing
the  “hard  drachma”  policy  and  limiting
exchange-rate volatility.
Karfakis  and  Μoschos  (1999)  and  Karfakis
(2002) take as a theoretical basis the FGM of
Sachs et al. (1996) and analyse the relation-
ships between crises and economic aggregates
over  rather  lengthier  periods.  Karfakis  and
Μoschos  (1999)  examine  the  period  up  to
1995. Their empirical test suggests that the
extent of the drachma’s real appreciation com-
pared with its long-term value, the adequacy of
foreign reserves relative to domestic liquidity,
the net capital account and the net position of
the current account can help predict an upcom-
ing crisis.10 Disruptions in the first three vari-
ables explain most of the volatility of the spec-
ulative pressure indicator.
Karfakis  (2002)  focuses  on  the  period
between  January  1990  and  March  1998  to
examine whether the increasing openness of
the Greek economy has changed the way eco-
nomic aggregates affect the probability of an
exchange-rate  crisis.  This  question  is  quite
interesting, given Greece’s growing intercon-
nection  with  the  international  environment
and the emerging importance of international
crisis contagion. However, this higher open-
ness is proxied in an ad hoc fashion, by split-
ting the sample into sub-periods before and
after the lifting of restrictions on capital move-
ments in May 1994. His findings provide evi-
dence of a statistically significant link between
drachma crises and the real exchange rate, the
adequacy of foreign reserves, the net capital
account,  domestic  borrowing,  the  terms  of
trade  and  the  rate  of  credit  expansion,
although this latter appears with a negative
sign. They also confirm that capital movement
liberalisation caused the factors affecting the
ability to predict speculative attacks on the
drachma to change.
4 METHODOLOGY
The methodological basis for an empirical test
is provided by Limited Dependent Variable
Models. A technical description of these mod-
els  can  be  found  in  Annex  2.  The  “Binary
Response Model” (hereinafter BRM) includes
a dependent variable, broken down into two
eventualities  ―“crisis”  (1)  and  “calmness”
(0)― and correlates the probability that a cri-
sis  will  emerge  with  the  behaviour  of  the
explanatory  variables.  With  respect  to  the
dependent variable, two basic types are used:
(a) an ad hoc indicator that traces events on
the  basis  of  the  historical  course  of  the
drachma;11 and (b) a composite indicator, con-
structed by use of the empirical data. Accord-




9 9 These numbers should not be taken as binding, due to the model’s
simplifying assumptions as to the nature of the interventions by the
Bank of Greece (only consumption of reserves) and the definition
of pressure in general. This perhaps also explains the seemingly par-
adox fact that the crises of e.g. September 1992, May-June 1994 and
October 1997 have left no trace on the indicator of speculative pres-
sure, despite the recorded intensive interventions.
1 10 0 The crisis is proxied by an indicator construed similarly to the one
used in this study. It is calculated as the sum of percentage change
in the nominal effective exchange rate and percentage change in
foreign reserves.
1 11 1 In binary models, the indicator’s categories “SP*” and “SP” as they
appear in Table 1, i.e. devaluations and repulsed attacks respec-
tively, jointly constitute the eventuality “1”: crises.
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weighted sum of changes in the exchange rate,
interest rates (used by the Bank of Greece to
defend  the  currency)  and  the  negative  of
changes in foreign reserves (i.e. losses). The
indicator is constructed with a view to tracing
all  speculative  attacks,  including  those  suc-
cessfully repulsed by the central bank. As a sec-
ond step, all observations at least 1.5 standard
deviation  greater  in  size  than  the  sample’s
average are traced and defined as a “crisis” (1),
whereas  all  other  observations  constitute
“calmness” (0). A comparison of the two basic
indicators  allows  the  identification  in  the
empirical data of events historically recorded
as  crises,  as  well  as  ―less  high-profile―
instances of volatility in the foreign exchange
market.
A variation of the indicator constructed by use
of  the  data  records  only  those  cases  where
forced exchange-rate devaluations were both
sizeable and sufficiently unusual. These mod-
els overcome the difficulties and partial sub-
jectivity  inherent  in  capturing  repulsed
attacks.  But  most  importantly,  they  help
answer the main question posed by this study,
i.e. whether successful attacks are structurally
different from unsuccessful ones. Comparison
with the models that employ the composite
indicators offers some first evidence in this
respect.
A more rigorous evaluation of this question is
achieved  by  use  of  the  distinct  Multiple
Response (or Multinomial) Models. In these,
the eventuality of crises is dichotomised into
two sub-eventualities: (a) attacks that forced
devaluation;  and  (b)  speculative  pressures
repulsed by the Bank of Greece. Crises are
identified in the data by use of the composite
indicator,  to  maximise  objectivity  in  the
process of selecting the episodes to be studied.
Thereafter, the two eventualities are directly
juxtaposed  within  the  same  model,  which
allows for the existence of structural differen-
tiation between the two types of attacks based
on their relationship with the determining fac-
tors of the crises. This is achievable since the
model estimates two different sets of coeffi-
cients for the explanatory variables, one for
each sub-eventuality.
4.1 DEFINITION OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
The selection and construction of the explana-
tory variables is determined by the require-
ments of the theoretical models, while taking
into  consideration  the  availability  of  data.
Unusual fluctuations in these variables have
been observed prior to most crisis episodes.
The economic variables can be broken down
into  three  broader  groups:  those  reflecting
competitiveness, monetary and credit aggre-
gates  and  variables  that  measure  growth
prospects. In addition, account is taken of con-
tagion  from  international  crises,  political
parameters and the exchange-rate regime. In
what  follows  we  analyse  how  our  variables
relate to the theoretical models and the regu-
larities empirically observed, and consequently,
what effect they are expected to have.
Measuring competitiveness
Accumulated deviation of the Real Exchange
Rate (RER). An overheated economy com-
bined with a system of fixed or managed float-
ing exchange rates leads to real appreciations.
A freely floating exchange rate may come into
conflict  with  the  current  level  of  economic
activity in the presence of market imperfec-
tions.  In  addition,  capital  inflows  based  on
expectations may lead to appreciations even
when there is no real interest rate differential.
As a measure of appreciation we test a simple
indicator of the RER, as well as the percent-
age cumulative deviation of the RER over a
period of 24 months.12 This second measure
attempts to cover the case of a lagged recov-




1 12 2 The logic of accumulation is tested more broadly in the other vari-
ables as well. It is useful to test if at least some of the coefficients
have a significant effect only in the case that they deviate for a long
period of time, or if different variables operate in different time
horizons before an attack. Some theoretical models offer examples
of influences that take place only when there is accumulation, such
as gradual accumulation of excess financing or external sector
deficits.
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last two years or more. Any previous appreci-
ation (rise in the RER indicator) increases the
probability of an attack.
We also include a variable relating to the mani-
festation of low competitiveness: the current
account deficit as a percentage of GDP. This
variable may reflect the different policies coun-
tries implement in their external sector, faced
with a given appreciation, as well as differences
in the relative prices of tradeable and non-
tradeable goods, not captured by the RER.
The effect of this variable is expected to be
negative.
However,  even  if  the  economy’s  real  and
expected  growth  stand  at  high  levels,  wage
increases exceeding these levels may be per-
ceived by the market as a loss in competitive-
ness, which will be addressed at some point by
depreciation. This variable is central in Obst-
feld’s (1994) analysis, as it reflects the infla-
tionary  expectations  of  market  participants
that affect the exchange rate.
The cost of a loss in competitiveness is posi-
tively associated with the degree to which the
economy is open (openness). However, an
open economy implies that a given deprecia-
tion has a greater effect on the price level and
consequently a greater cost for the monetary
authorities. This factor is expected to limit
the incentive to abandon a regime of fixed
exchange rates. The economy’s openness is
proxied by the ratio of exports plus imports
to GDP.
Expectations of depreciation driven by com-
petitiveness problems lead to capital outflows.
Thus, we include a dummy variable for the
existence of restrictions on movements of cap-
ital.13 If the central bank is credible and eco-
nomic aggregates are considered sound, this
measure may be considered sufficient to avert
short-lived capital outflows, so that specula-
tors  may  shift  their  focus  elsewhere.  The
effect of this variable therefore should be neg-
ative.
Monetary and credit aggregates
Monetary expansion. All models predict that
monetary expansion ―used either to moderate
the pressure exerted on financial organisations
and on the real sector of the economy or to
cover a fiscal deficit― will at some point lead
to higher prices. In this case, the maintenance
of competitiveness and foreign reserves can
only  be  achieved  through  a  change  in  the
exchange rate. However, attacks are caused
only if the rate of monetary expansion consid-
erably exceeds the depreciation rate allowed by
the exchange-rate regime. Otherwise, the loss
in competitiveness brought about by inflation
can only be offset through a relatively smooth
and predictable depreciation rate. This study
measures monetary expansion as a percentage
change in Μ1.
Given that the money supply process involves
lags and seasonalities, monetary expansion is
sometimes better captured by directly meas-
uring total inflation, i.e. change in the CPI. In
this case, the CPI is preserved within the model
along with the unemployment rate so as to take
account of possible trade-offs as present in the
Phillips curve.
In addition, we use a variable measuring the
equivalent of monetary expansion: the increase
in domestic credit (as a percentage of GDP).
We also include the cause of monetary expan-
sion according to Krugman’s (1979) model: the
fiscal deficit (as a percentage of GDP). The
importance of this factor is exaggerated on
account of the unrealistic assumption that
there  is  no  access  to  international  capital
markets. In modern open economies ―and
Greece, at least in the later years of the sam-
ple, can be thus characterised― the central
bank has sufficient international credit lines
available. Consequently, the significance of this
variable is rather expected not to be decisive.




1 13 3 It must be noted that the constructed variable is subject to limi-
tations, as central banks also impose on movements of capital
obstacles not explicitly provided for, and consequently, untraceable
in the official administrative acts.
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a percentage of GDP, as an indication of the
potential for excessive and risky investment
and the existence of a vicious “boom and bust”
cycle.  Financial  “bubbles”  undermine  the
soundness of the banking sector and the finan-
cial  crisis  that  accompanies  the  subsequent
bust leads to abrupt and massive capital out-
flows, dragging the exchange rate down. This
phenomenon, described by Dooley (1997), can
also come about in the case of sound macro-
economic aggregates and a lack of incentives
for the government to undertake expansionary
policies  in  the  future  (low  unemployment,
strong growth). It may even worsen if there are
“bandwagon effects”. The variable is expected
to have a positive effect.
Incentives for expansionary policies
Both lack of growth (as proxied by the rate of
change in GDP) and low expectations of growth
provide an incentive to abandon a system of
fixed exchange rates or more generally to adopt
a more expansionary policy.
According  to  SGMs,  the  existence  of  high
unemployment rates constitutes a strong incen-
tive for the adoption of a Keynesian type expan-
sionary  policy  with  a  view  to  stimulating
demand, and therefore may be linked to the
emergence of crisis episodes. Addressing unem-
ployment through policies on the supply side,
such as abolishing minimum wages or deregu-
lating the labour market, entails a long-lasting
political process, and consequently cannot avert
speculative attacks.
Political parameters
Victory or defeat in parliamentary elections.
According  to  the  theoretical  framework  of
SGMs,  the  government’s  political  commit-
ment  is  considered  crucial  for  the  sustain-
ability of the exchange-rate regime. Elections
and changes in government can foster expec-
tations of a breach of this commitment and
therefore entail opportunities for speculation
or even herd behaviour. Furthermore, swings
in the political cycle can lead to a relaxation of
monetary and fiscal policies. We initially use
a dummy variable indicating when elections
are held, which is then substituted in subse-
quent models with two twin dummy variables,
of victory by the governing party (or coalition)
and change in power. These latter may capture
expectations of a loosening or tightening of
monetary and fiscal policy by a new govern-
ment, and the lowering of the reputation cost
brought about by an abandonment of the fixed
exchange-rate regime in an outgoing govern-
ment.
Contagion of international crises
We construct a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if a crisis transpires (according to the
specific underlying dependent variable used in
each  model)  in  the  same  month  in  some
“advanced country”, according to IMF’s clas-
sification;  or  0  otherwise.14 The  variable  is
expected to capture herd behaviour phenom-
ena,  as  well  as  all  the  structural  factors
described in SGMs. More specifically: (1) trade
links  (comparative  disadvantage  due  to
depreciation in a major partner or competitor,
as in Gerlach and Smets 1995); (2) macroeco-
nomic similarities (markets consider that coun-
tries of similar economic structures and prob-
lems will react similarly to an attack, as in
Buiter  et  al.  1996);  and  (3)  financial  links
(change in the investors disposition to take on
exchange-rate risk due to holdings in deprecia-
ting currencies). In interpreting the results,
attention must be paid to the fact that the vari-
able may not be expressing a net contagion of





1 14 4 “Crisis” in advanced countries is proxied in a similar manner, i.e.
using the indicator of foreign exchange market pressure (EMP).
Greece was included among emerging markets by some organ-
isations even until the eve of its entry into the euro area. How-
ever, based on political and geostrategic criteria, it has always
formed part of the block of advanced countries, and for this rea-
son markets did not treat it as similar to e.g. the block of non-
aligned countries. In any case, even some advanced countries suf-
fered consequences from contagion of crises that transpired in
developing countries (ΝΑ Asia, Russia), so that these effects are
reflected in the indicators of crises in advanced countries and
also taken into account in the crisis contagion dummy variable
used.
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FGMs and SGMs describe attacks on regimes
of  fixed  exchange  rates.  The  possibility  of
applying them to more flexible regimes, such
as  regimes  of  administratively  set  or  more
freely floating exchange rates, has to be tested
empirically. It is possible that the degree of
flexibility allowed by each regime and other
relevant institutional factors affect the syn-
chronisation  problem  speculators  face  by
changing expectations concerning the future
objectives  of  the  monetary  authorities  as
regards the exchange-rate policy. For this rea-
son,  we  include  a  dummy  variable  of  the
exchange-rate regime constructed according to
the  classification  of  Reinhart  and  Rogoff
(2003). This is based more on de facto than on
de jure definitions, and consequently offers a
more realistic picture of the existing regime.15
Including this variable within the models helps
ensure  that  the  evidence  regarding  hetero-
geneity of the crises provided by our other
models is not associated with the existence of
various different exchange-rate regimes within
the sample.
4.2 DATA ORGANISATION
The empirical test period stretches from 1960
to the end of 2000, when the euro replaced
the drachma in book-entry form. We opted
for a monthly frequency of the data, mainly
for two reasons: (a) to trace all shorter and
smaller  attacks,  mainly  repulsed  ones,  the
impact of which had soon been reversed and
therefore left no trace on lower frequency
data; and (b) to maximise volatility within the
sample and thus facilitate the drawing of con-
clusions. The data, collected from many dif-
ferent sources, have been extensively tested
for errors, omissions and comparability. Their
detailed description can be found in Annex 1.
For some variables for which monthly data
were not available throughout the sample, we
use  the  corresponding  quarterly  data  and
repeat their respective values for three con-
secutive months. The underlying assumption
is that market participants use the latest pub-
lished information to form expectations and
take action. The decreasing fluctuation that
stems from this repetition is more than offset
by the richness of information obtained on a
plethora of variables updated on a monthly
basis.
5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
5.1 BINARY RESPONSE MODELS
16
As an introduction to the econometric analy-
sis, we proceed with a charts analysis along the
lines of an event study. Chart 1 presents the
path of one key variable from each group of
variables, namely real exchange rate, inflation
and unemployment, for each of the three cases
of devaluation of Table 1. It can be discerned
that in all three cases the variables follow a
pattern  consistent  with  theory.  The  real
exchange rate appreciates a few months before
each crisis, depreciates during the crisis (as a
result of the crisis), and continues to appreci-
ate thereafter, although at somewhat lower
rates, due to the accumulation of inflation dif-
ferentials over the country’s trade partners. As
for inflation, it can be seen that it followed a
constant upward path in all three cases. As
regards unemployment, we are interested in its
absolute rate (as an incentive for expansionary
policies) and not its rate of change (which is
much slower compared with that of financial
variables).  Indeed,  the  three  depreciations
coincide with an unemployment rate consid-
erably higher than the sample’s average (about
5.5%), which in fact in two of the three cases
is on the rise.
Chart 2 compares developments in the levels




1 15 5 In the dummy variable, all regimes of freely floating and managed
floating exchange rates, as well as brief periods of floating, are cat-
egorised as “floating”. All types of monetary areas and exchange-
rate pegs (announced, de facto, and rolling) fall under the category
of “rigid and intermediary exchange-rate regimes”.
1 16 6 By including numerous explanatory variables of a comparable eco-
nomic content we run the risk of increasing the multicollinearity
within the model, and limiting the significance of individual vari-
ables. For this reason, from each specification we eliminate the vari-
ables that proved to be statistically insignificant.
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Chart 1 Behaviour of variables in specific crises
Devaluation: January 1983 Devaluation: October 1985 Devaluation: March 1998
(course of variables 12 months before and 6 months after each devaluation)
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responding levels in periods of “calmness”. For
this comparison we use the average of the two
variables for all the cases of successful attacks
and repulsed pressures of Table 1, and the
average of all other observations.17 The Charts
clearly indicate that crisis periods are charac-
terised by accumulation of appreciations com-
pared with the average development of the real
exchange rate in calmness periods. Such appre-
ciations are reversed by the crisis itself. Also,
the unemployment rate is considerably higher
in periods of turmoil in the foreign exchange
market than in calmness periods.
The charts analysis, albeit quite illuminating,
captures the variables’ behaviour a few months
before the crisis, but is unable to capture the
effect  of  long-term  cumulative  deviations.
More importantly, this analysis is bivariate and
therefore cannot take into account as well any
possible interactions or complementary action
between the explanatory variables. Thus, con-
firmation of the initial conclusions necessitates
an estimation of the multivariate econometric
models.
In specifying the models, we use cumulative
changes in the real exchange rate and the rate
of change in the level of prices (30 and 24
months respectively).18 This choice is dictated
by  the  monthly  frequency  of  the  data.  As
regards the real exchange rate, given that sev-
eral cases of turmoil in the foreign exchange
market last more than one month, it is often
the  case  that,  at  the  moment  the  indicator
defines a “crisis”, the exchange rate is already
overvalued and the model captures the first
results of the crisis, i.e. devaluation or depre-
ciation. Thus, using contemporaneous values
of the RER variable results in the appearance
of a negative correlation between appreciation
and crisis, a conclusion that is misleading. Mar-
ket short-time dynamics and psychology sug-
gest a continuing course of the currency in this
direction. However, the use of cumulative vari-
ables shows in the longer run that, if a real
appreciation has accumulated over a consid-




Chart 2 Behaviour of variables on average
in crises and in calmness periods
1 17 7 Presenting the average inflation for all these ―most likely dis-
similar― cases is pointless, if it is not compared with the average
rates of inflation in the country’s trade partners, and is therefore
omitted. The information is effectively included in the development
of the real exchange rate.
1 18 8 For the variables that appear as simple rates of change we use
twelfth differences to limit the effect of seasonal factors. Estima-
tion with first or third differences showed that the key quality fea-
tures of the crises-fundamentals relationships are not altered. We
also estimated models that use cumulative forms for all variables.
But given that cumulative variables operate as an average of many
short-lived and possibly counteracting effects, these models fail to
capture the exact time the crises transpired and therefore their per-
formance is low. For this reason they are omitted from the pres-
entation.
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of crises. This finding confirms the hypothesis
of a lagged return to the exchange-rate level
that restores purchasing power parity and has
appeared in other studies as well. With respect
to inflation, an incentive for devaluation is the
constant accumulation of inflation differentials
compared with the country’s trade partners,
which undermine competitiveness, and not a
momentary rise in the level of prices possibly
attributable to seasonal or conjunctural fac-
tors.
Model 1 in Table 2 uses the ad hoc crisis indi-
cator. It may be discerned that the relation-
ships coincide with the predictions of theory.
The performance of the model, as measured by
the Akaike Information Criterion,19 is satis-
factory enough, but its ability to correctly clas-
sify eventualities is only average.20 This was
expected, as we use a long time series that
incorporates many dissimilar incidents, as was
also demonstrated in the qualitative analysis.
More generally, the monthly frequency incor-
porates much of the noise that characterises
the foreign exchange market (exchange rate
volatility is much greater than that of funda-
mentals) and thus obscures the longer-term
relationships  between  crises  and  macroeco-
nomic aggregates. In practice, this translates
into some sensitivity of the results as regards
the significance of the variables in each model.
Nevertheless, several variables are significantly
correlated with attacks on the drachma. The
existence of a considerable current account
deficit, as well as of a high unemployment rate,
increases the probability of a crisis to a statis-
tically  significant  extent.  Accumulated  real
appreciation appears to be positively corre-
lated with the probability of a crisis, even if
only with marginal statistical significance. Also,
contagion effects of crises that originated in
other advanced countries are relatively signif-
icant and complement, if not substitute, inter-
nal imbalances.21
Model 2 uses the composite indicators of the
emergence of successful and repulsed crises
constructed by use of the data. It must be noted
that several of the crises captured by the com-
posite indicator coincide with those of the ad
hoc  indicator,  even  though  some  may  be
shifted one month before or after the broadly
accepted date. However, several cases differ.
More specifically, a larger volume of “crisis”
observations appears after 1980, when foreign
exchange market volatility was greater. It may
be discerned that the performance of Model 2
falls short compared to that of Model 1.
Model 2 highlights the importance of accu-
mulated inflation differentials and of the rate
of wage increases as factors correlated with the
crises. Unemployment still appears to be pos-
itive  and  statistically  significant.  The  real
exchange rate once more has the theoretically
anticipated sign, but loses its level of statisti-
cal significance. Contagion still appears to be
significant, although the coefficient is some-
what smaller in size. An important new finding
is highlighted by this shift of the “crisis” obser-
vations is the statistically significant positive
effect of the exchange-rate regime on the prob-
ability of a crisis transpiring. Given the way in
which the variable is defined, this implies that
the probability of a crisis is higher in regimes
of more fixed exchange rates. This feature con-
firms the predictions of theory that interme-
diary  exchange-rate  regimes  (between  free
floating and monetary union) are more vul-
nerable to the emergence of speculative attacks
when markets deem that the monetary author-
ities’ target exchange rate deviates from that
consistent  with  the  fundamental  macroeco-
nomic aggregates.
Model 2Β is specified exactly as Model 2, but




1 19 9 The Akaike Information Criterion was selected as it is not affected
by the number of variables and the specialisation of the model and
therefore can be used for comparing non-nested models. Higher
values of the criterion imply lower performance of the model.
2 20 0 The use of lagged explanatory variables so as to be able to describe
the model as “predictive” reduces the model’s performance with-
out altering the quality of the relationship. In any case, “prediction”
has no meaning when studying a currency that no longer exists.
2 21 1 It is recalled that the variable may record disruptions common to
all the countries examined and not an authentic contagion of crises
through macroeconomic and trade linkages or through herd behav-
iour on the part of investors.
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unpegged  from  the  US  dollar  and  started
floating vis-￠-vis a basket of currencies) up to
end-1990 (when the implementation of poli-
cies for meeting the Maastricht criteria is con-
sidered to have started). Comparison between
the two models highlights a number of quite
interesting elements. In general, it confirms
that the crises of this period exhibit the fea-
tures described by FGMs. This view can be
summarised by the fact that the real exchange
rate  variable  is  now  strongly  significant,
whereas it was insignificant when the same
model was estimated over the entire sample.
Conversely,  the  fact  that  the  crises  of  this
period can be explained more easily by inter-
nal imbalances, in particular by competitive-
ness and monetary aggregates, is reflected in
the fact that international contagion is statis-
tically insignificant, whereas it was significant
during estimation with the entire sample.22 In
addition, the model’s ability to correctly clas-
sify crisis observations increases significantly,













Restrictions to the movement of capital 0.205
(0.8378)
International contagion of crisis 2 2. .2 23 35 5 1 1. .6 66 68 8 1.051 0.265
(0.0254) (0.0974) (0.2934) (0.7914)
Elections 1.217 0.858 1.359
(0.2234) (0.3911) (0.1741)
Current account (% of GDP), lnxt - -1 1. .7 79 91 1 -0.619 -0.575 -1.231
(0.0733) (0.5358) (0.5651) (0.2182)
Inflation, lnxt-lnxt-12, (cumulative) 2 2. .2 26 68 8 2 2. .0 05 51 1 2 2. .0 01 17 7
(0.0233) (0.0403) (0.0437)
Rate of GDP growth, lnxt-lnxt-12  0.024 -0.333 0.157
(0.9808) (0.7388) (0.8753)
Openness, lnxt -0.967 - -2 2. .0 08 82 2
(0.3335) (0.0373)
Loans to the private sector/GDP, lnxt-lnxt-12 0.570 1 1. .6 64 46 6
(0.5690) (0.0989)
Real exchange rate, lnxt-lnxt-12 (cumulative) 1 1. .6 65 53 3 1.376 2 2. .0 08 83 3 0.135
(0.0986) (0.1688) (0.0372) (0.8928)
Unemployment, lnxt 2 2. .3 31 17 7 2 2. .7 77 73 3 2 2. .3 39 97 7 2 2. .3 32 27 7
(0.0205) (0.0056) (0.0165) (0.0200)
Exchange-rate regime -0.275 2 2. .0 04 41 1 2 2. .5 53 32 2 0.877
(0.7831) (0.0412) (0.0113) (0.3806)
Wages, lnxt-lnxt-12 1 1. .9 90 02 2 2 2. .4 48 88 8 1.412
(0.571) (0.0129) (0.1580)
Constant 1.096 -1.124 -1.356 -0.625
(0.2729) (0.2611) (0.1752) (0.5319)
0.37797 0.59213 0.87509 0.50564
Note: Model 1: yi,t= ad hoc indicator, covering the period from January 1960 to December 2000.
Model 2: y* i,t= EMP indicator, crisis (y=1) if obs>1.5 σ+ﾵ, covering the period from January 1960 to December 2000.
Model 2B: as Model 2 but covering the period from March 1975 to December 1990.
Model 3: yi,t : crisis if: ∆sit > 1,75 σi
∆s και ∆sit > 1,5, covering the period from January 1960 to December 2000.
Coefficients statistically significant at the level of 10% appear in bold characters. P-values in parentheses, i.e. P[ |Z| > z].
2 22 2 A more rigorous evaluation of the increasing role played by expec-
tations and international contagion in the latest crises, as well as
of the respective decrease in the role of internal imbalances due
to policies related to euro area entry, would require the model to
be estimated with data of the period 1990-2000. Unfortunately this
is not possible, due to the small number of “crisis” observations in
this sub-period and the ensuing unreliability of the findings.
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tic fundamentals. In all other respects, Model
2Β reproduces the findings of Model 2.
Model 3 uses the indicator that captures in the
data sizeable and unusual devaluations of the
drachma.23 Although the general causalities are
in the same direction as in the previous mod-
els, devaluations appear to be correlated rather
more  intensely  with  internal  fundamental
imbalances compared with repulsed attacks.
This is reflected in the fact that international
contagion is insignificant. Moreover, the model
highlights for the first time the statistically sig-
nificant negative effect of the economy’s open-
ness  on  the  probability  of  crisis.  Openness
seems to increase the effect that a possible
devaluation exerts on the level of prices and
therefore reduces the authorities’ incentive to
devalue. Apart from all this, devaluations are
related  significantly  to  the  accumulation  of
high inflation rates, increased bank loans to the
private sector and a high unemployment rate.
5.2 MULTIPLE RESPONSE MODEL
Model 4 in Table 3 is a multiple response logit
for  non-classified  eventualities  (multinomial
logit). This model allows for a direct comparison
between crises that forced devaluation and those
successfully dealt with by the Bank of Greece, in
terms of correlating the crises with their deter-
minants. The cases of devaluation are captured
in terms of the indicator that uses the exchange
rate exclusively. Speculative pressures repulsed
by the Bank of Greece are defined as these cases
where the composite indicator indicates a “cri-
sis”, but the indicator that uses the exchange rate
exclusively does not indicate devaluation. The
model calculates two different sets of coeffi-
cients for the independent variables.
Isolation of the two eventualities allows for cer-




2 23 3 Results come with a health warning, due to the small number of
“devaluation” observations within the sample.










Current account (% of GDP), lnxt -0.482 -1.373
(0.6300) (0.1699)
Inflation, lnxt-lnxt-12, (cumulative) 2 2. .5 59 97 7 0.854
(0.0094) (0.3931)
Openness, lnxt 1.394 -0.459
(0.1852) (0.6459)
Real exchange rate, lnxt-lnxt-12 (cumulative) 1.350 1 1. .6 67 72 2
(0.1771) (0.0935)
Unemployment, lnxt 2 2. .3 31 13 3 1.133
(0.0207) (0.2573)




Note: Model 4Α: repulsed attack if: for the EMP indicator (y* i,t) obs>1,5σ+ﾵ and [∆sit < 1,75 σi
∆s, ∆sit < 1,75], covering the period from Jan-
uary 1960 to December 2000.
Model 4Β: depreciation if: ∆sit > 1,75 σi
∆s και ∆sit > 1,75, covering the period from January 1960 to December 2000.
Coefficients statistically significant at the level of 10% appear in bold characters. P-values in parentheses, δʷλαδʮ P[ |Z| > z].
3.Meleti Anastasatou-Manou:￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1  09-11-09  10:36  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 68eign exchange market incidents that ended in
devaluation are correlated with competitive-
ness problems, as these are recorded in the sig-
nificance of the variable of the cumulative real
exchange rate.24 In contrast, the real exchange
rate  is  not  significant  for  repulsed  attacks.
Moreover, international contagion is significant
for repulsed attacks, but not for devaluations.
This is an indication that devaluation requires
more  than  factors  linked  with  international
expectations.  Similarly,  the  accumulation  of
high inflation rates and a high level of unem-
ployment  are  significant  parameters  for  the
coordination of expectations of devaluation and
ensuing speculative pressures, but do not suf-
fice on their own to bring about devaluation.
Finally, it is confirmed that an intermediary
exchange-rate  regime  (more  rigid  than  free
floating,  but  more  flexible  than  monetary
union) attracts more speculative pressure.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
POLICY PURSUIT
The changeover to the euro on 1 January 2001
was  an  event  of  decisive  importance  for
Greece’s economic history and delineated a
range of discussions concerning the short- and
long-term  benefits.  The  present  study  has
attempted to contribute to this dialogue by
focusing  on  an  important  aspect  of  Greek
monetary  history,  the  pressures  on  the
drachma in the period between 1960 and 2000.
Aside from its historical usefulness, this dis-
cussion  highlights  the  first  evident  benefit
from entry into the euro area, namely, exemp-
tion from monetary crises and the strong neg-
ative effects these entail in terms of stability
and growth. Our analysis confirms the con-
clusion of the literature that for small open
economies,  such  as  Greece,  the  available
choices as regards the exchange-rate regime
are the two opposite extremes, i.e. either fully
floating  or  entry  into  a  monetary  union.
Regimes  characterised  by  an  intermediary
degree of flexibility are less likely to be sus-
tainable, since they tend to invite speculative
attacks. For countries in a phase of transition
to EMU this constitutes an extremely useful
criterion to guide conduct.
As regards the relationship between crises and
fundamentals, the pivotal conclusion is that not
all events can be explained based on a single
rationale of causalities and event sequences.
The long period covered by empirical analysis
incorporates many changes in the exchange-
rate regime and the monetary policy frame-
work. Nevertheless, a more general conclusion
may  be  deduced,  namely  that  speculative
attacks on the drachma up to the early 1990s
are linked significantly with macroeconomic
imbalances, particularly those associated with
the economy’s competitiveness and monetary
aggregates. After the structural change in mon-
etary policy brought about by the need to meet
the Maastricht criteria, the observed shocks
have resulted more from contagion from inter-
national  crises  within  an  increasingly  inter-
connected  international  environment.  In
addition, the cases where speculative attacks
ended in devaluations were typified by deeper
structural imbalances, in contrast to pressures
repulsed by the Bank of Greece, which were
rather the outcome of transient market expec-
tations.
The policy pursued by the Bank of Greece for
averting exchange-rate crises, taking into con-
sideration the partial independence it enjoyed
up to 1994 and its weight within the interna-
tional financial environment, cannot be deemed
but successful. Comparisons of the costs paid in
terms of economic growth and financial system
disruptions by countries with similar structural
problems that suffered attacks prove the valid-
ity of this claim.
The ECB’s increased credibility and its com-
mitment to policies oriented towards stability




2 24 4 Similarly, external imbalances are more significant for devaluations,
although the variable loses its level of statistical significance. More
generally, we should take into account that the small number of
“crisis” observations within the sample may have led to the under-
estimation and sensitivity of the coefficients applying to each even-
tuality.
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currency,  offer  a  measure  of  the  long-term
advantages from the country’s entry into the
euro area. Monetary stability is particularly
important on account of: (a) the Greek econ-
omy’s  increasing  interconnection  with  and
opening up to the international economic envi-
ronment; and (b) the increasing mobility of
international financial capital and the inherent
tendency  of  mutual  fund  shareholders  to
analyse in detail any profitability opportunities
arising from existing and/or potential weak-
nesses of economies. Finally, we should also
take into account the change in “economic cul-
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International Financial Statistics (IFS line rf).
• Total foreign reserves excluding gold: IMF
(IFS line 1ld).
• Short-term interest rate: discount rate from
January 1961 until May 1980 (IFS line 60)25
and interbank market rate on overnight place-
ments26 from  June  1980  (since  the  series
became available) until December 2000, Bank
of Greece.
• Real  effective  exchange  rate:  European
Commission, DGFIN. A rise is equivalent to
appreciation,  quarterly  data,  with  values
repeated for the 3 months of each quarter until
1969. From January 1970 onwards, real effec-
tive monthly exchange rate from the OECD’s
Main Economic Indicators database. For all
data the base year was set to 1995 and com-
parability was tested.
• Current  account  surplus/deficit:  Monthly
Statistical Bulletin, Bank of Greece.
• Fiscal surplus (+) or deficit (-): IMF (IFS
line 80).
• Nominal GDP: IMF (IFS line 99bc).
• Domestic credit: IMF (IFS line 32).
• Loans to the private sector: IMF (IFS line
32d).
• Wages, index (1995=100): IMF (IFS line 65
or 65ey).
• Imports and exports in US dollars: IMF (IFS
line 70d and 71d respectively).
•Broader money supply Μ1: IMF (IFS line 34).
• Consumer Price Index: IMF (IFS line 64).
• Unemployment rate: Datastream (ʟʕCD),
conversion  from  quarterly  data,  seasonally
adjusted.
Victory or defeat of the governing party or
coalition: incidents collected from Keesing’s
Record of World Events and classified accord-
ing to the change/continuance of the govern-
ing coalition in power. Consequently, they do
not include local government elections or pres-
idential elections in countries where the pres-
ident has no essential powers. Respectively, a
significant change in the composition of a gov-
erning coalition is classified as a change, even
when one or more parties of the previous coali-
tion remain in power.
The dummy variable indicating the existence of
controls on capital movements was constructed
on the basis of information included in the







2 25 5 The discount rate used up to 1980 was administratively set and did
not fully record the conditions prevailing in the market. However,
given the overall stability that characterised that period, as also
recorded in the ad hoc indicator, losses in effectiveness are small.
2 26 6 Average of the interest rates on all overnight operations in the
interbank market. Operations conducted between the Bank of
Greece and other banks (drawing or providing liquidity), but also
between other banks among them. By changing the interbank mar-
ket interest rate the Bank of Greece also offered guidelines as to
the level of the interest rates with which banks cover liquidity needs
among them.
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BRM) is derived once we assume an underly-
ing variable of response yi*, defined by the lin-
ear regression relationship with a vector of
explanatory variables:
yi* = xiβ + εi (1)
In this application yi* is an indicator of “spec-
ulative pressure” (βλ. below) and is considered
to be non observable. Instead we observe a
binary variable y ―here the result “crisis”―
defined by the relationship:
yi = 1 if yi* > τ
 (2)
yi = 0 otherwise
where τ is a “threshold”. The variables’ coef-
ficients and the probability of the event are
estimated through maximum likelihood meth-
ods. The hypothesis that εi follows the account-
ing  or  the  regular  cumulative  distribution
yields the logit and probit models respectively.
In the binary case, the two models are the same
after conversion of their coefficients’ value into
a common scale, so that probit models can be
used throughout the study for reasons of com-
parability and statistical tests.
The construction of the indicator of specula-
tive pressure y* for the identification of the
existence of an exchange-rate crisis is compli-
cated by the multifaceted symptoms appearing
in the various episodes (capital flow reversal,
excessive volatility in capital markets, bank-
ruptcies of banks, government rescue meas-
ures, abrupt deceleration of GDP growth after
the  crises,  etc.).  Furthermore,  Μeese  and
Rogoff (1983) and Mussa (1979), among oth-
ers, proved that structural models are unable
to measure the excessive demand for money
and predict the exchange rate. Consequently,
a “crisis” has to be proxied by an ad hoc con-
struction of “speculative pressure”. Expanding
the model by Girton and Roper (1977), exces-
sive  demand  for  foreign  exchange  appears
through three non-mutually excluding chan-
nels, i.e. depreciation, sale of foreign reserves,
and/or rise in interest rates. A weighted aver-
age of these is the “underlying” variable yi*. In
following Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996) we
refer to this indicator as the foreign “Exchange
Market Pressure” (EMP).27 Consequently,
EMPt = [(α ∆st) + (β ∆intt) - (ʳ ∆rt)]  (3)
where s is the nominal bilateral exchange rate
vis-￠-vis the US dollar, int is the short-term
interest rate and r the ratio of international
foreign reserves ―excluding gold― to money
supply (usually Μ1). All the variables are in
natural logarithms, the ∆ symbol indicates the
rate of change (typically first differences), the
subscript t indicates the month and year of the
observation and α, β and ʳ are positive con-
stants used as weights, namely the reverses of
the  volatilities  of  each  component.  Many
authors  apply  similar  weights  so  that  the
volatilities of the three series are “equalised”
and no component dominates on the indicator.
To define the crisis, we set the threshold τ of
the relationship (2) as (δ σʕΜʡ + ﾵʕΜʡ), where
ﾵ and σ are the average and the standard devi-
ation of the EMP indicator respectively and δ
is a positive constant, here 1.5. This approach
constitutes our launching pad, as it is consis-
tent with the spirit of the theoretical models,
but also able to identify attacks on exchange-
rate regimes less rigid than the regimes of fixed
exchange rates.
To avoid double counting of a crisis in case this
lasts more than one month, we remove obser-




2 27 7 Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996) also tested the calculation of the
variables as surpluses over those of Germany, selected as reference
country due to the post-war monetary stability that characterised
it. Anastasatos and Davidson (2006) proved that on monthly data
this weighting does not substantially differentiate results, and there-
fore is omitted. Similar non-weighted indicators were also used by
Sachs, ʤornell and Velasco (1996) and Frankel and Rose (1996).
ANNEX 2
METHODOLOGY
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values “0”, so as to avoid an overwhelming
majority of “calmness” observations over “cri-
sis” ones, which would thwart any causal rele-
vance between crises and fundamentals. As a
result of this practice (exclusion window), com-
mon in international literature, likelihood indi-
cators derived from the models do not accu-
rately correspond to crisis probabilities.
The construction of the EMP indicator involves
two issues of subjectivity in selecting its ele-
ments and in defining what “speculative pres-
sure” is per se. First, factors such as the setting
of interest rates by the authorities, the exis-
tence of controls on capital movements, and
risk premia, lessen the effect of the interest rate
differential  on  the  anticipated  depreciation
rate.28 Second, changes in foreign reserves may
not record fully interventions in the foreign
exchange market, as they overlook or insuffi-
ciently  reflect  factors  such  as  non-balance-
sheet transactions, third-party interventions,
auxiliary credit lines and liabilities abroad. The
imposition of capital controls could perhaps
constitute an equally informative indication of
speculative  pressure  accumulation,  but  the
quantification of capital controls ―so as to be
usable as a monotonic element in the indica-
tor― is a problem of no evident solution. Fur-
thermore, even capital controls may be cir-
cumvented through practices such as transfer
pricing and black-market trading, which slowly
erode the foreign exchange position and under-
mine the monetary authorities’ ability to main-
tain a fixed exchange rate. Finally, if capital
controls (existing or threatened) offer an indi-
cation of crisis, the adequacy of reserves could
respectively be used as an explanatory variable.
Such hesitations as regards the direction of the
examined causalities generate methodological
and economic questions and cast doubt on the
correct specification of the model as a whole.
Frankel and Rose (1996) suggested the use of
lagged variables so as to moderate the problem
of interdependence. Nonetheless, this solution
has no theoretical underpinnings and further-
more does not explain how basic underlying
relationships interact.
The difficulty of defining and tracing an attack,
especially an unsuccessful one, raises the ques-
tion of whether one should examine attacks, or
merely actual episodes of depreciation. Many
authors opt for exploring the second avenue.
This  is  the  practice  followed  here  as  well,
except that, in order to maximise objectivity,
instead of defining ad hoc the episodes to be
studied we have allowed the sample to select
them itself. In this case, the criterion aims at
tracing only the “actual” episodes of exchange-
rate  collapse  and  therefore  is  exclusively  a
function of the exchange rate:
∆sit > κ σi
∆s και ∆sit > λ (4)
where σi
∆s is the standard deviation of ∆s and
κ and λ are positive constants. Frankel and
Rose (1996) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997)
have used variations of this criterion. Its logic
lies in tracing incidents where the depreciation
is on the one hand unusual, after taking infla-
tion into consideration, and on the other hand
significant enough to markedly reduce the cur-
rency’s purchasing power. This fact implies a
short-term change in the real exchange rate e,
offering an alternative definition of what a cri-
sis is.








An assumption is made that the underlying
structural equation has an independent iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d) error term, which fol-




2 28 8 In particular for Greece, Karfakis and Μoschos (1999) emphasise
that interest rates were used as policy instruments for repulsing
speculative pressures after the liberalisation of capital flows in May
1994, a date close to the end of our sample. We may add that, dur-
ing the early years of the sample, interest rates were largely deter-
mined by the Bank of Greece according to the needs of macro-
economic  policy  and  did  not  fully  reflect  market  conditions.
Besides, financial markets were still at a fledgling phase and lacked
the sufficient maturity and depth in order to play such a role.
Therefore, there is a strong case in favour of omitting the interest
rates from the EMP indicator.
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β1=0 limitation is required for the identifica-
tion of the model, with j=1 corresponding to
“calmness” in this application. The major fea-
ture of the ΜNLΜ is that it allows the vector
of the variables’ coefficients to differ for each
response (eventuality), so as to be able to cap-
ture the probability of structural differences
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Manos Matsaganis, Theodore Mitrakos and Panos Tsakloglou
Price and non-price competitiveness of exports of manufactures
Working Paper No. 69
Panayiotis P. Athanasoglou and Ioanna C. Bardaka
Health  expenditure  data  are  known  to  be
afflicted by restricted range, zero values, skew-
ness and kurtosis. Several methods for model-
ling such data have been suggested in the lit-
erature to cope with these problems. This paper
compares the performance of several alterna-
tive estimators, including two-part models and
generalized linear models. The dependent vari-
able is household expenditure on health care in
Greece, a country where out-of-pocket health
expenditure is higher than anywhere else in the
European Union, whether as a proportion of
GDP, as a share of all health spending, or in per
capita terms. To facilitate comparison of model
performance, household health expenditure is
examined in two different specifications: expen-
diture on all health care (where zero values are
rare) and expenditure on hospital services alone
(where zero values are common). In the case of
all health expenditures three of the estimators
performed almost equally well in terms of three
alternative  model  performance  indicators:  a
modified two-part model with non-linear least
squares in the second part, a constant-variance
generalized linear model, and a variance-pro-
portional-to-mean generalized linear model. In
the case of hospital expenditures the constant-
variance  generalized  linear  model  outper-
formed the rest. The findings suggest that no
estimator is best under all circumstances, while
most alternative estimators are likely to pro-
duce relatively similar results.
This paper develops a demand function for
Greece’s exports of manufactures according to
“New  Trade  Theory”.  The  sample  covers  a
rather long period of four decades at quarterly
frequency. Trade data is aggregated based not
on trade classification SITC (5-8), (which is
usually adopted in most of the relevant empir-
ical research) that categorizes about 80% of
Greek manufactures, but on industrial classi-
fication (ISIC) which covers the total of man-
ufacturing. The study contributes to a better
understanding of the effects of export prices,
domestic and competitors’, as well as of price
and  non-price  competitiveness,  the  latter
approximated with capital stock, on export per-
formance.  The  analysis  assumes  imperfect
competition in international markets, where
trade consists mainly of the exchange of dif-
ferentiated products. The empirical estimation
uses  the  Johansen  maximum  likelihood
approach in the long run and a dynamic error-
correction equation in the short run. The esti-
mated long-run and short-run relationships fol-
low the economic theory, are remarkably sta-
ble and exhibit satisfactory in sample predic-
tive performance. It is shown that non-price
competitiveness plays a vital role in explaining
export performance in the long run as well as
in the short run and that failure to include it
in the export equation may lead to mis-speci-
fication  error.  As  opposed  to  conventional
models of export demand where income effects
are  very  high,  in  the  present  study  foreign
income has a moderately high effect on exports
in the long run and no effect in the short run.
Long-run and short-run foreign income elas-
ticities are higher when GDP is the foreign
income  variable.  Further,  export  prices
(domestic  and  competitors’)  have  a  strong
effect on exports in the long run while their
short-run impact is moderate. On the other
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when  GDP  is  the  foreign  income  variable.
Also,  long-run  export  price  elasticities  are
higher  compared  with  those  of  unit  labour
costs. Thus, we could argue that broader price
or  income  definitions  generate  higher  esti-
mates of long-run elasticities. Price and cost
competitiveness elasticities are close to one in
the long run and even in the short run, indi-
cating that Greek exporters have some ability
to compete on the basis of prices. Finally, the
speed of adjustment to the long-run equilib-
rium  depends  on  the  definition  of  foreign
income adopted. The use of industrial pro-
duction produces a higher speed of adjustment
compared with GDP.
With the 14 members of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) having set
the objective of adopting a common currency
for the year 2018, an expanding empirical lit-
erature has emerged evaluating the benefits
and costs of a common-currency area in South-
ern Africa. This paper reviews that literature,
focusing on two categories of studies: (1) those
that assume that a country’s characteristics are
invariant to the adoption of a common cur-
rency; and, (2) those that assume that a mon-
etary  union  alters  an  economy’s  structure,
resulting in trade creation and credibility gains.
The literature review suggests that a relative-
small group of countries, typically including
South Africa, satisfies the criteria necessary for
monetary unification – they are subject to few
asymmetric  shocks  between  themselves  and
have a high shares of intra-SADC trade. How-
ever, the fact that the major exports among all
countries of the SADC differ significantly leads
to the conclusion that a single monetary pol-
icy may not be appropriate for all SADC coun-
tries. The literature also suggests that, in a
monetary union comprised of all SADC coun-
tries and a regional central bank that sets mon-
etary policy to reflect the average economic
conditions (e.g., fiscal balances) in the region,
the potential losses (i.e., higher inflation) from
giving up an existing credible national central
bank,  a  relevant  consideration  for  South
Africa, could outweigh any potential benefits
of trade creation resulting from a common cur-
rency.
The above factors point to the desirability of
a selective and gradual approach to monetary
unification in Southern Africa, centred on the
Common  Monetary  Area  (CMA)  as  a  core
monetary union. As neighbouring countries
demonstrate an ability to deliver disciplined
and stable macroeconomic policy ―particu-
larly  with  respect  to  fiscal  balances―  they
could become members of the monetary union.
Such a selective and gradual approach could
build on the credibility of the existing monetary




The benefits and costs of monetary union in Southern Africa: a critical survey of the literature
Working Paper No. 70
George S. Tavlas
Monetary and fiscal policy interaction: what is the role of the transaction 
cost of the tax system in stabilisation policies?
Working Paper No. 71
Panagiotis Chronis and Aspassia Strantzalou
A general equilibrium model is built, in order
to investigate monetary and fiscal policy inter-
actions within a monetary union, with two het-
erogeneous countries and a common central
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The aim is to look for economic policy impli-
cations regarding the way the efficiency of fis-
cal policy affects the price stability pursued by
the central bank of the monetary union.
The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  the
introduction of the operational or transaction
cost of the tax system into economic (monetary
and fiscal) policy analysis. In this way, fiscal
policy is allowed to endogenously affect (via
the  transaction  cost)  the  price  stabilisation
policies of the central bank of the monetary
union, thus resulting in the non-neutrality of
fiscal policy. This fiscal policy non-neutrality is
consistent with the departure from the Ricar-
dian equivalence proposition, which explicitly
assumes that the tax instrument does not have
any effect on economic activity, pointing to the
view  that  inflation  is  only  a  monetary  phe-
nomenon.
The analysis does not explicitly assume any
specific type of tax instrument (e.g. lump sum
or proportional). Instead, a more general con-
sideration  of  the  tax  system  is  adopted,  by
introducing the transaction or operational cost.
This stems from the fact that the imposition of
taxes  generates  frictions  which  relate  the
behaviour of tax payers, stipulated by socio-
economic  and  psychological  characteristics,
with tax administration aspects, like tax col-
lection and tax compliance, resulting in a loss
of tax revenue or a deadweight loss, with budg-
etary consequences. The functional form of the
transaction  cost  is  endogenously  derived,
within optimality.
Thus, a microfountation of macroeconomic
theory, regarding monetary and fiscal policy
interactions, is formed, where, starting from
the operational properties of the tax system,
the way the efficiency of fiscal policy is related
to the political cycle, the path of debt and
inflation level is examined. The assumption
that countries are heterogeneous allows for
the identification of possible spillovers in a
monetary and fiscal policy interaction frame-
work.
It is shown that in the presence of a consider-
able degree of heterogeneity, the transaction
cost of the tax system is the factor determining
the countries’ policy choices and hence the
resulting level of debt as well as the inflation
path. On the other hand, when a considerable
degree of homogeneity is the case, it is the
countries’ strategic behaviour that determines
the outcome.
The  paper  formally  develops  a  channel,
through which the operational cost of the tax
system, related to fiscal policy objectives, is not
independent  of  price  stability  (the  primary
objective of the central bank). In this frame-
work, it is also shown that numerical fiscal
rules (such as those of the stability and growth
pact) are not efficient at altering the behaviour





An affine factor model of the Greek term structure
Working Paper No. 72
Hiona Balfoussia
The objective of this paper is to contribute to
our understanding of the dynamics driving the
Greek term structure of nominal interest rates
and to explore their possible macroeconomic
determinants.  The  framework  employed  is
founded  on  the  theoretical  concept  of  a
unique stochastic discount factor pricing all
financial assets in the economy, as used in the
context of the affine class of term structure
models. These allow us to model the entire
term structure, including the risk-free rate,
and to extract and examine the underlying fac-
tors which drive its evolution over time. A
canonical, Vasicek-type latent (unobservable)
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structure is estimated, using a Kalman filter,
on data spanning the period March 1999 to
February 2007. This specification is parsimo-
nious  and  theoretically  consistent  with  the
absence  of  arbitrage  opportunities,  while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to provide a
close fit to yield dynamics. Moreover, it allows
a  direct  examination  of  the  impact  of  the
extracted factors on the shape of the yield
curve over time and on the associated price
and  amount  of  risk  in  the  term  structure.
Three latent factors appear to capture most of
the time variation in the Greek nominal term
structure  of  interest  rates  and  to  drive  its
intertemporal  and  cross-sectional  dynamics
over  the  sample  period.  Their  respective
"level", "slope" and "curvature" effects on the
yield curve fall in line with related findings in
the literature. While the model does not use
macroeconomic information, conclusions can
nonetheless be drawn on the interdependence
between the bond market and macroeconomic
fundamentals. Macroeconomic intuition in the
latent factor context stems from an examina-
tion  of  the  time-series  properties  of  the
extracted factors, as well as from their com-
parison to observed data on macroeconomic
fundamentals  they  may  possibly  represent.
When examined on the basis of business cycle
theory and related to developments in macro-
economic fundamentals of the Greek econ-
omy, the evolution of the extracted factors




Exploring the nexus between banking sector reform and performance: evidence from 
newly acceded EU countries
Working Paper No. 73
Sophocles N. Brissimis, Manthos D. Delis and Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou
Three interrelated determinants of bank per-
formance stand out prominently in the related
literature,  namely  the  financial  reform
process, the degree of competition and the
risk-taking behaviour of banks. At least two
groups of studies involve these determinants:
one mainly theoretical that examines the rela-
tionship between deregulation, bank risk tak-
ing and competition, and an empirical one that
investigates the evolution of bank performance
during periods of financial deregulation.
In the present paper we combine these two
approaches  by  focusing  on  how  bank  per-
formance is affected by reforms in the banking
sector, and the associated changes in the indus-
try structure and the risk-taking behaviour of
banks.  To  carry  out  such  an  analysis,  we
develop  a  two-stage  empirical  model  that
draws on the recent econometric contributions
of  Simar  and  Wilson  (2007)  and Khan  and
Lewbel (2007). Bank performance, measured
in terms of productive efficiency and total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) growth, is derived via
nonparametric techniques in the first stage and
then the scores obtained are linked to reform,
competition and bank risk taking, using boot-
strapping techniques that account for the pos-
sible endogeneity of risk. We opt for an appli-
cation of this model to ten newly acceded EU
countries, since the transition from centrally
planned to market economies involved quite
uniform institutional, structural and manage-
rial changes in the banking sectors.
The results indicate that, on average, efficiency
and TFP have been improving, while competi-
tive conditions in the banking systems examined
have changed only slightly. Also, banking sec-
tor reform has a positive effect on bank effi-
ciency, which is partly channeled through the
effects of competition and risk-taking of banks.
Moreover, TFP gained ground toward the end
of the reform process, capturing the longer-term
effects of technological improvements. Finally,
the effect of capital risk and credit risk on bank
performance is usually negative, while increased
liquid assets seem to reduce bank performance.
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the so-called periphery during the period of
the gold standard were no rare event. They
were also not limited to the Ottoman Empire
and the Balkan countries. Prominent exam-
ples  outside  this  region  were  Peru,  Brazil,
Argentina and Portugal.
In this paper a distinction is drawn between
open and hidden, or veiled, government bank-
ruptcies. The latter occur if budget deficits are
covered by substantial money creation lead-
ing to inflation. In this case non-indexed gov-
ernment debt loses its value and is inflated
away. This path is not open, if the debt is not
denominated in the national but in a stable
foreign currency or in units of gold or silver.
This is usually the case for debt owed to for-
eigners.  But  sometimes  both  kinds  of  gov-
ernment bankruptcies occur together.
In the present paper several general quali-
tative hypotheses are tested for the Balkan
countries and the Ottoman Empire: First,
that the abolishment of fixed exchange rates
is  usually  the  consequence  of  budgetary
deficits leading to inflation. Second, that in
this  case  the  national  currency  becomes
undervalued.  Third,  that,  by  contrast,  an
overvaluation arises if only a mild inflation
is  caused  in  this  way,  so  that  the  fixed
exchange  rate  can  be  maintained.  And
fourth, that with an open bankruptcy relative
to foreign owed debt a kind of crisis devel-
ops which finally leads to an international
agreement reducing the amount of the debt,
or of the interest rate paid on it. Another
feature of this agreement may be the insti-
tution of more or less far-reaching foreign





Government bankruptcy of Balkan nations and their consequences for money and inflation 
before 1914: a comparative analysis
Working Paper No. 74
Peter Bernholz
Multiple potential payers and sovereign bond prices
Working Paper No. 75
Kim Oosterlinck and Loredana Ureche-Rangau
Sovereign bonds are usually priced under the
assumption that only the sovereign issuer is
responsible for their repayment. In some cases,
however, bondholders may legitimately expect
to be repaid by more than one agent. For exam-
ple, when a country breaks up, successor states
may agree to recognize their responsibility for
part of the debt. Other extreme events, such as
repudiations, may lead (and have led) bond-
holders to consider several bailout candidates
at the same point in time. This paper first dis-
cusses  the  theoretical  financial  implications
stemming from an infrequent and challenging
situation,  namely  the  existence  of  multiple
potential  payers.  Then,  through  a  historical
precedent, the 1918 Russian repudiation, the
paper confirms that the existence of multiple
potential  payers  has  a  diversification  effect
which lowers the volatility of the bond price and
increases its value. These results are strength-
ened by a comparison with a closely related
standard case of default.
Our results also show that the debate on the
role  of  institutional  interventions,  especially
operated by the IMF, during financial crisis
caused by sovereigns stopping their debt serv-
ice, is far from being closed. These interven-
tions indeed may induce some moral hazard
both in debtor and creditor attitude towards
risk but they also may allow a certain diversifi-
cation of risk sources that maintains bond prices
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single potential payer.
This comparison of repudiated and defaulted
bonds opens a more general question regarding
the way financial markets perceive different
events. Looking at our results, one could then
even wonder if, in the end, a political revolution
is not considered by financial markets as being
more likely to be reversed than an economic cri-
sis. One can indeed imagine that revolutions,
state disintegration or political regime changes
can be very sudden, whereas rebuilding a coun-




The banking sector and the Great Depression in Bulgaria, 1924-1938: interlocking and 
financial sector profitability
Working Paper No. 76
Kiril Danailov Kossev
The economic narratives of Southeast Europe
during the first part of the 20th century are cur-
rently being re-written. A story of failed indus-
trialisation and delayed modernisation during
the Interwar period has dominated since the
pioneering  work  of  Gerschenkron,  but  not
enough aggregate data are available to see this
as the only interpretation. In particular, vir-
tually nothing is known about the financial sys-
tem.  This paper has two aims. First, it looks at
the banking sector in Bulgaria between 1924
and 1938. We provide new data for the 1920s
rise and the 1930s decline of the Bulgarian
banking sector and we evaluate its potential
contribution to Bulgarian economic growth. In
the second part, we discuss different explana-
tions for the widespread collapse of commer-
cial banks after the onset of the Great Depres-
sion. Relying on a new data set for over 100
Bulgarian commercial banks, we show that tra-
ditional explanations for the collapse of Euro-
pean commercial banks in the 1930s (based on
the  default  of  risky  loans  and  falling  asset
prices due to deflation) need to be comple-
mented by the pernicious effects of widespread
insider lending in the Bulgarian case. We con-
clude that insider lending was the single most
important factor behind the demise of the pri-
vate  banking  system  after  the  onset  of  the
Depression.
The regulation and supervision of the Belgian financial system (1830-2005)
Working Paper No. 77
Erik Buyst and Ivo Maes
This paper provides an overview of the regula-
tion and supervision of the Belgian financial
system from the creation of Belgium in 1830 to
the early 21st century. After severe crises in
1838 and 1848, the National Bank of Belgium
was established in 1850. The Great Depression
and the bankruptcies of the 1930s led to major
reforms, increasing the role of the government
in the financial sector. A Decree of August 1934
required the so-called mixed banks to be split
up into two separate institutions: a pure deposit
bank  and  a  holding  company.  Separating
deposit-taking from the acquisition of shares
restricted the leverage of the banking sector. A
Decree of July 1935 established the Banking
Commission. This institution had the power to
require banks to maintain a liquidity ratio and
a solvency ratio. In the post-war period, reforms
in the institutional framework of banking super-
vision were not driven by crises, like in the inter-
war period, but by changes in the financial land-
scape, especially an increasing role for market
forces. In line with the despecialisation process,
the responsibilities of the Banking Commission
were gradually extended. In 1990, it was trans-
formed into the Banking and Finance Commis-
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ance Supervision Office, creating the Banking,
Finance and Insurance Commission. Moreover,
at the turn of the millennium, the role of the





Banking transformation (1989-2006) in Central and Eastern Europe −
with special reference to Balkans
Working Paper No. 78
Stephan Barisitz
The paper provides an overview of the history
of banking transition (1989-2006) in 13 Central
and Eastern European countries (Belarus, Bul-
garia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Kazakhstan,  Poland,  Romania,  the  Russian
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia,
Ukraine  and  Uzbekistan)  -  with  particular
emphasis  on  the  four  Balkan  countries
included in this list.
In most countries, the 1990s were a decade of
major banking upheavals, turmoil and reform.
The turn of the millennium either featured sec-
tor consolidation or represented the culminat-
ing point of restructuring efforts. The first years
of the new millennium have generally featured
calmer, stronger and more open banking sec-
tors  than  the  1990s.  Two  “banking  reform
waves” are distinguished, salient features of
which all countries (need to) run through in
order to mature. The first reform wave imme-
diately follows the collapse of communism, and
includes liberalization measures, up-front reha-
bilitation  and  initial  efforts  at  privatization
(often  “surface  privatization”).  The  macro-
economic situation temporarily stabilizes. But
underlying  distorted  incentives  favour  the
renewed accumulation of bad loans and set the
stage for new banking crises. Only the second
reform wave ushers in hard budget constraints,
in-depth privatization and “real” owners (which
are  mostly  ―but  not  exclusively―  foreign
direct investors). Banking regulation and super-
vision are tightened substantially.
Western European FDI has come to dominate
banking in all former socialist countries that
have either already become members of the
EU or are candidates or are involved in asso-
ciation agreements or the association process
with the prospect of eventual Union member-
ship – this latter category includes the entire
Balkan region. Recently, dynamic catching-
up  processes  have  gathered  momentum  in
many  countries.  Against  the  background  of
sustained economic recovery and expansion,
credit  booms  have  unfolded,  which  are  not
without risks.
Banking performance in Southeastern Europe during the interwar period
Working Paper No. 79
Žarko Lazarević
In the framework of the broader political and
economic  development  of  the  individual
states  on  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  this  paper
makes a comparison between the performance
of the banking sector in the newly established
Yugoslavia,  Romania,  Greece  and  Bulgaria.
The analysis is carried out on the sample of bal-
ance sheets for the most important joint stock
banking companies in the respective countries.
The analysis of the business performance was
carried out from 1928 and 1929. Those were
important years, since they represent the peak
of the activity and performance of banks in
region. In the following years, the whole region
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the  thirties  when  the  issue  of  banking  per-
formance was considered differently, mostly in
terms of the extent to which private banking sys-
tems could survive and the degree to which
state  intervention  was  necessary.  The  banks
analysed primarily had one thing in common
and that is the fact that they both shared the
same geographical area, that is Southeastern
Europe. Common patterns do exist in some seg-
ments of a certain shared feature. One of those
features is certainly the prevailing role of short-
term resources and a huge imbalance in inter-
est incomes and incomes from other bank trans-
actions. This fact testifies not only to high mar-
gins and effective interest rates, but also to a
limited portfolio in bank services and other
transactions, which was the consequence of the
social  and  economic  environment  in  which




How similar to South-Eastern Europe were the islands of Cyprus and Malta in 
terms of agricultural output and credit? Evidence during the interwar period
Working Paper No. 80
Alexander Apostolides
Cyprus and Malta have always been consid-
ered in economic history as similar to other
South-Eastern European states in perform-
ance and structure, despite the lack of sub-
stantial evidence to prove it. This paper uses
new evidence on the gross domestic product
of the islands during the interwar period in
order to evaluate the extent to which the eco-
nomic structure of the islands differed from
each other, as well as from other South-East-
ern European states.
For  the  sectors  calculated  (rental  income
from housing, construction, mining, agricul-
ture, forestry and fishing), the interwar period
(1921-1938) was one of positive growth for
both islands, contrary to the existing litera-
ture;  too  much  emphasis  is  placed  on  the
depressed state of the islands’ economies in
the 1930s and the real growth improvements
during the 1920s are ignored. However, since
income  prior  to  1921  is  unknown,  the
improvement in growth witnessed in the 1920s
might simply be due to a recovery from the
recession of 1920-1921.
Recovery after the Great Depression was slow
and uneven, possibly due to the lack of inde-
pendent economic policies; it is in the late
1930s  that  the  performance  of  the  islands
truly diverge from that of the Southern Euro-
pean states. This could be due to a limited
ability to exercise independent economic poli-
cies, since both Cyprus and Malta were British
colonies at the time; thus their ability to influ-
ence  their  economic  fortunes  during  the
period was constrained.
It is interesting to also note how the islands
exhibit slightly different  periods of growth
and  decline  from  South-Eastern  European
countries such as Greece and Bulgaria. Malta
has a shallow recession but is again in reces-
sion in 1936. Cyprus is affected by a severe
drought in 1930 -1932 that leads to output
falling below the 1921 level; however, recov-
ery was particularly strong at the end of the
1930s. Although both islands show signs of
slow structural change, their economies are
not transformed until after the Second World
War.
In terms of economic structure, the islands
also seem to differ from the stylised Southern
European typology. Malta is an exception due
to the very high urbanisation of its economy.
Its economic fortunes were explicitly linked to
the British navy’s presence on the island and
thus its income was also influenced by global
political events. It is no surprise that Cyprus,
being  geographically  closer  to  continental
Southern  European  States,  shows  an  eco-
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Greece and Turkey. However, despite some
similarities, there are again significant dif-
ferences:  the  Cypriot  economy  was  not  as
reliant on one staple product for its foreign
exchange and remained more open to world
trade  throughout  the  interwar  period−as
colonies with limited ability to exercise inde-
pendent economic policy, the islands did not
initiate  extensive  protectionist  measures.
Overall, despite their differences, some ten-
tative suggestions on the advantages and dis-
advantages of being independent during the




Stabilisation policies in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia during communism’s terminal years: 
1980s economic visions in retrospect
Working Paper No. 81
Roumen Avramov and Dragana Gnjatović
In  the  course  of  the  1980s,  Bulgaria  and
Yugoslavia faced severe economic crises gen-
erated in different political contexts but shar-
ing common features and outcomes. For both
countries, those disorders were not simply
events  related  to  habitual  macroeconomic
imbalances. They bore the seals of a fin de
regime  and  of  the  ultimate  exhaustion  of
long-standing societal and economic models.
Indeed, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia represented
archetypes  of  the  post-war  communist
extremes. The former was the most orthodox
Soviet ally, copying in detail the features of
its planning infrastructure. The latter, in turn,
symbolized  for  decades  the  “revisionist”
approach to economic policy and successfully
played  in  the  no  man’s  land  between  the
Communist block and Western democracies.
In this paper, we adopt a comparative view of
the  stabilization  policies  designed  and
implemented in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia dur-
ing the fatal economic crises of their regimes
in the late 1980s. The role of the IMF can be
better  highlighted  by  comparing  “with
(Yugoslavia) – without (Bulgaria)” scenarios
in  a  communist  context.  The  authorities'
views  are  discussed  and  newly  accessible
archival evidence is presented in the case of
Bulgaria.  The  ruling  elites’  vision  is  con-
fronted by that of critical professionals, thus
permitting a retrospective assessment of the
conceptual readiness of the society for the
forthcoming transition to a market economy
in the early 1990s.
The evolution of Bulgarian banks’ efficiency during the twenties: A DEA approach
Working Paper No. 82
Nikolay Nenovsky, Martin Ivanov and Gergana Mihaylova
This paper studies the dynamics of bank effi-
ciency in Bulgaria in 1924 and 1929. In so
doing,  several  similarities  in  response  are
detected, related mainly to the reaction of
different type of banks to the financial crisis
and financial stabilization. Official bank bal-
ance sheets and the profit and loss statements
of nearly 70 Bulgarian credit institutions are
used.  After  their  classification  into  sub-
groups, different variations of dynamic envel-
opment analysis (DEA), and more particu-
larly  the  intermediation  approach,  are
applied to the banks’ financial positions. The
DEA  allows  us  to  overcome  several  defi-
ciencies associated with traditional account-
ing measures of bank efficiency – an advan-
tage that has made DEA very popular in the
recent  literature.  To  our  knowledge,  this
method has not been applied so far to his-
torical data.
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pendence  in  1923,  there  were  no  foreign
exchange reserves, no central bank and little
human capital to allow economic recovery and
the creation of a strong financial system. The
adoption of a rational approach to finance by
the young Republic prevented a banking or
financial crisis as the lack of capital was man-
aged successfully. With increased emphasis on
liberalisation policies during the 1950s, pub-
lic banks extended their leading role in the
financial system.
In the 1960s, a semi-socialist system of plan-
ning was successfully applied to the Turkish
economy and banking was shaped by “five-
year plans”. Unfortunately, the oil crises of
the 1970s took away all hope for the emer-
gence of strong private banks. After the bal-
ance  of  payment  crises  at  the  end  of  the
1970s, liberalisation allowed the free setting
of deposit and credit rates in support of mar-
ket discipline. The second half of the 1980s
was marked by private banks beginning to
acquire a market share.
The  1990s  may  be  described  as  the  “lost
years” of banking, not only because of the
1994 banking crisis, but also because of a lack
of  commitment  to  social  welfare  and  eco-
nomic re-structuring, as the losses of public
banks rose to unbearable amounts and fiscal
deficits led to significant crowding out so that
the banking system fell again into another cri-
sis in 2001. Since then, the Turkish banking
system has been recovering from the crises
and performing re-structuring. The adoption
of  European  standards  is  almost  complete





Banking in Turkey: history and evolution
Working Paper No. 83
Y￼ksel G￶rmez
Banking and finance in South-Eastern Europe: the Albanian case
Working Paper No. 84
Kliti Ceca, Kelmend Rexha and Elsida Orhan
This paper aims to present the main devel-
opments of banking and finance in Albania in
a historical perspective. After the fall of the
communist  regime  in  1989,  the  Albanian
banking sector was still underdeveloped and
centrally planned. The reform process con-
sisted in the establishment of a two-tier bank-
ing  system,  the  privatization  of  the  state-
owned banks, the introduction of a new reg-
ulatory regime and the entry of foreign banks.
The pyramid schemes phenomenon in 1997
and the deposit crises in 2002 were the main
difficulties the country had to face. During
recent years, the level of financial interme-
diation has increased significantly due to a
rise in customers’ confidence in banks, ade-
quate  legal  protection  of  lenders  and  the
introduction of modern credit risk manage-
ment  techniques.  This  historical  overview
might help to better understand not only the
great difficulties and obstacles the country
faced in the past, but also the successes it
achieved. It is widely known that the financial
system, especially the banking sector, is con-
sidered as very important as it serves as a cat-
alyst for the economic development of the
country. And this is because financial depth
determines economic growth. The paper also
highlights  the  future  challenges  that  the
Albanian financial system will face within the
context of the country’s European integration
and the EU harmonization of the financial
policies. 
4.DOKIMIA ERGASIAS :￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1  09-11-09  10:37  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 90Financial crises are an old problem going back
to  the  origins  of  capitalism.  However,  the
topic is an important one today for emerging
market economies in the current era of glob-
alization. It was similarly important in the ear-
lier era of globalization from 1870 to 1914.
However, the incidence and virulence of crises
was much less in the earlier era for the emerg-
ing  countries  than  is  the  case  today.
Advanced countries in recent years have expe-
rienced few crises, but they experienced many
more in the course of their economic devel-
opment,  when  they  were  emerging  market
economies. During the interwar period and
again in the 1970s, 1980s and the early 1990s,
advanced countries experienced both currency
and banking crises. This paper briefly revisits
the evidence on the incidence and severity of
different varieties of crises within the context
of globalization pre-1914 and from 1980 to the
present,  drawing  on  my  earlier  work  with
Barry Eichengreen and Chris Meissner. I dis-
cuss  the  determinants  of  emerging  market
crises from the perspective of the recent bal-
ance sheet approach to financial crises which
builds on the earlier literatures of banking
crises, debt crises, and first and second gen-
eration currency crises. This approach puts the
importance of financial development on cen-
tre stage. I then consider the ‘deep’ institu-
tional determinants of financial development
and their relationship with financial stability.





Growing up to financial stability
Working Paper No. 85
Michael D. Bordo
Banking and central banking in pre-WWII Greece: money and currency developments
Working Paper No. 86
Sophia Lazaretou
In the gold standard era, central banks acted
as the guardians of the gold standard, currency
managers and providers of war finance. Lais-
sez-faire rules secured monetary and financial
stability. In the interwar years, however, the
new orthodoxy of monetary policy implemen-
tation turned its attention to the founding of
‘real’ central banks in each country, in order to
use monetary policy tools effectively to protect
economies  from  the  serious  monetary  and
financial disorders that followed the aftermath
of the war. This paper aims to trace the history
of banking and central banking in pre-WWII
Greece.
First, we study the country’s financial struc-
ture and the process of financial development.
Several indices of financial development are
assessed and their evolution studied. Financial
depth increased at the turn of the 19th century
and expanded further till the early 1920s. How-
ever, on the basis of the behavioural indices
examined,  banks  are  shown  to  have  been
poorly managed on both the asset and the lia-
bility sides of the balance sheet. They also suf-
fered from capital inadequacy and were highly
leveraged. Second, an analysis of the compo-
sition of the money supply and its long-run
behaviour suggests that monetary base varia-
tions  were  the  proximate  determinants  of
money supply movements, whereas the money
multiplier had only a limited impact. Third,
central banking in pre-WWII Greece is viewed
with regard to the monetary policy strategy, the
monetary policy implementation framework
and state interventions. The balance sheet of
the Bank of Greece reveals an excessive focus
on the chosen monetary policy strategy of a
currency peg. Domestic credit was controlled
via  liquidity-providing  standing  facilities,
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Bank’s considerable involvement in govern-





Monetary policy objectives and instruments used by the 
privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia (1884-1914)
Working Paper No. 87
Milan Sojic and Ljiljana Djurdjevic ’
In the first thirty years of its operations, the
three key functions of the Privileged National
Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia (1884-1914)
were those of a creditor of the economy, issuer
of currency and banker to the central govern-
ment. At the time of its founding, the National
Bank of Serbia was one of 16 central banks
operating and its activities were more or less the
same as the activities of other central banks.
Pursuant to the 1883 Law on the National Bank,
its objective was “to promote trade and eco-
nomic activity by providing access to cheap cap-
ital and viable credit arrangements”. This was
stipulated  in  all  pieces  of  legislation  on  the
National Bank until the enactment of the 1920
Law. Until the end of World War I, the National
Bank’s  primary  activity  was  the  extension  of
credit. The discount rate of the National Bank
was always lower than market interest rates, indi-
cating that the Bank did not use rates to ease the
pressure on gold reserves, but rather to encour-
age commercial banking and create conditions
for the economic development of the country.
In its function as an issuing institution, the
National Bank was responsible for stability of
the national currency – the issuing of banknotes
and maintenance of convertibility of the dinar
into gold and silver at fixed parity. The first
gold-backed 100-dinar banknotes were issued
immediately  after  the  establishment  of  the
National Bank in 1884. However, as they could
not be retained in circulation, silver-backed 10-
dinar banknotes were issued in 1885, marking
the introduction of bimetallism. This remained
the basis of Serbia’s monetary system all the
way through to the end of World War I.
The National Bank’s efforts to sustain the value
of  domestic  currency  often  clashed  with  its
function as banker to central government. Due
to the need to finance budget deficits, the gov-
ernment resorted to substantial borrowing from
the National Bank. In 1898 government debt
with the National Bank was nearly three times
higher than the debt of all credit bureaus taken
together. In 1903, the relationship between the
National Bank and the government was set on
new foundations. Strict supervision of budget
revenue and expenditures was implemented by
the government and its borrowing from the
National Bank, from 1903 until the outbreak of
World War I, was temporary and short-term in
character. As a result, the National Bank of
Serbia was able to implement both credit pol-
icy measures and those aimed at stabilizing the
dinar with more success.
The National Bank of Romania and its issue of banknotes:
between necessity and possibility, 1880-1914
Working Paper No. 88
George Virgil Stoenescu, Elisabeta Blejan, Br￮ndușa Costache and Adriana Iarovici Aloman
From a historical perspective, the issue of bank-
notes is the overriding task of a central bank.
Starting from this prerequisite, we look at the
National Bank of Romania’s activity from 1880
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issue  in  modernising  Romanian  society  and
making it a part of the economic system pre-
vailing in Europe.
The paper analyses the level of cover respect-
ing the National Bank of Romania’s notes and
the avenues used by the central bank to put its
banknotes into circulation. Developments in
discounting commercial paper, loans backed
by government paper and the trade in drafts
and  remittances  provide  the  most  relevant
evidence on the National Bank of Romania’s
support  for  the  promotion  of  commercial,
industrial and agricultural activities via the
establishment of a nationwide credit system
and to the Romanian government’s endeav-
our  to  put  in  place  a  modern  institutional
infrastructure. The National Bank of Roma-
nia’s responses to the episodes of crisis in
1884, 1899-1900 and 1907 were of paramount
importance.
The National Bank of Romania was success-
ful in managing the seigniorage right and thus
provided  the  Romanian  economy  and  the
society as a whole with some of the financial
means for modernisation. At the same time,
maintaining  a  stable,  trustworthy  domestic
currency  ensured  that  Romania’s  economy





Institutions matter: financial supervision architecture, central bank and path dependence. 
General trends and the South-Eastern European countries
Working Paper No. 89
Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn
The  current  worldwide  wave  of  reforms  in
supervisory architectures leaves the interested
bystander with a great number of questions
regarding the true determinants of, and moti-
vations behind, these changes. These questions
are all the more justified because the emerg-
ing institutional structures are certainly not
homogeneous across countries.
An answer to these questions requires a politi-
cal economy approach. Indeed, financial super-
visory reform is a political process which involves
many stakeholders: the political class, the cen-
tral bank, the supervised entities, as well as the
customers of the financial services. So the all-
encompassing  question  is:  which  considera-
tions and views prevail in the end in the deci-
sion-making process, and to what extent are
the decision-makers taking into account the
views of these different classes of stakeholders
when deciding on a reform of the supervisory
structures.
We propose a path dependent approach to ana-
lyze the evolution of the financial supervisory
architecture, focusing on the institutional role
of the central bank, and then apply our frame-
work to describe the institutional settings in a
selected sample of countries. The policymaker
who decides to maintain or reform the super-
visory architecture is influenced by the existing
institutional setting in a systematic way: the
more the central bank is actually involved in
supervision, the less likely it is that a more con-
centrated supervisory regime will emerge, and
vice versa (path dependence effect).
We test the path dependence effect describing
and evaluating the evolution and the present
state of the architecture of six national super-
visory  regimes  in  South-Eastern  Europe
(SEE): Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania,
Serbia,  and  Turkey.  The  study  of  the  SEE
countries confirms the postulated role of the
central bank in the institutional setting. In five
cases the high involvement of the central bank
in  supervision  is  correlated  with  a  multi-
authorities regime, while in one case a high
degree of financial supervision unification is
related to low central bank involvement.
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8 MAY AND 5 JUNE 2008
The Governing Council of the ECB decides
that the minimum bid rate on the main refi-
nancing operations and the interest rates on
the marginal lending facility and the deposit
facility will remain unchanged at 4.00%, 5.00%
and 3.00% respectively.
3 JULY 2008
The Governing Council of the ECB decides to
increase the minimum bid rate on the main
refinancing operations by 25 basis points to
4.25%, starting from the operation to be set-
tled on 9 July 2008. In addition, it decides to
increase by 25 basis points the interest rates on
both the marginal lending facility and the
deposit facility, to 5.25% and 3.25% respec-
tively, with effect from 9 July 2008.
7 AUGUST, 4 SEPTEMBER AND 2 OCTOBER 2008
The Governing Council of the ECB decides
that the minimum bid rate on the main refi-
nancing operations and the interest rates on
the marginal lending facility and the deposit
facility will remain unchanged at 4.25%,
5.25% and 3.25% respectively.
8 OCTOBER 2008
The Governing Council of the ECB decides to
decrease the minimum bid rate on the main
refinancing operations by 50 basis points to
3.75%, starting from the operations to be set-
tled on 15 October 2008. In addition, it decides
to decrease by 50 basis points the interest rates
on both the marginal lending facility and the
deposit facility, to 4.75% and 2.75% respec-
tively, with immediate effect.
Moreover, the Governing Council decides
that, as from the operation settled on 15 Octo-
ber, the weekly main refinancing operations
will be carried out through a fixed-rate tender
procedure with full allotment at the interest
rate on the main refinancing operation (i.e.
currently to 3.75%). Furthermore, as of 9
October, the ECB will reduce the corridor of
standing facilities from 200 basis points to 100
basis points around the interest rate on the
main refinancing operation. Therefore, as of
9 October, the rate of the marginal lending
facility will be reduced from 100 to 50 basis
points above the interest rate on the main refi-
nancing operation, i.e. currently to 4.25%, and
the rate of the deposit facility will be increased
from 100 to 50 basis points below the interest
rate on the main refinancing operation, i.e.
currently to 3.25%. The two measures will
remain in place for as long as needed, and at
least until the end of the first maintenance
period of 2009, on 20 January.
6 NOVEMBER 2008
The Governing Council of the ECB decides to
decrease the interest rate on the main refi-
nancing operations of the Eurosystem by 50
basis points to 3.25%, starting from the oper-
ations to be settled on 12 November 2008. In
addition, it decides to decrease by 50 basis
points the interest rates on both the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility, to
3.75% and 2.75% respectively, with effect
from 12 November 2008.
JANUARY-NOVEMBER 2008
With a view to supporting the normalisation of
the euro money market, the Governing Coun-
cil of the ECB decides to conduct supplemen-
tary open market operations, further to the
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2 JANUARY 2008
The  Greek  branch  of  the  Germany-based
"Deutsche Bank AG" commences operations.
22 JANUARY 2008
– Authorisation  is  given  for  the  merger  by
absorption of Proton Financial Consultants,
Technology and IT SA by Proton Bank SA.
– The  Cyprus-based  Costanus  Limited  is
authorised to acquire a qualifying holding in
Aegean Baltic Bank SA.
4 FEBRUARY 2008
– Increase in the upper limits of the financial
penalties that may be imposed by the Bank of
Greece on supervised entities and setting dead-
lines for the payment of fines imposed by the
Bank of Greece.
– Codification and amendment of the provi-
sions of existing Bank of Greece decisions on
the criteria and the procedure for the assess-
ment  of  credit  institutions'  applications  for
authorisation  to  establish  new  branches  in
Greece or abroad.
21 FEBRUARY 2008
Codification of the provisions on credit insti-
tutions’ reporting obligations (supervisory data
and other information) to the Bank of Greece
and definition of the persons that are consid-
ered as related parties and are thereby subject
to a specific supervisory regime.
22 FEBRUARY 2008
Amendment of Annex 4 "Prevention of money
laundering and terrorist financing" to Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2577/9 March 2006, re:
framework of operational principles and crite-
ria for the evaluation of the organisation and
Internal Control Systems of credit and financial
institutions, and relevant powers of their man-
agement bodies.
22 APRIL 2008
Setting of the framework governing the trans-
actions of credit institutions with the persons
that are considered related parties within the
meaning of Bank of Greece Governor's Act
2606/21.2.2008.
2 MAY 2008
– Clarification  of  the  provisions  of  Bank  of
Greece  Governor’s  Act  2501/31.10.2002  on
credit institutions’ requirement to provide infor-
mation to customers with respect to the terms
and conditions that govern their transactions.
– Extension  of  the  deadline  for  the  imple-
mentation of International Accounting Stan-
dards by credit cooperatives.
– Alpha Bank SA is authorised to establish 25
new branches in Albania.
12 ʜʑʥ 2008
– The period granted to ʤ.C. Ziraat Bankası
A.Ş. to commence operations is extended until
31.12.2008. 
– The  authorisation  for  the  conversion  of
Geniki Cards and Financial Services SA to a
credit company under the name SFS Hellasfi-
nance SA is revoked.
15 MAY 2008
A new Act of the Monetary Policy Council is
adopted, amending an earlier Act on the instru-
ments and procedures for the implementation
of monetary policy by the Bank of Greece.
19 MAY 2008
– Agricultural Bank of Greece SA is authorised
to participate in the increase of the share capi-
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acquire a qualifying holding in Hellenic Post-
bank SA.
– EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA is authorised to
acquire a qualifying holding in Hellenic Post-
bank SA.
26 JUNE 2008
– ICAP Group is recognised as an eligible
External  Credit  Assessment  Institution
(ECAI) whose credit assessments of Greek
non-financial  corporations  can  be  used  by
credit institutions for the purpose of calcu-
lating  the  capital  requirements  under  the
standardised approach.
– Emporiki Bank of Greece SA is authorised
to increase its qualifying holding in the Roma-
nia-based Emporiki Bank Romania SA.
– EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA is authorised to
increase its qualifying holding in its Amster-
dam-based subsidiary EFG New Europe Hold-
ing SA.
– Approval is given to the renaming of the rep-
resentative office of Banca del Gottardo SA to
BSI SA.
– The authorisation to the Manila-based Equi-
table PCI Bank to operate a representative
office in Greece is revoked.
21 JULY 2008
– Further  clarifications  are  given  on  the
application of the provisions regarding the
requirement on credit institutions to provide
information  to  customers  under  the  terms
and conditions that apply to their transac-
tions.
– The  Greek  branch  of  Cetelem  bank  is
renamed to BNP Paribas Personal Finance.
26 AUGUST 2008
National Bank of Greece SA is authorised to
establish five new branches in Albania.
15 SEPTEMBER 2008
–Approval is given to the renaming of the Ameri-
can Bank of Albania – Greek Branch to Intesa
Sanpaolo Bank of Albania – Greek Branch.
– Approval is given to the renaming of the rep-
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DECISIONS OF THE BANK OF GREECE
BANK OF GREECE GOVERNOR'S ACT 2602/4 FEB-
RUARY 2008
Raising the upper limits of the financial penal-
ties that may be imposed by the Bank of Greece
on supervised entities and setting deadlines for
the payment of fines imposed by the Bank of
Greece
Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2602/4 Feb-
ruary 2008 raises the upper limits of the
administrative sanctions that it can impose on
banks and other supervised entities, under its
Statute which has the force of law.
In more detail, the new Act increases the
upper limits as follows:
• from ᾬ8,804,108 to ᾬ20,000,000 for the
penalty in the form of a non-interest bear-
ing deposit with the Bank of Greece
imposed in cases where the amount of the
violation cannot be determined (a penalty
which essentially translates into lost inter-
est income, depending mainly on the
opportunity cost of alternative holdings);
• from ᾬ880,441 to ᾬ2,000,000, the lump
sum fine in favour of the Greek State; and
• from ᾬ1,467,351 to ᾬ3,000,000, for the
penalty that can be imposed in the event of
repeated violation.
These penalties may be combined with other
administrative sanctions and corrective meas-
ures, as laid down by law.
The adjustment of the above mentioned lim-
its is aimed to ensure harmonisation with
those applying to the other penalties that the
Bank of Greece can impose according to the
legislation in force, for violations connected to
the provision of investment services (Law
3606/2007), and to update the amounts taking
into consideration the growth of banking
aggregates and transactions in the period since
the limits were first specified.
BANK OF GREECE GOVERNOR'S ACT 2603/4 FEB-
RUARY 2008
Criteria and procedure for the assessment by the
Bank of Greece of credit institutions' applica-
tions for authorisation to establish new branches
in Greece or abroad
BANK OF GREECE GOVERNOR'S ACT 2604/4 FEB-
RUARY 2008
Acquisition by credit institutions of a qualifying
holding in financial corporations
These two Acts (2603 and 2604) codify and
amend the provisions of existing relevant deci-
sions of the Bank of Greece (Decision of the
Monetary and Credit Matters Committee No.
505/8/23 July 1992 and Decision of the Bank-
ing and Credit Committee No. 80/15/29 August
2000, as currently in force) requiring credit
institutions to seek prior authorisation from
the Bank of Greece for: (i) any extension of a
bank's branch network and (ii) any acquisition
of a "qualifying holding" (10% and more of the
capital) in a financial corporation.
These new Acts simplify the application of
assessment procedures by introducing an auto-
mated authorisation process based on mini-
mum criteria, with the aim of ensuring the
required supervisory monitoring while reduc-
ing administrative costs. These criteria mainly
relate to:
• the level of the capital adequacy ratio
(CAR), assessed on the basis of quantita-
tive and qualitative criteria referring to all
the risk exposures of the credit institution
(Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2595/
20.8.2007, Pillar II); and
• in the case of an intended expansion of net-
work, the level of non-performing loans
(NPL) assessed against the targeted NPL
ratiosetbytheBankofGreeceforeachbank.
BANK OF GREECE GOVERNOR'S ACT 2606/21 FEB-
RUARY 2008
Codification of the provisions on credit institu-
tions’ supervisory reporting obligations to the
Bank of Greece – Definition of the persons that
are considered as related parties
Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2606/21 Feb-
ruary 2008 determines and consolidates into a
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single legal act credit institutions' supervisory
reporting obligations to the Bank of Greece.
This facilitates credit institutions in fulfilling
their obligations under the current regulatory
supervision framework and at the same time
enhances the efficiency of supervision by the
Bank of Greece.
In more detail, by this Act, which replaces Bank
of Greece Governor's Act 2563/19 July 2005:
a. credit institutions' reporting for the purpose
of computation of capital requirements,
own funds and capital adequacy is adjusted
to the requirements of the new banking law
(Law 3601/1 August 2007) and the relevant
decisions of the Bank of Greece. Supervi-
sory reporting shall be submitted using the
Common Reporting (COREP) templates
prepared by the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors (CEBS);
b. the obligation for financial reporting in line
with the said COREP templates is estab-
lished;
c. additional specific reporting is required in
respect of:
(i) certain investment products and new bank-
ing instruments;
(ii)persons considered, for supervisory pur-
poses, as related parties, as defined by the
Bank of Greece under authorisation of Law
3601/1 August 2007.
This Act is the final step, also at the technical
level, towards the implementation of Basel II
framework and at the same time brings the
supervisory reporting regime up to date.
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